Old Dominion University

ODU Digital Commons
School of Public Service Theses & Dissertations

School of Public Service

Summer 8-2020

Governance Impact on Public-Private Partnerships for Member
Countries of the World Bank Group
Kouliga Koala
Old Dominion University, kkoal001@odu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/publicservice_etds
Part of the International Relations Commons, Public Administration Commons, and the Public Policy
Commons

Recommended Citation
Koala, Kouliga. "Governance Impact on Public-Private Partnerships for Member Countries of the World
Bank Group" (2020). Doctor of Philosophy (PhD), Dissertation, School of Public Service, Old Dominion
University, DOI: 10.25777/dmzz-gf28
https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/publicservice_etds/47

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Public Service at ODU Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in School of Public Service Theses & Dissertations by an authorized
administrator of ODU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@odu.edu.

GOVERNANCE IMPACT ON PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS FOR MEMBER
COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD BANK GROUP

by
Kouliga Koala
B.A. May 2012, Canisius College
M.A. May 2016, Minnesota State University, Mankato

A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of
Old Dominion University in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND POLICY
OLD DOMINION UNIVERSITY
August 2020

Approved by
Meagan M. Jordan (Chair)
Joshua M. Steinfeld (Member)
John R. Lombard (Member)
Norou Diawara (Member)

ABSTRACT
GOVERNANCE IMPACT ON PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS FOR MEMBER
COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD BANK GROUP
Kouliga Koala
Old Dominion University, 2020
Chair: Dr. Meagan M. Jordan

Member countries of the World Bank Group (WBG) increasingly turn to public-private
partnerships (PPPs) to finance their transportation infrastructure projects due to the financial
burden of undertaking big projects on their own. The World Bank coordinates the PPPs between
investors and recipient countries. PPPs are expected to produce positive outcomes that respond to
policy objectives. However, the outcomes and benefits of PPPs not only depend on several
factors, but more importantly on how those factors interact with one another to yield the
expected outcomes. This dissertation has identified good governance, PPP governance, and PPP
outcome as the key concepts in the examination of the value that PPPs bring to countries that
receive transportation PPP contracts. Using secondary data, the study explores the relationships
between the three major concepts and assesses the possible mediating role of the internationally
recognized PPP practices on the relationship between good governance and PPP outcome. The
relationships are also examined for groups of countries based on their income level. The
dissertation uses the overarching theory of good governance to explore these relationships. The
dissertation analyzes the relationships using multivariate regression in the generalized structural
equation modeling (GSEM) in the STATA package. Most of the hypotheses set in the study were
supported. Recommendations are made to the World Bank and member countries to conduct
effective transportation PPP contracts. The contribution to theory and practice is discussed. A
framework for examining the relationships is provided.
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GLOSSARY, ABBREVIATIONS, AND ACRONYMS

PPPs: Public-private partnerships
PPP governance: The governance of PPPs comprises the stages of the PPP process including the
preparation stage, the procurement stage, and the contract management stage.
PPP governance main categories: The main categories include PPP preparation, PPP
procurement, and PPP contract management.
PPP preparation subcategories: The practices at the preparation stage
PPP procurement subcategories: The practices at the procurement stage
PPP contract management subcategories: The practices at the contract management stage
Country governance: Good governance at the country level
PPP outcome: The outcomes of the transportation PPP projects
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Purpose
Public-private partnerships (PPPs) are perceived as an effective tool to support
governments’ efforts in major infrastructure development (Flinders, 2005; Bojović, 2006;
Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff, 2011). Central to this dissertation is the understanding of three
major concepts with regards to the study of transportation PPPs in the context of the World Bank
Group: country governance, PPP governance, and PPP outcome. The purpose of the dissertation
is to study the relationships between the three concepts and examine whether PPP governance
mediates the relationship between country governance and PPP outcome. The relationships are
further examined by income level groups respective of the classification of countries by income
level. To conceptually ground this research, a PPP is defined as a form of cooperation between
public and private parties in the planning, construction, and exploitation of infrastructural
facilities in which the parties share or reallocate risks, costs, benefits, resources, and
responsibilities (Koppenjan, 2005). Good governance refers to the strengths of the institutions in
a country with regards to government actions and concerns for accountability, political stability,
effectiveness, the rule of law, and corruption. PPP governance refers to the application of
practices at the different stages of PPP contracts to maximize the likelihood of successful PPP
project outcomes. PPP outcome refers to how well PPP projects are executed with regards to the
established objectives, tasks, and responsibilities.
PPPs are contracts, agreements, or arrangements between governments and the private
sector for the construction of roads, highways, bridges, schools, and major facilities (Koppenjan,
2005; Bojović, 2006). Entering a partnership means that governments and private sector
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contractors share responsibility for the design, building, financing, maintenance, and operation of
the projects (Custos and Reitz, 2010; Greve and Hodge, 2013) on the principle of value for
money (VFM). The potential of VFM allows governments to achieve public infrastructure
development and relieves governments from budget and financial burden (Custos and Reitz,
2010; Siemiatycki and Farooqi, 2012; Siemiatycki, 2013; Soomro and Zhang, 2013; Forrer, Kee,
and Boyer, 2014; Soomro and Zhang, 2016). Partnerships are based on agreements and
arrangements on the various aspects of a PPP project. For, example, in transportation PPPs, the
private sector expects to recover the cost of investments through the institution of tolls and
payments (Custos and Reitz, 2010; Queiroz, Vajdic, and Mladenovic, 2013). Theoretically, the
use of partnerships in public service provision was advanced by the birth of ideas leading to the
new public management (NPM) movement in the 1990s (Osborne and Gaebler, 1993; Broadbent
and Laughlin, 2003). Governments in developed economies as well as in less developed
economies and international financial institutions then viewed PPPs as an alternative to
government financing.
Practically, while individual countries engage in PPPs at the national level, the World
Bank coordinates the public-private initiatives between stakeholders at the international level. As
a financial institution with expertise in financing and investment, the World Bank coordinates
and mediates the partnerships between donors and recipient countries. The World Bank is a
cooperative of 189 member-countries that connects private investments to the needs of
developing countries (The World Bank, 2018d). It provides financial and technical assistance in
the form of loans and grants and innovative knowledge sharing to developing countries. Over the
past few years, the assistance to PPP projects has substantially increased. The report of the
Private Participation in Infrastructure (PPI) showed that private investments through the World
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Bank in energy, transport, information and communication technologies (ICT) backbone, and
water infrastructure in low- and middle-income countries in 2018 reached US$43.5 billion for
the financing of 164 projects (The World Bank; 2019a). Transportation which includes airports,
ports, railways, and roads, accounted for 57 percent of total investments (The World Bank;
2019). The larger investment in transportation showed the eagerness of developing economies to
improve their transportation capacity by embracing the PPP approach led by the World Bank. It
is important to note that some countries received larger investments than others. For example, the
BRICS which include Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa received the bigger piece of
the cake in the 2018’s assistance.
With growing investments in PPPs, standards and internationally recognized practices
were developed to guide recipient countries in the PPP process. Donors and the World Bank
expect certain conditions and standards to be met by recipient countries those conditions are
viewed as prerequisites for effective management and for the recovery of investment cost in the
transportation infrastructure. Part of the World Bank’s responsibilities is to set standards and
define practices from the preparation to the closing of PPP contracts. The enforcement of
standards and practices is viewed as the ability of governments and their agencies to adhere to
the principles of transparency, accountability and participation, fairness, and orientation towards
the public interest (Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff, 2011; Torchia and Calabrò, 2018) when PPPs
are prepared, procured, and managed. Governments are expected to show that the conditions and
standards are met or that prescribed steps are taken to create such conditions. For example,
effective PPP governance enhances the risk assessment, which in turn diminishes the likelihood
of negative political behaviors (Johnston and Gudergan, 2007). In other words, countries are
expected to adopt governance with regards to the stages and practices of PPPs. Such governance
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is referred to as PPP governance. PPP governance encompasses three stages in the PPP lifecycle:
the preparation stage, the procurement stage, and the management stage (Hueskes, Verhoest, and
Block, 2017). There are good practices associated with each of the three stages of the PPP
process. Thus, PPP governance is the government capacity to properly implement internationally
recognized PPP good practices (The World Bank, 2018a) by creating and empowering agencies
to assume the responsibilities. Therefore, the examination of the effect of PPP governance on
PPP outcome is of utmost importance in this dissertation.
More studied than PPP governance is good governance which became the necessary
condition for giving assistance to countries in need. Countries that request the assistance of the
World Bank are required to show some commitments to good governance. The probability of
risks and losses are minimized when good governance factors are met. It is believed that
countries with good governance are more likely to facilitate the participation of the private sector
in the PPP process. This also means that market principles are considered and integrated in the
decision-making and planning process of those countries. The World Bank in the 1990s defined
good governance as “…the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a county’s
economic and social resources for development” (IBRD, 1992). The approach of national
government to the use of economic and social resources becomes the measure of conditions that
the World Bank and its financial stakeholders consider when making decisions on the PPP
contracts (IBRD, 1992; IBRD, 1994). The most frequently used indicators of good governance
include voice and accountability, rule of law, control of corruption, political stability and lack
terrorism, government effectiveness, and regulatory quality.
Good governance is necessary for PPPs because strong democratic institutions create the
necessary conditions for partnerships (Agnafors, 2013; Casady, Eriksson, Levitt, and Scott,
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2019). Countries with strong institutions tend to be more effective in PPP projects because of
their ability to create the conditions that facilitate the private sector growth (Cheung, Chan, and
Kajewski, 2012; Matos, Dewulf, and Mahalingam, 2012; Percoco, 2014; Reynaers, 2014;
Panayides, Parola and Lam, 2015; Pusok, 2016; Osei-Kyei and Chan, 2017; The World Bank,
2018b). These countries are more effective in PPP projects because their institutional structure
allows them to make reforms or create specialized units to govern the entire PPP process (Unit,
2011) and therefore lead to better outcome of the PPP investment projects (Anonymous, 2000;
Anonymous, 2015; Galilea and Medda, 2009; Sultana, 2012; Agnafors, 2013; Osei-Kyei and
Chan, 2017; Keping, 2018). Because of the strong focus on good governance as a prerequisite for
investments, this dissertation examines its influence on the outcome of transportation PPP
projects.
In this study, PPP outcome refers to how effectively the objectives of the PPP projects
are achieved, how effectively the World Bank assumes its share of responsibilities throughout
the contract lifecycle, and how effectively the borrowing country governments and their
implementing agencies perform or comply with practices (Greve and Hodge, 2013; IEG, 2019).
In short, this dissertation focuses on transportation PPP contracts awarded by the World
Bank to its member countries. The purpose is to examine the relationships between country
governance factors and the outcome of transportation PPP projects outcome. In doing so, the
dissertation seeks to address the role of PPP governance in the relationships. Comprehensively,
the dissertation explores the relationship between country governance, PPP governance, and PPP
outcome. The study of the relationships is important because it adds a new dimension to the
literature on PPPs. More specifically, the dissertation examines the relationship between PPP
outcome and the standards or practices that the World Bank encourages its member countries to
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adhere to. It also examines the relationship between country governance and PPP governance.
Using new data, the dissertation examines the relationships between good governance, PPP
governance and PPP outcome. By using more reliable data, this dissertation establishes more
reliable relationships.
Governance Indicator Data
The World Bank values measurable results and tracks governance and project outcome
scores to evaluate the success, failures, and lessons learned (The World Bank, 2018b). This
tracking includes collecting information from government compliance to good practices scores.
Independent groups collect data on the World Bank’s operations. This dissertation uses data from
the Procuring Infrastructure Public-Private Partnerships Report 2018 jointly produced by the
World Bank’s Infrastructure, PPPs and Guarantees (IPG) Group, and the Global Indicators
Group at the World Bank (The World Bank, 2018a). The report was designed both to help
governments improve their PPP regulatory quality based on internationally recognized good
practices for procuring PPPs and informing the policy debate and decision making (The World
Bank, 2018a). The report contains scores of PPP stages, scores of good practices at each stage,
and gross national income (GNI) scores for each country. No previous studies used the database
because no concise data on PPP governance existed until 2017.
The dissertation also uses data from Private Participation in Infrastructure (PPI)
reported by the Independent Evaluation Group (IEG, 2019a). The report contains outcome
ratings in sectors such as agriculture and rural development, global information or
communications technology, energy and mining, financial and private sector development,
transport, health, nutrition and population, social protection, environment, water, and financial
and private sector development. As stated earlier, the study focuses only on the outcome of
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transportation projects. The PPI data were widely used in previous studies (see Kirkpatrick et al.,
2006; Durakoğlu, 2011; Estache and Iimi, 2011; Chou, Tserng, Lin, and Yeh, 2012; Chen,
Wang, and Fang, 2014; Pérez-D’Oleo, Castro, Herraiz and Carpintero, 2015; Moszoro, Araya,
Ruiz Nunez, and Schwartz, 2015; Baker, 2016; Somma and Rubino, 2016).
Another source used in the dissertation is the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI).
The database contains estimates of six governance indicators including voice and accountability,
political stability, government effectiveness, control of corruption, rule of law, and regulatory
quality (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi, 2010). The WGI database was used in several studies
(See Pérez-D’Oleo et al., 2015; Wang, Liu, Xiong, and Song; 2019). The score of democracy
(political liberties and civil rights scores) from Freedom House (Freedom House, 2018) are used.
Research Questions
The research questions are based on two main takeaways from the extant literature. First,
the dissertation re-examines the influence of governance on PPP outcome because such
relationship was mischaracterized in the previous studies. For example, studies by Bota-Avram
(2014), D’Oleo et al. (2015), Sabry (2015), and Osei-Kyei and Chan (2017) found that good
governance indicators had a positive effect on the level of investment in PPP projects and
investment growth. While the studies found significant results, they referred to outcome as the
level or the number of PPP investments that countries received. Second, the extant literature does
not address PPP governance. Very few studies evaluated the relevance of PPP governance to the
success of PPP contracts. The lack of effective PPP governance was the reason for the report on
the capacity of countries on the PPP practices (The World Bank, 2018a). Thus, this dissertation
not only addresses the mischaracterized relationship between country governance and PPP
outcome, but also examines the relationship between PPP governance and PPP outcome. The
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dissertation claims that there exist some relationships between country governance, PPP
governance, PPP outcome. The overarching question is: Are there any relationships between
country governance, PPP governance, and PPP outcome? The relationships are expected to be
positive and statistically significant. Five main research questions are examined in the
dissertation:
Research question 1: Is there any relationship between country governance and the PPP
outcome in that country? The PPP outcome data used in the extant literature are not
reliable for examining such relationship because the number of projects was used as
outcomes. Contrary to the number of projects, the dissertation used outcome data that
measure different aspects or factors of PPP projects.
Research question 2: Is there any relationship between country governance and PPP
governance in that country? This relationship has not been explored in the literature. This
dissertation expects a positive relationship as one would expect effective country
governance to lead to effective governance of PPP projects.
Research question 3: Is there any relationship between PPP governance and PPP
outcome in that same country? The relationship between PPP governance with PPP
outcome is unexplored because of the lack of studies on PPP governance.
Research question 4: Does PPP governance mediate the relationship between country
governance and PPP governance? The exploration of the first three questions will allow
determining the mediating role of PPP governance.
Research question 5: What differences or similarities exist for countries based on
income-level considering the four previous research questions?
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This dissertation involves a mediation analysis and is the first to use PPP governance in
that context (See Figure 1). That is, given X the exogenous variable, M the mediator, and Y the
endogenous variable; X in this study refers to country governance, M refers to PPP governance,
and Y refers to outcome (Kenny, 2018). In the mediation analysis (Baron and Kenny, 1986), the
effect of the exogenous variable (X) directly on the endogenous variable (Y) becomes
significantly smaller in size relative to the effective size of the mediator on the endogenous
variable (Iacobucci, 2008).
Figure 1: General Mediation Framework

M
PPP governance

X

Country governance

Y
PPP outcome

Figure 1 is set up to show the relationships to be explored. It is an adaptation from the
mediation studies (see Baron and Kenny, 1986; Iacobucci, 2008; and Kenny, 2018). It shows the
four main relationships that this dissertation examines. First, it examines the relationship
between country governance and PPP outcome. Second, it examines the relationship between
country governance and PPP governance. Third, it examines the effects of PPP governance on
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PPP outcome. Fourth, it examines the mediating role of PPP governance on the relationship
between country governance and PPP outcome. The four main relationships are explored for
each of the income level groups.
Dissertation Preview
The remainder of the dissertation presents the literature review pertaining to the three
main concepts including good governance, PPP governance, and PPP outcome. The dissertation
breaks down the factors relevant to each of the three major concepts. The methods section which
follows the literature review describes the process used in the mediation analysis as well as the
multivariate regression used along with generalized structural equation modeling (GSEM). The
methods section also provides insights on data and the hypotheses that arise from the research
questions. In the third chapter, the dissertation presents the results and evaluates their statistical
and substantive significance. In the final chapter, the dissertation discusses the conclusion and
implication of the findings, provides recommendations, and explains the theoretical and practical
contributions.
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW
Chapter II is a review of the literature from three major perspectives. First, it presents a
review of good governance theory and its implications on developed and developing countries.
Second, the three stages of PPP process including the preparation, the procurement, and the
contract management are reviewed along with their impact on PPP outcomes. Third and lastly,
the six indicators of good governance are reviewed along with their impact on PPP outcome.
Governance, Good Governance, and Definitions
Governance, according to the Institute on Governance, is the way “…society or groups
within it organize to make decisions.” In other words, it is about how traditions, institutions, and
processes determine the exercise of power, how citizens are given a voice, and how decisions
take into account the public interest (Institute on Governance; Lynn Jr, Heinrich, and Hill
(2001)). For Lynn Jr, Heinrich, and Hill (2001), governance is “the means for achieving
direction, control and coordination of wholly or partially autonomous individuals or
organizational units on behalf of interests to which they jointly contribute’’ (p. 6). When it comes
to the relationship between the World Bank and recipient countries, the relationship can be
described as hierarchical from the perspective of governance. Governance is conceived at the
global and national levels whereby it is defined and contextualized. Politics then influences the
rules, regulations, and processes that define governance, which in turn determine the
management strategies used to achieve policy objectives (see Figure 2). From management
emerges the primary work, the outputs and results such as availability, quality, and cost of public
goods or services (see Figure 2). Last, the political assessment determines the motivation and
political support to achieving results.
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At the country level, good governance is determined by the economic, social, political, and
institutional conditions in that country. Kaufmann et al. (2010) defined governance as the
tradition and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised. They reveal three instances
that fall under this definition. First, they view governance as the process by which governments
are selected, monitored, and replaced (Kaufmann et al., 2010). Second, governance is the
capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies (Kaufmann et
al., 2010). Governance also includes the creation, execution, and implementation of activities
backed by the shared goals of citizens and organizations, which may or may not have formal
authority or policing power (Rosenau, 1992). Byman (2018) defines good governance as an
effective way of formulating and implementing state policies, including law and order and
programs designed to encourage popular welfare. As such, good governance at its core includes
the exercise of the rule of law, popular participation, and government accountability involving
both the state and civil society. Third, governance refers to the respect of citizens and the state
for the institutions that govern the economic and social interactions among them (Kaufmann et
al., 2010). Countries with systems that meet the definition are thought to exercise good
governance. Those countries are not only capable of maximizing their outcomes, but they are
more dynamic in coping with economic and financial crises (Gamberger and Smuc, 2013).
The good governance concept is built around effectiveness and efficiency, accountability and
transparency, equity, rule of law, and voice legitimacy, performance, fairness, and direction
(Graham et al., 2003). The players at the national level include the government, the private
sector, civil society, and media (Graham et al., 2003). The IRBD (1992) defines governance as
the way power is exercised in the management of a county’s economic and social resources
towards development. The World Bank 1992’s report identifies four major components of

13

governance including the public sector management, accountability, legal framework for
development, and transparency and information (IRBD, 1994). In the newer report of 1994, the
World Bank added participatory approaches to policy, program, and project design and
implementation to its definition of governance. The Ex-UN Secretary-General Koffi Annan
referred to good governance as the respect for human rights and the rule of law, strengthening
democratization, and promoting transparency and capability in public administration.
Keping (2018) defined good governance as the public administration process that maximizes
public interest. Good governance in that sense is a type of collaborative management of public
life performed by the state and the citizens. It is a new relationship between political state and
civil society. Keping (2018) argued that good governance theory should be composed of
legitimacy, transparency, accountability, rule of law, responsiveness, and effectiveness. Adrian
and Mabel (2016) argued that good governance means the presence of the rule of law and market
efficiency. The rule of law, of which depend peace and order, is the bedrock to achieving
economic growth as it improves trade and investment activities. Agnafors (2013) argued that an
acceptable definition of the quality of governance or good governance must be consistent with
the demands of a public ethos, the virtues of good decision making and reason giving, the rule of
law, efficiency, stability, and a principle of beneficence. For Rothstein (2014), the quality of
governance should be the opposite of corruption, which is impartiality. The lack of impartiality
means poor governance or favoritism in the system.
The good governance theory implies that a governance system can be poor. Poor governance
occurs when government officials fail to make a clear separation between what is public and
what is private but tend to divert public resources for private gain (IRBD, 1994). In other words,
corruption and bribery are examples of poor governance. Poor governance also occurs when a

14

government fails to establish a predictable framework of law and government behavior
conducive to development (IRBD, 1994). Poor governance is linked to civil wars, corruption and
a lack of economic development (Byman, 2018). There is also poor governance when the
government arbitrarily applies the rules and laws by abusing the powers. Excessive rules,
regulations, and licensing requirements are poor governance policies that can impede the
functioning of markets and encourage rent-seeking. When the priorities are inconsistent with
development, this indicates that there is a misallocation of resources. The use of extremely
narrow and non-transparent decision-making process is also an indicator of poor governance
(IRBD, 1994).
Good governance theory stipulates that a country’s development rests on how well the
institutional and legal framework allows for fair and transparent processes of decision making
conducive to effectiveness and efficiency in government operations. The relevance of good
governance becomes clear for PPPs which are being favored as a mechanism for infrastructure
development. In other words, the institutional environment considerably influences PPP
processes and project outcomes (Matos et al., 2012). Considering PPPs, governance is good
when a country government can make social, economic, and financial changes to integrate and
promote PPP initiatives. Institutional processes must be considerate of principles of private
investments into the government-led projects. The relationship between good governance and
PPPs are susceptible of influence in the hierarchical model of governance in Figure 2.
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Figure 2: Model of Governance
Global/National/cultural context

Political interests
Legislative choice

Governance Regimes

Management Strategies

Primary work and its results, outcomes

Political assessment
Source: A Complex Model of Governance--Lynn Jr, Heinrich, and Hill (2001).

The model in Figure 2 shows that there is a hierarchical approach to governance. This is
conceivable in the present study where the global context or the World Bank decisions on PPPs
surpasses those of national governments. The politics of those national governments and the
subsequent decision-making process such as rules, strategies, and outcomes are influenced by the
World Bank’s decisions.
Public-Private Partnerships: Merits and Challenges
The rationale for entering a PPP and procuring large infrastructure projects is VFM
(Siemiatycki and Farooqi, 2012; Vining and Boardman, 2008). The United Nations Secretariat

16

defines VFM as the “optimization of whole-life costs and quality needed to meet the user’s
requirements, while taking into consideration potential risk factors and resources available”
(Doing Business with the United Nations, 2015; p. 2). In general, the rationale is that
governments can achieve economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in their spending (NAO, 2017).
By economy, governments seek to minimize the cost of resources used in projects. Efficiency
means that the governments can achieve the objectives given a certain level of spending. By
effectiveness, the government assesses whether it is spending wisely according to expected
outcomes and actual outcomes (NAO, 2017). The rationale for PPPs is based on the idea that the
criteria of economy, efficiency, and effectiveness can be best achieved if the public and private
sector collaborate. Vining and Boardman (2008) states that the appropriate test of a successful
PPP project is whether the project has lower total costs, including production costs and all the
transaction costs and externalities associated with the project.
Given the rationale for VFM, PPPs have been defined in various ways to capture all the
aspects that would potentially lead to VFM. PPPs have been defined by the World Bank as a
“long-term agreement between the contracting authority and the private partner, for providing a
public asset or service, in which the private partner bears significant risk and management
responsibility, and remuneration is linked to performance” (The World Bank, 2017; p. 2).
Koppenjan (2005) defined PPPs as “a form of structured cooperation between public and private
partners in the planning or construction and exploitation of infrastructural facilities in which they
share or reallocate risks, costs, benefits, resources, and responsibilities” (p. 4). PPPs have been
defined as arrangements between governments and private sector entities for the purpose of
providing public infrastructure, community facilities, and related services (Bojović, 2006); or
any arrangement between the government and the private sector in which partially or
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traditionally public activities are performed by the private sector (Bansal, 2003). PPPs can lead
to management reform, problem conversion, moral regeneration, risk shifting, and power sharing
(McQuaid, 2000; Scharle, 2002) to achieve VFM.
These definitions have some implications for the rationale behind PPPs. First, in the
context of the World Bank, it implies that developing countries that do not have the financial
resources, the expertise, the capital, and the technological know-how will have access to them
through the private sector involvement. It further invokes the responsibilities and role of the
financial institutions including the World Bank in accompanying those countries. Jandhyala
(2016) argues that the involvement of multilateral development banks (MDBs) can lower PPP
project risks. They can do so through operational assistance to ensure well-reviewed project
contracts and by encouraging a greater level of supervision of a project implementation. Policy
dialogue is another channel to positively influence negotiations and help resolve project disputes
between client governments and their private sector partners. The participation of MDBs lowers
project risks and reduces the probability of cancelling projects. Jandhyala’s (2016) study of
2,117 infrastructure PPP projects in 45 developing countries from 1995 to 2009 shows that the
odds of project distress when MDBs participate is 50% lower than for projects without their
participation. Lee et al (2018) found that the involvement of MDBs can significantly increase the
success of projects in developing Asia. MDBs can play an important role in reducing funding
gaps for infrastructure and can facilitate regional cooperation for the provision of public goods
among neighboring countries. Nose (2014) argued that the involvement of international financial
institutions could significantly reduce the breach of contract risk as governments try to avoid
losing the reputation with the international community. In other words, yielding satisfactory
performance becomes an outcome measure of PPP projects. IEG (2019) measures the World
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Bank’s performance as “the extent to which the services provided by the Bank ensured quality at
entry of the project and supported effective implementation through appropriate supervision
towards the achievement of development outcomes” ( IEG, 2019; p.17).
In terms of performance, the borrower country is also expected to be on top of the whole
PPP process (Lee et al, 2018). IEG (2019) measured the borrower country performance as the
extent to which the borrower, including the government and implementing agency or agencies,
ensured quality of preparation and implementation, and complied with covenants and agreements
towards the achievement of development outcomes (See Table 1). The performance of country
government is key to PPP success. For example, the World Bank (2007) found that the efficiency
of a PPP unit was highly correlated with the success of a country’s PPP program. That is because
specialized units and separation of roles and responsibilities are put in place to ensure the respect
of the principles of transparency, efficiency, economy, and competition (PNDES, 2016). Lee et
al. (2018) confirmed that the presence of at least one PPP unit and direct government subsidies
and indirect support through guarantees can help PPP projects become more viable.
Governments can bear some project risks by providing capital and revenue subsidies or in-kind
contributions, such as land; favorable government policies to investment; or incentives, such as
loan guarantees for sub-sovereign and non-sovereign borrowing (Lee et al., 2018).
Second, the risk, cost, and resources associated with major infrastructure projects are
shared by the public and private partners. The sharing can be problematic and conflictual.
McQuaid (2000) and Axelrod (1984) argued that partnerships imply solving conflicts and
interests of the public and private partners involved. At the early stages, the relationship between
the public and the private is complex as game theory always plays out in that relationship
scenario. The best outcome for a partnership is to reach an agreement for cooperation. The
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prisoner’s dilemma theory (McQuaid, 2000) helps explain the relationship. While the parties do
not have full confidence in their partners, parties become convinced that any type of confession
or decision except cooperation by one of the parties can be costlier. The fear of loss creates the
incentives for greater cooperation and abandoning self-interest behavior. With cooperation,
conflicting goals and interests are managed through negotiations on risk shifting and power
sharing (Linder, 1999).
Wang et al (2019) discussed the relevance of prospect theory in the stakeholders’
decision to pursue or curtail investments. PPPs are a way for government to share or reallocate
risks, costs, benefits, resources, and responsibilities (Koppenjan, 2005) and characterized by the
sharing of investment, risk, responsibility, and reward between the partners. They induce strong
incentives to invest in cost reductions (Hoppe et al., 2013) and reduce operating costs that benefit
both sectors (Hart, 2003). Stakeholders expect gains to outweigh losses. More specifically, PPP
outcomes are defined in terms of achieved objectives and the success of PPPs is based on clear
and shared objectives (McQuaid, 2000; Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff, 2011). IEG (2019) defined
achieved objectives as “…the extent to which the operation’s major relevant objectives were
achieved, or are expected to be achieved, efficiently” (IEG, 2019). The measure includes the
relevance of the project’s objectives and design, efficacy, and efficiency (IEG, 2019). Success is
also conceived as the lack of cost overruns, the lack of time delays, the ex-post level of traffic,
and generated revenues (Trujillo et al., 2018). The definition of PPP outcome is presented in
Table 1.
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Table 1: Outcome of Public-Private Partnership Projects
Outcomes

Indicators

Definition/measure

Achieved
objectives

Achieved
objectives

The extent to which the
IEG, 2019 ; McQuaid,
operation’s major relevant
2000; and Brinkerhoff
objectives were achieved, or are and Brinkerhoff, 2011
expected to be achieved,
efficiently

Bank
performance

Quality of entry

The extent to which services
provided by the Bank ensured
quality at entry of the operation
and supported effective
implementation through
appropriate supervision

IEG, 2019 ; Jandhyala,
2016 ; Lee et al, 2018 ;
Nose, 2014

Borrower
Performance

Government
performance
Implementing
agency
Overall
borrower
performance

The extent to which the
borrower (including the
government and implementing
agency or agencies) ensured
quality of preparation and
implementation, and complied
with covenants and agreements,
towards the achievement of
development outcomes

IEG, 2019 ; The World
Bank, 2007

Quality of
supervision
Overall bank
performance

Authors/sources

Third, partnership is a win-win scenario. Via partnership, governments alleviate the
burden on the budget as they no longer carry the full cost of projects. Reyes-Tagle and Garbacik
(2016) argued that PPPs can be an immediate remedy for fiscal constraints because of private
sector financing. The benefits of PPP become more visible as the private sector brings in
additional funding, more efficient management, and better public services (Lee et al, 2018) or
governance, legitimacy and credibility, capacity building, and role model actions (Maktabi,
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2014). Enough policies, regulations, frameworks, fiscal and non-fiscal support, communication,
and government engagement that originate from PPPs hold partners accountable and minimize
risks (Maktabi, 2014). Percoco (2014) examined the quality of institutions and private
participation in transport infrastructure investment in developing countries using the Private
Participation in Infrastructure database. Percoco (2014) found that that greater participation by
private parties in PPP contracts is associated with better institutions in terms of lower corruption,
civil freedom, and a better regulatory framework. Reynaers (2014) examined the impact of
design-build-finance-maintain-operate (DBFMO) PPP projects on public values using PPI data.
Reynaers (2014) found that accountability, responsiveness, transparency, and responsibility had
increased. The private sector gains from the partnership as it recovers cost by collecting user fees
and a priori agreed-upon payments.
Structurally, the success of PPPs depends on jointly determined goals, collaborative and
consensus-based decision making, non-hierarchical and horizontal structures and processes trustbased relationships, synergistic interactions, and shared accountability for outcomes and results
(Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff, 2011). The success of partnerships also depends on the clarity of
objectives, the agreement on the operation of the partnership, resources, responsibility over dayto-day management, clear lines of communication and decision-making, clear exit routes, a
supportive institutional infrastructure, and a suitable system of incentives (McQuaid, 2000).
Koppenjan (2005) argued that well-formed partnerships, interaction in the planning phase, and
joint market planning lead to successful project results. Bhattacharya (2002) found that resource
dependency, commitment and common goals, good communication and cooperation between
partners, and cultures play a role in the success of PPPs. Using case studies from Bangladesh,
Nepal, Tanzania, and Uganda, Maktabi (2014) found that the role and involvement of the
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government, robust communication streams, building a sense of ownership and trust between
partners in the project, and sustainable funding systems appear critical to minimizing risks. OseiKyei and Chan (2016) argued that strong government commitment and will, constant public
consultations on toll increments, selection of right private partner, clear contractual agreement,
appropriate risk allocation, and agreement were key to positive PPP project outcomes. Countries
vary in their level of development and institutional governance. This variation also implies that
the success or outcomes of PPP will vary accordingly.
State of Public-Private Partnerships in Developed Economies
Developed countries have fewer difficulties than developing countries meeting the
necessary conditions for PPPs success due to their predisposition to good governance
institutions. Countries with high level of institutional sophistication including the United
Kingdom, Australia, Spain, and Ireland have effective partnership relationships (Siemiatycki,
2013). In those countries, new innovative models are refined; more creative, flexible approaches
are applied to the roles of public and private sector; more sophisticated risk models are used; and
a greater focus on total lifecycle of project in rationale for PPPs is considered. Cheung et al.
(2012) examined the success factors of PPPs in Hong-Kong, the United Kingdom, and Australia.
They found that favorable legal framework, commitment and responsibility of public and private
sectors, strong and good private consortium, stable macro-economic condition, and appropriate
risk allocation and risk sharing were critical. Furthermore, private sector methods of operation
and management are adopted by public sector institutions in response to greater competition
(Siemiatycki, 2013). Governments look for innovative models to monetize assets while
organizational skills are enhanced in government to support greater role of PPPs (Siemiatycki,
2013). In other words, those countries have strong PPP policy expertise, supportive civil society,
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and PPP policy consensus (Siemiatycki, 2013). Unit’s (2011) evaluated the environment for
PPPs in Asia Pacific using PPI data. The findings showed that countries such as Australia, South
Korea, India, United Kingdom have strong and effective central and local policies and
institutions, detailed guidance-based PPPs framework, strong local PPP regulations, training and
oversight, rapid growth, and prudent economic management. They also focus on cost-benefit
analysis and VFM consideration. As a result, those countries that created a reliable environment
attract investments and have high ranking scores in regulatory framework, institutional
framework, investment climate, financial facilities, and subnational adjustment.
More importantly, they consider effective project preparation and risk assessment as
preventive measures to dispute resolution. Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) countries
that improved in regulatory framework had improved their regulation and implementation of new
PPP laws, enhanced the fairness of contracting processes, and strengthened the dispute resolution
mechanisms (Unit, 2014). Those countries have also included mandatory cost-benefit and VFM
analysis for the selection of PPP projects (Unit, 2014). The positive view of PPP in developed
countries makes them a model for infrastructure development for developing countries.
However, the challenges are complex for developing countries because of different internal
conditions and unequal development status.
State of Public-Private Partnerships in Developing Economies
While PPPs have become a praised mechanism for infrastructure development in
developed countries, their application in developing countries faces a myriad of challenges due
to pre-existing institutional weaknesses. In developing countries that experience governance
shortcomings, the ability of the partnership to produce desired outcomes is put at risk
(Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff, 2011). Private participation is viewed as inappropriate for
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developing countries because of weak technical capacities and imperfect information, inability or
unwillingness to pay the cost-covering tariffs, higher subsidies, high capital cost and risks in
developing countries, low and uncertain revenues, cherry picking favoring lucrative sectors, and
misdirected regulatory capacities (Tan, 2011). Furthermore, high contracting costs due to
opportunism, high construction complexity, high revenue uncertainty, and poor contract
management can lead to failure in PPP projects in developing countries (Vining and Boardman,
2008). Lee et al. (2018) found that about 41.8% of transportation PPP projects between 1991 and
2015 in low-and middle-income Asian countries failed for similar reasons.
There are also challenges in the distribution of PPP awards and funding across countries
and regions. Most PPPs are concentrated in a small number of developed countries and emerging
markets (Siemiatycki, 2013) and executed by a small number of highly globalized construction
contractors, engineering firms, financiers, accountancies, and consultants from developed
countries (Siemiatycki, 2013). Of 34 countries that received investments in 2018 through the
World Bank, China, Turkey, Vietnam, India, and Brazil accounted for 66 percent of the global
total investments in infrastructure (The World Bank, 2019). The level of investments for LAC
and South Asia Region (SAR) declined. The increase was 3% for Sub-Saharan African (SSA),
with most of the investments awarded to South Africa (The World Bank, 2019). Galilea and
Medda (2009) found that the location or region of the project influenced the success of PPPs.
The failure of PPP projects is often linked to the failure to abide by the principles and
good practices of PPPs contracts. Sanni and Hashim (2014) showed that challenges for
infrastructure development through PPP arrangements in South Africa included low competition,
lack of policy direction among the political leaders, lack of clarity in the minds of the
implementing agencies and the private sector in the delivery of PPP projects, no technical know-
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how, lack of resources and authority, and use of ineffective procurement measures. Lee et al
(2018) showed that failures in Asian countries were due to the lack of project preparation,
competitive systematic project awarding method, poor governance, misaligned priorities, the
underrepresentation of the public sector in decision making, and the lack of coordination and
cooperation between partners. Unit (2014) found that Asia Pacific countries including Georgia,
Indonesia, China, Armenia, Kyrgyz Republic, Mongolia, Tajikistan, Philippines, Papua New
Guinea, Thailand, Pakistan, and Vietnam lacked clear central guidance on the roles and
responsibilities and experience. Those countries had inadequate concession law, weak
coordination, and oversight among agencies in charge of PPP regulations, limited transparency in
procurement, uncertain conditions for investment or operating environment, institutional conflict
and shortages, and weak bidding and resolution regulations. Unsurprisingly, they had lower
ranking scores. Unit (2014) also noted that the dispute-resolution mechanisms remained the
weakest component of the regulatory framework across LAC countries.
In short, the performance in PPP governance influences the success of PPP projects. PPP
governance encompasses actions at different stages of the process as well as key practices at
each stage. The next section explains PPP governance and hypothesizes its relationship with PPP
outcome.
The Stages of PPP Process
The governance of PPP projects generally comprises the main stages of the PPP lifecycle
including the identification phase, the preparation stage, the procurement stage, as well as
contract management, the contract administration phase, and the transfer phase. Some scholars
consider the identification phase and the preparation phase as a single phase. Other studies
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separate the contract administration phase from the contract management phase. This dissertation
considers three main stages: preparation, procurement, and management.
PPP governance includes steps taken by national governments to ensure that they act
according to and implement the standard practices and principles at each stage that they agreed
to. The practices address economic, environmental, and financial assessment and guide partners
to ensure transparency and fairness in the procurement process as well as satisfactory dispute
resolution and managing change during the implementation process. Lee et al (2018) cited the
choice of the type of PPP including private participation level, contract, award method,
government support or guarantee. They also noted that sponsor, government, private, and foreign
funding are project level factors that can influence PPP project outcome. The significant success
factors include government support, proper project planning, good coordination between parties,
trust, good tendering system, proper information dissemination and communication system and
high managerial capabilities (Abednego and Ogunlana, 2006). Those factors are being
considered in countries and regions around the world. For example, Francophone West African
countries took the initiatives to implement national development goals using PPPs. The countries
have created PPP legislative, regulatory, and institutional framework to ensure universally
accepted principles in public procurement are achieved, including freedom of access, equal
treatment of bidders, competition, objectivity of procedures and transparency (PNDES, 2016).
This includes the planning, design and preparation of bids, awards, assessment and negotiation of
bids, and execution.
While the goal in this section is to address each stage, studies on PPP have combined and
mixed stages and practices and drawn cross-stage conclusions. For example, from their review of
PPP literature from 1996 to 2016, Bao et al. (2018) found that 92 of 282 publications in PPP
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governance were indivisible topics. The studies simultaneously covered topics of the
identification, preparation, procurement, and management phases.
Preparation of PPPs and Influence on PPP Outcomes
The practices at the preparation stage of PPPs requires risk, fiscal, economic, financial, and
environmental, and market assessments (Siemonsma et al., 2012; El-Sawalhi and Mansour,
2014; Jacob et al., 2014; Kashi, 2015; Soomro and Zhang, 2015; Opawole and Jagboro, 2017;
The World Bank, 2018a; Lee et al, 2018; Osei-Kyei and Chan, 2019). Bao et al. (2018) found
that from 1996 to 2016, 63 of 282 publications on PPP dealt with the preparation phase. The
studies highlighted the management structure including the PPP team formation, the constitution
of the public, and early briefing. They also highlighted detailed PPP design including the
concession period, government guarantee, financing structure, pricing, and contract design. Of
the 282 publications on PPP, 35 dealt with the project identification. Those studies focused on
risk allocation including risk identification and risk analysis. They also addressed project
selection including feasibility, suitability, and attractiveness. Government capacity and
compliance to those practices influence investment decisions and project outcome.
EIU’s (2015) benchmarking of PPP projects for Asia and the Pacific showed that weak
legal and regulatory frameworks, poorly prepared or structured projects, lack of capacity to carry
projects out in the public and private sectors, and weak financial markets undermined PPP
projects. Galilea and Medda (2009) found that a country’s experience in PPP agreements in
transport, its gross domestic product (GDP) growth, and the current account balance influenced
the success of PPPs. El-Sawalhi and Mansour (2014) found that the critical success factors of
PPP projects included stability of the political situation, clear and detailed contract, existence of
a sound economic policy, reliable delivery of service, analysis and allocation of risks, suitable
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legal framework, experienced private sector, profitability to the private sector, and accepted level
of toll or tariff for a project. Wibowo and Alfen (2015) found that the top five greatest gaps in
PPPs were as follows: (1) the lack of sufficient project integration with national and local
planning processes, (2) the lack of clearly defined mechanisms to coordinate needs, (3) the
lack of competent, independent, and efficient regulators, (4) the lack of adequate awareness
of legal, technical, and financial aspects of the public sector (see also Parry and Hughes,
2018), and (5)the lack of strong political support. Loxley (2013) found that governments in
South Africa in particular, and Africa in general provided no detailed information on value, risk,
contracts, financial agreements, and schedules. This means that key elements in the PPP contract
are not painstakingly addressed for lack of appropriate governance structures.
Unit (2014) shows that LAC countries that improved the institutional framework
including the creation of new units and centralization of planning and promotion attracted better
investments (Unit, 2014; The World Bank, 2018a). All PPP contracts must be approved by the
central authority and priorities must be consistent with public investments priorities (Unit, 2014;
Wibowo and Alfen, 2015; The World Bank, 2018a). All contract drafts are expected to be
included in the requests for proposals (Liu et al., 2015, The World Bank, 2018a). Kotze et al.
(1999) found that the lack of detailed draft contracts lengthened the negotiation process even
after a bid was awarded. Standardized contract models should be available for orientation to
better and more efficient agreements (Kotze et al., 1999; The World Bank, 2018a). An
appropriate allocation of risks is a necessary condition for successful contracts (Marques and
Berg, 2010; Marques and Berg, 2011; Soomro and Zhang, 2015; Wang et al., 2019). Panayides
et al. (2015) found that market openness, ease to start a business, and enforcing contracts were
important institutional determinants of port PPP success that attract private bidders and the
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market competitiveness of ports. Using PPI data, Chou et al. (2012) found that the size of the
market or large size markets and inflation attracted more PPP projects in developing economies.
In short, from Table 2, this study hypothesizes that effectiveness in the practices at the
preparation stage leads to better PPP outcomes. Table 2 presents the variables used to
operationalize the practices of PPP preparation.
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Table 2: Practices of the Preparation Stage
Stages
Preparation
of PPPs
-

Practices/guidelines
Central Budgetary Authority’s
approval
Fiscal treatment of PPPs

-

PPP’s prioritization consistentwith public investment
prioritization
Economic analysis assessment

-

-

-

-

Authors/sources
The World Bank, 2018a; Unit, 2014; Wibowo and
Alfen, 2015;
The World Bank, 2018a; Siemonsma et al., 2012; ElSawalhi and Mansour, 2014; Jacob et al., 2014; Kashi,
2015; Soomro and Zhang, 2015; Opawole and Jagboro,
2017; The World Bank, 2018a; Lee et al, 2018; OseiKyei and Chan, 2019
The World Bank, 2018a

The World Bank, 2018a; El-Sawalhi and Mansour,
2014; Siemonsma et al., 2012; El-Sawalhi and
Mansour, 2014; Jacob et al., 2014; Kashi, 2015;
Soomro and Zhang, 2015; Opawole and Jagboro, 2017;
The World Bank, 2018a; Lee et al, 2018; Osei-Kyei
and Chan, 2019
Fiscal affordability assessment The World Bank, 2018a
The World Bank, 2018a; El-Sawalhi and Mansour,
Risk identification
2014; Loxley, 2013; Marques and Berg, 2010;
Marques and Berg, 2011; Soomro and Zhang, 2015;
Wang et al., 2019
Financial viability assessment The World Bank, 2018a; Wibowo and Alfen, 2015;
Loxley, 2013; Siemonsma et al., 2012; El-Sawalhi and
Mansour, 2014; Jacob et al., 2014; Kashi, 2015;
Soomro and Zhang, 2015; Opawole and Jagboro, 2017;
The World Bank, 2018a; Lee et al, 2018; Osei-Kyei
and Chan, 2019
The World Bank, 2018a
PPP vs. Public Procurement
comparative assessment
The World Bank, 2018a; EIU, 2015; Panayides et al.,
Market Sounding analysis
2015; Chou et al., 2012
The World Bank, 2018a;
Environment impact
assessment
The World Bank, 2018a; Liu et al., 2015
Assessments included in the
RFP and/or tender documents
Draft PPP contract included in The World Bank, 2018a El-Sawalhi and Mansour,
2014; Loxley, 2013; Kotze et al., 1999
the request for proposals
The World Bank, 2018a; Kotze et al., 1999; Panayides
Standardized PPP model
et al.; 2015
contracts and/or transaction
documents
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Procurement of PPPs and Influence on PPP Outcomes
The practices at the procurement stage can influence the outcome of PPP projects. In the
procurement phase, required principles include freedom of access, equal treatment of bidders,
competition, objectivity of procedures, and transparency in the process (PNDES, 2016). Desired
practices at this stage also include qualified evaluation committee members, issuance of a
procurement notice by the procuring authority, a minimum time of 30 days for bid submissions,
available procurement procedures, and permission for foreign companies to participate in the
bidding (Soomro and Zhang, 2015). Bao et al. (2018) found that from 1996 to 2016, 42 of 282
publications on PPP addressed the PPP procurement phase. The studies focused on the bidding
process including concessionary selection, negotiation, critical success factors for bidding
process, and incentive creation. They also focused on bidders’ concerns such as financial
viability, risk assessment, and bid-winning strategies.
Osei-Kyei and Chan (2015) reviewed studies on the critical success factors for PPP projects
from 1990 to 2013. The top five influential factors were risk allocation and sharing, strong
private consortium, political support, community or public support, and transparent procurement.
Direct negotiation, presence of details of the procurement stages and prequalification criteria,
and openness to clarification questions on RFPs are necessary for a successful PPP project (ElSawalhi and Mansour, 2014; Liu et al., 2015). Furthermore, pre-bidding conference, evaluation
of proposals based on published criteria, simultaneous submission of financial models and
proposals, public of award notice and of contract, negotiation before contract signing, and
notification of the results of the procurement process are key practices to be observed. The lack
of attention to those practices can lead to failure (The World Bank, 2018a). Soomro and Zhang
(2015) found that among 27 failure mechanisms initiated by the public sector partners, 14
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failures occurred during the procurement process. This converts to twice more than the failures
in the preparation stage and three times more than the management stage. Complex issues of
procedures at this stage impede competition and cost-effective PPP bidding (Carrillo et al., 2008;
Chen and Doloi, 2008; De Clerck and Demeulemeester, 2014). Osei-Kyei and Chan (2016)
argued that the lack of competition and transparency in SSA projects led to project failure.
Eberhard and Gratwick (2013) discussed success stories of independent power projects (IPPs) in
African countries including South Africa, Kenya, and Nigeria. They found that success factors
included competitive bids for renewable energy, well-designed procurement process, expertise,
and the flexibility in the design of subsequent bid rounds. In short, this study hypothesizes that
effectiveness in the practices at the procurement stage leads to better PPP outcomes. Table 3
presents the variables used to operationalize the practices of PPP procurement.
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Table 3: Practices of the Procurement Stage
Stages
Procurement
of PPPs
-

-

-

Practices/Guidelines
Evaluation committee members required to meet
specific qualifications
Public procurement notice of the PPP issued by
procuring authority
Foreign companies permitted to participate in PPP
bidding
Minimum period of time to submit the bids (>=30
days)
Availability of various procurement procedures for
PPPs
Direct negotiation not discretionary

Tender documents detail the stages of the
procurement process
Tender documents specify prequalification criteria

-

Clarification questions for procurement notice
and/or the request for proposals

-

Pre-bidding conference
Financial model submitted with proposal
Proposals strictly and solely evaluated in
accordance with published evaluation criteria

-

Treatment when only one proposal is received
Publication of award notice
Notification of the results of the PPP procurement
process to all bidders
Negotiations with the selected bidder before
contract signing

-

Standstill period
Publication of contract

Authors/sources
The World Bank, 2018a
The World Bank, 2018a
The World Bank, 2018a; Soomro
and Zhang, 2015
The World Bank, 2018
The World Bank, 2018a; Eberhard
and Gratwick, 2013
The World Bank, 2018a; ElSawalhi and Mansour, 2014; Liu
et al., 2015
The World Bank, 2018a; Eberhard
and Gratwick, 2013
The World Bank, 2018a; ElSawalhi and Mansour, 2014; Liu
et al., 2015
The World Bank, 2018a; ElSawalhi and Mansour, 2014; Liu
et al., 2015
The World Bank, 2018a;
The World Bank, 2018a;
The World Bank, 2018a; ElSawalhi and Mansour, 2014; Liu
et al., 2015
The World Bank, 2018a;
The World Bank, 2018a;
The World Bank, 2018a
The World Bank, 2018a; ElSawalhi and Mansour, 2014; Liu
et al., 2015; Bao et al., 2018
The World Bank, 2018a
The World Bank, 2018a
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PPP Contract Management and Influence on PPP Outcomes
Good practices in the contract management stage include among others the systems for
managing the implementation, the system for tracking the progress of the contract work, and the
monitoring and evaluating system (Soomro and Zhang, 2015). Bao et al. (2018) found that from
1996 to 2016, 47 of 282 publications on PPP dealt with the implementation phase. The studies
focused on risk management including risk mitigation strategies; the stakeholder management
including the relationship between stakeholders; the implementation performance including
monitoring performance, overruns, and technological innovation; and change management
including the renegotiation, sharing excess resources, and dispute resolution.
For project success, it is necessary that precautions be taken for change in the structure in the
private partner, modification or renegotiation of contract, and unforeseen circumstances during
the contract (Marques and Berg, 2010, The World Bank, 2018a). Cruz et al. (2014) examined
road PPP contracts in Portugal. They found that unilateral changes by the government, changes
in design due to environmental reasons, delays in expropriation, and traffic below expectations
were among the main causes of renegotiation of contracts. Guasch et al.’s (2016) renegotiation
study in Latin America showed that causes of renegotiation included economic crises, elections
and change in administration, breach of contract obligation by governments, lack of preparation,
bidding errors, and opportunistic behavior. Important considerations include dispute resolution
mechanisms (Liu, et al., 2015); protection from expropriation, arbitration procedures, respect for
contract agreements, processes for recovering of costs, and making profits proportional to project
risk (Jamali, 2004); and lender step-in right, ground for termination, and permission for foreign
companies to repatriate income (Soomro and Zhang, 2015).

35

Moszoro et al. (2014) argued that PPP investment in infrastructure is highly sensitive to the
number of disputes in a sector. Contractual disputes between the public and private sector
partners is costly as the renegotiation and termination of PPP contracts impede infrastructure
development, disrupt public services, discourage private investments, and increase risk
premiums (Lee et al, 2018). Soomro and Zhang (2013) examined the factors hindering transport
PPPs. They found that poor economic and financial assessments for feasibility studies,
inappropriate risk allocation between partners at the procurement stage, delayed land acquisitions
at the construction stage, and lower user demand at the operation stage led to project failures.
Osei-Kyei and Chan (2016) argued that high toll-fee charges, high cost of construction, poor
public-user relationship, and negative public perception on PPP toll roads in Sub-Saharan Africa
(SSA) led to project failure. Ismail and Harris (2014) found that the lack of government
guidelines and procedures, lengthy delays in negotiations, high user charges, project delays
caused by political debate, and confusion over government objectives and evaluation criteria for
projects, mostly affected project implementation in Malaysia. In short, this study hypothesized
that effectiveness in the practices at the contract management stage leads to better PPP outcomes.
Table 2 presents the variables used to operationalize the practices of PPP contract management.
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Table 4: Practices of the Management Stage
Stages
PPP contractmanagement

-

-

-

Authors/sources
The World Bank,
2018a; Bao et al., 2018;
Soomro and Zhang,
2015
The World Bank,
System for tracking progress and completion of
2018a; Soomro and
construction works
Zhang, 2015
The World Bank,
Monitoring and evaluation system
2018a; Bao et al., 2018;
Soomro and Zhang,
2015
The World Bank,
Foreign companies permitted to repatriate income
2018a
Change in the structure of the private partner
The World Bank,
2018a; Bao et al., 2018;
Marques and Berg,
2010
Modification/renegotiation of the PPP contract regulated The World Bank,
2018a; Bao et al., 2018;
Marques and Berg,
2010
Circumstances that may occur during the life of the PPP The World Bank,
contract regulated
2018a; Marques and
Berg, 2010
The World Bank,
Dispute resolution mechanisms
2018a; Bao et al., 2018
The World Bank,
Lenders step-in right
2018a
The World Bank,
Grounds for termination of a PPP contract
2018a
Practices/Guidelines
System to manage the implementation of the PPP
contract

Table 4 shows the studies and authors that found support for the influence of the 10
contract management practices on the indicators of PPP outcome. The practices become the
variables in the analysis section of this dissertation. The idea that PPP governance (preparation,
procurement, and management) has an influence on PPP outcome is showed in Figure 3.
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Figure 3: Influence of PPP Governance on PPP Outcome
PPP Governance
• Project preparation
• Project procurement
• Project management

PPP Outcome
• Achieved Objectives
• Bank performance
• Borrower country performance

Figure 3 is set up for the purpose of this research to show the relationships between PPP
governance and PPP outcome. It is a representation of the relationship between PPP governance
and PPP outcome. PPP governance is expected to have a positive influence on PPP outcome.
Governance Theory and its Relation to PPP Governance and PPP Outcome
Past studies that used good governance have focused on the six indicators developed by
(Kaufmann et al., 2010). Two of the six indicators belong to political governance and include
political stability and voice and accountability. Two others pertain to economic governance and
encompass government effectiveness and regulation quality. The last two belong to institutional
governance and entail corruption control and the rule of law (Asongu and Nwachukwu, 2017).
This dissertation uses the six indicators, which become the variables of good governance. This
section defines and explains each of the indicators. Findings from past studies on the indicators
and their influence on PPP outcome are also discussed following the relationships shown in
Figure 4.
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Figure 4: Influence of Country Governance on PPP Governance and Outcome

Country governance
• Voice and accountability
• Political stability
• Government effectiveness
• Regulatory quality
• Rule of law
• Control of corruption

PPP Governance
• Project preparation
• Project procurement
• Project management

PPP Outcome
• Achieved Objectives
• Bank performance
• Borrower country
performance

Figure 4 is set up for the purpose of this research to show the relationships between
country governance, PPP governance, and PPP outcome. In Figure 4, the relationship between
country governance factors and PPP governance is represented by the shorter arrow. The longer
arrow represents the relationship between country governance factors and PPP outcome. The
purpose is to identify significant relationships between the two sets of factors.
Voice and Accountability: Influence on PPP Governance and Outcome
The indicator “Voice and accountability” is defined as “…the extent to which a country’s
citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression,
freedom of association, and free media (Kaufmann et al., 2010, p. 4 ). Accountability is
important for progress when governments answer to people on the use of resources. Holding
these lines helps prevent mismanagement of resources and opportunistic behaviors. The lack of
accountability in financial management in developing countries such as Mali, Mozambique, Peru
and Uganda, constitutes greater obstacle to progress than the lack of resources that developing
countries themselves experience (OECD, 2014). Domestic accountability, considering horizontal
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accountability and vertical accountability, in the entire government system and structure can
mean greater commitment to good governance practices. Bureaucratic accountability can mean
accountability to the internal hierarchy, accountability to the legislature, accountability to the
judiciary, accountability to the citizens and accountability to the media (Sultana, 2012). Effective
domestic accountability means that there is transparency whereby citizens have access to
information about government commitments and action taken to meet them (OECD, 2014). It
also entails answerability in the sense that citizens can ask for explanations and justifications
(OECD, 2014). Enforceability must also prevail for citizens to be able to sanction the
government if the government fails to meet certain standards (OECD, 2014).
Domestic accountability is an important consideration for international donors who want to
cooperate with national governments. A government in good terms with its citizens and
institutions presents a favorable climate of investment, of citizens’ participation and acceptance
of investment outputs, and use of the final products. Actions taken by a government that is
illegitimate can be suspected or boycotted by citizens. OECD (2014) suggests that international
organizations can contribute to improving domestic accountability by understanding the political
context, power, and incentives; considering accountability as a whole; and ensuring that
development assistance does not undermine domestic accountability. Brown-Shafii and ProQuest
(2011) argued that the World Trade Organization agreement can be used to promote
accountability because countries agree to participate based on legal accountability that they have
or are willing to build the institutional and human capacity necessary. However, the countries
must be given to necessary timelines to meet the conditions. The definition and description of
accountability and the findings implied that the strength of voice and accountability in a country
leads to better outcomes in that country in general.
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From the perspective of PPP projects, greater accountability is related to better PPP
investments and outcome (Lee et al., 2018; Galilea and Medda, 2009). Focusing on developing
countries, Wang et al. (2019) examined the relationship between risk allocation and private
investment in PPP market using PPI, WGI, and WDI data. They found that better governance in
developing countries led to less risk assumed by private partners. Wang et al. (2019)
recommended that transport and information, communication, and technology (ICT) sectors pay
greater attention to improving regulation quality and voice or accountability to reduce the
negative impact of risk allocation in private investments. Using PPIs, WGI, and World Bank’s
World Development indicators, Pérez-D’Oleo et al. (2015) analyzed the influence of institutional
environment on the investment carried out through public-private partnerships in 80 middle-andlow income countries for the period 1996–2011. They found that countries with better
institutional environment tend to have a higher level of investment in PPP projects. This
influence was more significant for the indicator voice and accountability. Hayllar (2010) argued
that mechanisms that supported PPPs included democratic mechanisms to prevent inequitable
concentrations of power. Politicians should be responsible and accountable through regular and
fair elections. A parliament in such context should promote participation and transparency and
plays its role of oversight (Hayllar, 2010). Thus, this study tests for the positive influence of
voice and accountability on PPP governance and PPP outcome.
Political Stability: Influence on PPP Governance and Outcome
Political stability is defined as “…the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or
overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including politically‐motivated violence and
terrorism” (Kaufmann et al., 2010; p.4). Alemu (2018) found that controlling corruption and
maintaining political stability reduced the illicit financial outflow in 32 African countries. Aisen

41

and Veiga’s (2013) research on 169 countries showed that political instability reduced economic
growth because of its adverse effects on productivity growth and physical and human capital
accumulation. In their study of 157 countries from 1964 to 2014, Karnane and Quinn (2019)
found that ethnic fragmentation and corruption caused political instability, which in turn had a
negative impact on economic growth. Houdhary and Reksulak (2019) argued that ethnic
divisions may have a negative impact on economic whereas strong economic institutions and
policies that provide for the needs of people may mitigate ethnic tensions. Easterly and Levine
(1997) believed that ethnic diversity led to polarization of interest groups in countries with high
numbers of ethnic groups and therefore accounted for rent-seeking behavior and lack of
consensus for public goods. The lack of social cohesion issues and social constraints make it
difficult to build quality institutions that can support growth and long-term economic policies. As
Easterly, Ritzen, and Woolcock (2006) puts it, opportunistic politicians take advantage of ethnic
differences to seek political power, a process that can exacerbate division as groups are
politically mobilized along ethnic lines. Asongu and Nwachukwu (2017) examined the impact of
terrorism on governance in Africa. They found that domestic, transnational, unclear, and total
terrorism negatively impact political governance and its constituents. Second, evidence of a
negative relationship is sparingly apparent in economic governance and its components. More
than domestic terrorism, transnational terrorism negatively affects political, economic, and
general governances.
The literature shows that there is a positive relationship between political stability and PPP
investments and outcome. Eberhard and Gratwick (2013) noted the political uncertainty for
investments in countries such as in Nigeria because of interruptions and changing in political
administrations. Lee et al (2018) found that internal conflict had an impact on PPP outcome.
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Osei-Kyei and Chan (2017) found that political support and acceptability for PPPs, government
positive attitude towards private sector investments, and political stability were the most
impactful factors attracting investments in developing countries. Chou et al. (2012) examined the
determining factors in attracting the private partners for infrastructure projects using World Bank
PPI data. They found that political stability was one of the important factors. Thus, this study
tests for the positive influence of political stability and lack of terrorism on PPP governance and
PPP outcome.
Government Effectiveness: Influence on PPP Governance and Outcome
Government effectiveness refers to “…the quality of public services, the quality of the
civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy
formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such
policies” (Kaufmann et al, 2010; p. 4). Alam, Kiterage, and Bizuayehu (2017) examined the
impact of government effectiveness on economic growth in 81 countries. They found that
government effectiveness had a significantly positive effect on economic growth. Their finding
is key as international organizations and multilateral development banks and developed countries
evaluate government effectiveness when allocating foreign aid (Alam, et al, 2017). Kaufmann
(2009) argued that government effectiveness in terms of improved governance and anticorruption will lead to aid effectiveness in developing countries. Stakeholders must work on
solutions that address or include governance and political corruption, IT revolution, free media,
innovations in public-private partnerships, private donors (Kaufmann (2009). When African
countries met for the first Public Procurement Conference in November 30- December 4, 1998
held in Abidjan, Cote d’ Ivoire, they agreed with donors on a consensus document which called
for building support for reform, political commitment, resources for reform, strategy for reforms,
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steps in developing a strategy, and changes to support reform (International Trade Centre, 1999).
The 2008 Accra Agenda for Action, a continuation of the 2005 Paris Declaration called for
strengthening country ownership over development, building more effective and inclusive
partnerships for development, delivering, and accounting for development results, and looking
forward (OECD, 2019). Developed countries required recipient countries to build procurement
capacities and meet requisite standards on efficiency and probity as preconditions for disbursing
aid (OECD, 2019).
The literature showed that there is a positive relationship between government
effectiveness and PPP investments and outcome. Lee et al (2018) found that the quality of
bureaucracy had an impact on PPP outcome and higher government effectiveness in a
developing country reduces the negative relationship between risk allocation and private
investment. Pérez-D’Oleo et al. (2015) found that countries with better institutional environment
tended to have a higher level of investment in PPP projects. Though less influential, they found
that government effectiveness had an impact in level of investments. Sabry (2015) and BotaAvram (2014) found that good governance institutions with bureaucratic efficiency and
independence increased PPP performance because of their positive effect on investment growth.
Osei-Kyei and Chan (2017) found that the top five important factors attracting private
investments included political support and acceptability for PPPs, government positive attitude
towards private sector investments, political stability, favorable existing legal framework and
policy and well-organized and committed contracting authority. Unit (2014) showed that Latin
America and the Caribbean countries that built institutional knowledge through repetitive PPPs
project implementation, international and domestic training had improved their operational
maturity. Operational maturity allows the public sector to improve its project management
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capacity, planning, and oversight. Furthermore, countries perform better when they are effective
in balancing technical and economic criteria in project selection and efficient risk allocation laws
(Unit, 2014). Countries that demonstrate the connection between political support for PPPs and
performance in the regulatory and institutional frameworks improve their performance. They
develop national development plans that support PPPs had the best investment climate (Unit,
2014). Strong political will strengthens PPPs (Pebble, 2015) while deteriorated political support
is harmful to investment. Furthermore, countries with effective financial facilities such as strong
capital markets, effective government finances, and use of subsidies improved their capacity of
government to meet their obligation to private partners (Unit, 2014). The IEG report includes the
bank and the borrower country performance as well as the project outcome (IEG, 2019). Thus,
this study tests for the positive influence of government effectiveness on PPP governance and
PPP outcome.
Regulatory Quality: Influence on PPP Governance and Outcome
“Regulatory quality” is defined as “…the ability of the government to formulate and
implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development”
(Kaufmann et al., 2010; p. 4). The quality of institutions matters to economic growth. Mudassaar,
Khan, and Aziz (2019) found that ineffective institutions and weaker governance reduced the
impact of investment on economic growth because of the lack of property rights, lack of
protection to investment in human capital and physical capital. Acemoglu and Robinson (2010)
argued that institutions play a major role in growth and development of countries as they are
responsible for good practices such as in property rights protection. While institutions are
different across countries because of social and political forces that determine the quality of the
institutions, improving poor institutions will lead to be better growth and development. Das and
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Quirk (2016) examined which institutions promote economic growth. They found that marketcreating institutions played a very signiﬁcant role in the promotion of economic growth. Marketstabilizing institutions and human capital also had an impact on growth. Furthermore, marketcreating and market-stabilizing institutions were more relevant for lower income countries.
However, they argued that democratic institutions did not necessarily mean growth for poor
countries.
The literature showed that there is a positive relationship between regulatory quality and
PPP investments and outcome. Moszoro et al. (2014) argued that that PPP investment in
infrastructure is highly sensitive to the quality of regulations. Regulatory quality in a developing
country reduces the negative relationship between risk allocation and private investment (Wang
et al., 2019). Baker (2016) found from a sample of 83 developing countries for the period 1999–
2011 that regulatory quality had a positive impact in attracting private investors to PPP markets
regardless of the degree of uncertainty in the exchange environment. Panayides et al. (2015)
found that regulatory quality was an important institutional determinant of port PPP success that
attracted private bidders and the market competitiveness of the ports. Using Private Participation
in Infrastructure (PPI) data, Moszoro et al. (2015) showed that countries that significantly
improve the quality of regulation could gain 3% increase in infrastructure investments. Chou et
al. (2012) found that quality of regulation and governance were some of the important factors.
Pérez-D’Oleo et al. (2015) concluded that countries that improved in regulatory quality attracted
a higher level of investment through PPP projects. Sabry (2015) and Bota-Avram (2014) found
that good governance institutions with good regulatory quality help PPPs in performing well.
Thus, this study tests for the positive influence of regulatory quality on PPP governance and PPP
outcome.
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Rule of Law: Influence on PPP Governance and Outcome
“Rule of law” is “…the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules
of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and
the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence” (Kaufmann et al., 2010; p. 4). The
rule of law is also considered as a legal order consisting of predictable, enforceable and efﬁcient
rules required for a market economy to ﬂourish (Santos, 2012). The World Development Report
(WDR) issued in 2017 referred to the rule of law as the impersonal and systematic application of
known rules to government actors and citizens alike which is needed for a country to realize its
full social and economic potential (Chalmers and Pahuja (2019) or the guiding principle of
legitimate governance (Allan, 2003). The institutionalization of a legal system that is capable of
both authorizing and enforcing the new developmental state protects foreign investment. Salevao
(2005) emphasized the rule of law in its demands for the equality of all citizens, fairness in the
way government treats its citizens, the absence of arbitrary rule, responsibility and accountability
of government to the governed, equity, respect for human dignity, the protection of rights and
liberties (Salevao, 2005). The rule of law is the instrument that provides some guarantee that
government will be conducted justly, fairly, honestly, and openly for the benefit of all citizens of
the state (Salevao, 2005). Many aid projects in developing economies set the improvement and
strengthening of the rule of law as a condition. They support their decision with the argument
that a stronger rule of law leads to success in projects. Ranasinghe and Restuccia (2018) argued
that weak rule-of-law institutions substantially amplify the negative impact of financial frictions
and financial liberalization would be beneficial if property rights security results from the rule of
law.
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The literature showed that there is a positive relationship between the rule of law and PPP
investments and outcome. Moszoro et al.’ (2014) findings also showed that that PPP investment
in infrastructure is highly sensitive to the rule of law. Lee et al (2018) found that law and order
had an impact on PPP outcome. The rule of law in a developing country reduces the negative
relationship between risk allocation and private investment (Wang et al., 2019). Baker (2016)
also showed that regulatory quality had a positive impact in attracting private investors to PPP
markets. Moszoro et al. (2015) showed that the private sector is more likely to invest 4% more in
infrastructure if countries significantly improve the enforcement of the rule of law. Thus, this
study tests for the positive influence of rule of law on PPP governance and PPP outcome.
Control of Corruption: Influence on PPP Governance and Outcome
The control of corruption captures “…the extent to which public power is exercised for
private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as “capture” of the state
by elites and private interests” (Kaufmann et al., 2010; p. 4). Gberevbie et al. (2014) observe the
manifestation of unethical behavior amongst public officials as the major challenge hindering
development in the country. They recommended among others the need for the government to
strengthen the existing anti-corruption agencies to enable them to enforce proper ethical
standards. Mudassaar et al. (2019) found that corruption had a negative effect on economic
growth in developed and West Asian economies as corruption meant diversion of resources and
human talent and imposition of taxes which increases the cost of doing business. Ahmad, Ullah,
and Arfeen (2012) argued that while corruption may not reduce growth if other conducive factors
are in place, highs level of corruption of bureaucratic inefficiency erode domestic and foreign
direct investments and investments in education, health and infrastructure project. Anoruo and
Braha (2005) argued that corruption in Africa has a negative direct impact on economic growth
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as it lowers productivity. Indirectly, it impacts economic growth by hampering investments.
Dridi (2013) argued that corruption was most likely to reduce growth through its effects on
human capital and political instability. Freckleton, Wright, and Craigwell (2012) found that
corruption in the long run had no impact on growth as investors are usually driven by prospects
of profitability, government directed incentives, and local institutional and human capital
effectiveness.
The literature showed that there is a positive relationship between control of corruption
and PPP project operations. Lee et al (2018) found that the level of corruption had an impact on
PPP outcome and greater transparency and less corruption can significantly reduce a project’s
hazard rate. Moszoro et al. (2014) argued that PPP investment in infrastructure is highly sensitive
to freedom from corruption. Osei-Kyei and Chan (2016) studied transportation projects across
Nigeria, Mozambique, and South Africa. They found that allegations of corruption were one of
the failure factors of projects. Controlling corruption in a developing country reduces the
negative relationship between risk allocation and private investment (Wang et al., 2019). Pusok
(2016) examined PPP and corruption in the water and sanitation sectors in developing countries.
Pusok (2016) found that high corruption influenced the private actors to pursue profit
maximization over public needs, leading to inadequate water sanitation. Moszoro et al. (2015)
showed that the private sector is more likely to invest 7% more in a country that successfully
controls corruption. In the same study, they concluded that corruption in transport would not be
improved despite progress. Pérez-D’Oleo et al. (2015) concluded that countries that improved in
control of corruption attracted a higher level of investment through PPP projects. Galilea and
Medda (2009) found that the perception of a country’s level of corruption influenced the success
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of PPPs. Thus, this study tests for the positive influence of control of corruption on PPP
governance and PPP outcome.

Table 5: Sources, Factors, and Outcome
Governance Factors
Voice and accountability

Political stability

Government effectiveness

Regulatory quality

Rule of law

Control of corruption

Sources of
Factors
Kaufmann et
al., 2010; WGI
2018; Sultana ;
2012
Kaufmann et
al., 2010; WGI
2018
Kaufmann et
al., 2010; WGI
2018
Kaufmann et
al., 2010; WGI
2018
Kaufmann et
al., 2010; WGI
2018
Kaufmann et
al., 2010; WGI
2018;
Gberevbie et
al. (2014)

Sources of outcome
Lee et al., 2018; Galilea and Medda, 2009;
Wang et al., 2019; Pérez-D’Oleo et al., 2015 ;
Hayllar , 2010
Eberhard and Gratwick, 2013; Lee et al., 2018;
Osei-Kyei and Chan, 2017;Chou et al., 2012
Lee et al., 2018; D’Oleo et al., 2015; Sabry,
2015; Bota-Avram, 2014; Osei-Kyei and Chan,
2017; Unit, 2014; Pebble, 2015; IEG, 2019
Moszoro et al., 2014; Wang et al., 2019; Baker,
2016; Panayides et al., 2015 ; Chou et al.,
2012; Pérez-D’Oleo et al., 2015; Sabry, 2015;
Bota-Avram, 2014; IEG, 2019
Moszoro et al., 2014; Lee et al., 2018; Wang et
al., 2019 ; Baker, 2016; IEG, 2019
Lee et al., 2018; Moszoro et al., 2014; OseiKyei and Chan, 2016; Pusok, 2016; PérezD’Oleo et al., 2015; Galilea and Medda, 2009;
IEG, 2019

Table 5 summarized the authors and sources that studied governance factors. The authors
and sources for each factor are summarized. Table 5 then grouped the authors and sources that
found significant relationship between the governance factors and PPP outcome. The authors and
sources are grouped by factor.
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From the literature review, it was clear that the mediating role of PPP governance or the
practices of PPPs was not examined. The relationships between good governance and PPP
outcome, between PPP governance and PPP outcome, and between country governance and PPP
governance were ambiguously studied in previous research. This study fills the gap and address
the ambiguity in previous studies. The methods section shows how the relationships are studied
for the purpose of exploring the relationships and addressed the gaps.
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CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY
The methods section presents the main concepts, indicators and measures used in the
study. The endogenous, the endogenous mediator, the exogenous variables, and the control
variables are explained along with their measures. The methods section also presents the data
collection including the sample and the procedures for data collection; missing data, data
transformation, and the limitations of the data; and the methods of analysis including a
discussion of the use of the mediation analysis and multivariate regression.
Concepts, Indicators, and Measures
Country governance, PPP governance, and PPP outcome are the main concepts examined
in the dissertation. Country governance is composed of six indicators: voice and accountability,
political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of
corruption. The indicators were measured by a score of (-2.5) to (2.5). PPP governance is
composed of three main indicators composed of the three PPP stages: PPP preparation, PPP
procurement, and PPP contract management. They were measured by a score of 0 to 100. PPP
governance is also composed of 41 binary indicators measured by 1 for yes and 0 for no (See
Table 10 for binary indicators). PPP outcome is composed of seven indicators: achieved
objectives, quality at entry, quality of supervision, Bank overall performance, government
compliance, implementing agency, and borrowing government performance. The concepts,
indicators and measures were explored for a sample of 100 countries. The exogenous, mediatorendogenous, and endogenous variables were drawn from these concepts, indicators, and
measures. They were elaborated and explained in the rest of this chapter.
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Figure 5: Concepts, Indicators, and Measures
Background Concept
Good Governance and PPP Outcomes

Systematized concept 1

Systematized concept 2

Systematized concept 3

Good Governance

PPP Governance

PPP outcome

Indicators
Voice and accountability
Political stability
Government
effectiveness
Regulatory quality
Rule of law
Control of corruption

Scores and cases
Cases: 100 countries
Score of indicators per
country: From (-2.5) =poor
score to (2.5) high score.

Indicators
Stages:
PPP preparation
PPP procurement
PPP contract
management
Subcategories
41 practices

Scores and cases
Cases: 100 countries
Score of stage per country:
From 0 to 100.
Score of practice per
country: Yes=1 and No=0

Source: Figure 5 was adapted from Adcock and Collier (2001).

Indicators
Achieved objectives
Quality at entry
Quality of supervision
Bank overall performance
Government compliance
Implementing agency
Borrowing government
performance

Scores and cases
Cases: 100 countries
Score of project per country:
6-point Likert scale From
“highly satisfactory” =6 to
“highly unsatisfactory”=1.
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Endogenous Variable
The endogenous variable also known as independent variable is PPP outcome. The
outcome indicators were extracted from the PPP database collected by the Independent
Evaluation Group (IEG) on the World Bank lending projects that closed between the fiscal years
2001 and 2017 (IEG, 2019). The PPP outcome reported by the IEG included the following
indicators: sustainability scores, borrower preparation scores, institutional development impact
scores, achieved objective score, quality of entry, quality of supervision, overall bank
performance score, government compliance, implementing agency performance, and overall
borrower performance scores (IEG, 2019; IEG, 2019a). The IEG rated the projects based on the
satisfaction level and so were the indicators that measured the outcomes of the projects. A 6point Likert ordinal scale was used to rate the performance of each project. More specifically, the
indicators are rated as “highly satisfactory, satisfactory, moderately satisfactory, moderately
unsatisfactory, and unsatisfactory, highly unsatisfactory.” From the scale, it is understood that
projects are rated as “highly satisfactory” when they perform very well and “highly
unsatisfactory” when they perform very poorly. Therefore, numerical values from “6” to “1”
were assigned to the different scale items; “6” being “highly satisfactory” and “1” being “highly
unsatisfactory.” The levels of satisfaction “satisfactory”, “moderately satisfactory”, “moderately
unsatisfactory”, and “unsatisfactory” were rated 4, 3, 2 and 1 respectively. The numerical values
are used in the statistical analysis. The rating scales and definitions from the IEG report (See
IEG, 2019a) are as follows:
Highly Satisfactory: There were no shortcomings in the operation’s achievement of its
objectives, in its efficiency, or in its relevance.
Satisfactory: There were minor shortcomings in the operation’s achievement of its
objectives, in its efficiency, or in its relevance.
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Moderately Satisfactory: There were moderate shortcomings in the operation’s
achievement of its objectives, in its efficiency, or in its relevance.
Moderately Unsatisfactory: There were significant shortcomings in the operation’s
achievement of its objectives, in its efficiency, or in its relevance.
Unsatisfactory: There were major shortcomings in the operation’s achievement of its
objectives, in its efficiency, or in its relevance.
Highly Unsatisfactory: There were severe shortcomings in the operation’s achievement
of its objectives, in its efficiency, or in its relevance.
Not all the indicators were considered in the study. Only the indicators achieved
objectives, the quality of entry, the quality of supervision, government compliance,
implementing agency performance, and overall borrower performance scores were considered.
These indicators were retained because data were available. In addition, these indicators were
relevant for evaluating the outcome of the PPP projects from both the recipient country
perspective and the donor organization (World Bank) perspective.
Indicators such as sustainability scores, borrower preparation scores, institutional
development impact scores that were discontinued because of improvements in the rating system
were left out (IEG, 2019). For most of the countries, those indicators did not have any ratings
and were simply marked “Not Rated.” Indicators such as risk to development outcome (RDO)
and the quality of monitoring and evaluation (M&E) did not have any ratings and were left blank
in the database. These indicators were excluded from further consideration in the research. The
exclusion of the indicators has no impact on the conclusions of the research because these
indicators were independent from the indicators retained in the study.
Table 6 displays the frequencies for the seven PPP outcome variables composed of
achieved objectives (Obj), quality at entry (QAE), quality of supervision (QOS), bank overall
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performance (BOP), implementing agency performance (ImpAg), government performance
(GovPerf), and Borrower overall performance (BorOp). For example, there are no data for the
scale moderately unsatisfactory for the variable achieved objectives (Obj). For quality at entry
(QAE), there are no data for highly unsatisfactory and moderately unsatisfactory. For all the
variables, between 31% and 42 % of countries reported moderately satisfactory results. Between
24% and 40% of countries reported satisfactory results. Between 0% and 3% of countries
reported highly satisfactory results. The frequencies showed that there are few countries that
achieved highly satisfactory results whereas most countries have moderate or satisfactory results.
This implied that the results and conclusions are expected to be more applicable to developing
economies than developed economies.
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Table 6: Frequencies of the Endogenous Variables
Indicators

Achieved
Objectives

Quality at
entry

Quality of
supervision

Bank overall
performance

Government
performance

Borrower overall
performance

Perct

Implementing
agency
performance
Freq
Perct

Frequency &
percentage

Freq

Perct

Freq

Perct

Freq

Perct

Freq

Freq

Perct

Freq

Perct

Highly
Satisfactory

3

3

2

2

3

3

3

3

3

3

2

2

0

0

Satisfactory

31

31

31

31

40

40

28

28

31

31

24

24

27

27

Moderately
Satisfactory

36

36

31

31

34

34

42

42

32

32

40

40

33

33

Moderately
Unsatisfactory

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Unsatisfactory

29

29

36

36

23

23

27

27

34

34

33

33

35

35

Highly
Unsatisfactory

1

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

3

3
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The Endogenous Mediator Variable
The endogenous mediator variable is PPP governance. According to Acock (2013),
the endogenous mediator variable is independent with respect to some variables in the model
and dependent with respect to other variables. In other words, the endogenous mediator
variable plays a role between an exogenous variable and an endogenous variable and
therefore the mediator endogenous is situated in the middle. As it will be shown later in the
models, in a regression, the mediator endogenous variable behaves as an endogenous variable
with regards to the exogenous variable. With regards to the known endogenous variable, in a
regression, the mediator endogenous variable behaves as an exogenous variable. For this
research, PPP governance is the endogenous mediator variable, which means that it is
hypothesized to mediate the relationship between country governance and PPP outcome. The
mediator was extracted from the Procuring Infrastructure Public-Private Partnerships 2018
report (The World Bank, 2018a). The report is designed to help governments improve their
PPP regulatory quality.
The report reported on two components of PPP governance. The first component is
the scores of the stages of the PPP process including PPP preparation, PPP procurement, PPP
contract management, and unsolicited proposals. The four stages were rated 0 to 100. Higher
scores signify that an economy’s regulatory framework is in greater compliance with
internationally recognized good practices in an area. Lower scores indicate that there is
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considerable room for improvement because of less adherence to international good practices
considered in the report (The World Bank, 2018a).
The second component comprises the subcategories of the three categories including
PPP preparation scores, PPP procurement scores, and PPP contract management scores.
There are thirteen subcategories for PPP preparation, 13 for PPP procurement, ten for PPP
contract management, and five for unsolicited proposals (The World Bank, 2018a). The
indicators excluding those of the unsolicited proposals are provided in Tables 2, 3 and 4.
The rating of the subcategories was complex. For example, for the indicator, fiscal
treatment of PPPs, there were four different scores even after a country stated that such
indicator was enforced. For the example of fiscal treatment of PPPs, a score of 0.5 was given
if there was a specific budgetary treatment of PPPs based on a regulatory provision. A score
of 0.25 was given if yes based on a recognized practice. A score of 0.5 was given if there was
a specific accounting system for PPPs based on a regulatory provision. A score of 0.25 was
given if the answer was based on a recognized practice. There were about 10 different scores
for the indicator, mechanisms inclusion in the PPP contract’s monitoring and evaluation
system (The World Bank, 2018a). To avoid this complexity and ensure reliability in the data,
the subcategories are recoded simply yes when a practice was enforced and no when it was
not. The binary values of 1 and 0 were assigned to the responses, 1 for yes, and 0 for no.
Not all the binary indicators were used in the study. The unsolicited proposals (USP)
scores were not considered in the research because there were no ratings across several
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countries. Traditionally, the USP is not also considered a step or stage in the PPP project
process. The Procuring Infrastructure Public-Private Partnerships 2018 report which report
data on the USP referred to the USP as a special module (The World Bank, 2018a). Other
binary variables were excluded for measurement validity considerations (See measurement
validity section). The retained variables are displayed in Table 8. The PPP governance exists
for the year 2017.
The year 2017 was retained to ensure that an acceptable sample was used in the
dissertation. A total of 135 countries were assessed in 2017. Before 2017, there were two
previous reports on PPP governance in 2015 and 2016 which respectively reported on 10 and
82 countries. The 2015 report focused on two main thematic areas which included the
procurement process and the public procurement complaint review mechanisms. The 2015
report covered a total of eight indicators. The indicators comprised needs assessment, call for
tender, and bid preparation; bid submission phase; bid opening, evaluation, and awarding
phase; content and management of the procurement contract; performance guarantee;
payment of suppliers; complaints submitted to the first-tier review body during the pre-award
stage; and complaints submitted to the second-tier review body before the awarding of the
contract. The data for 2015 could not be used because the data was limited to only eight
countries. The 2016 report used a more descriptive approach and did not provide detailed
information that could be used in the dissertation.
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Even though the objectives of the reports were to help government improve their PPP
contract process, the 2015, 2016, and 2017 reports measured different indicators. Table 7 is
an example of the comparison of appraisal scores of 10 countries for 2015, 2016, and 2017.
The ten countries are compared using the following indicators: the socio-economic impact,
financial viability or bankability, affordability assessment, comparative assessment, market
assessment, risk identification, assessment, and allocation among the countries.
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Table 7: PPP Appraisal Scores for 10 Countries Over Three Years
Country

Year

Cameroun

2015
2016
2017
2015
2016
2017
2015
2016
2017
2015
2016
2017
2015
2016
2017
2015
2016
2017
2015
2016
2017
2015
2016
2017
2015
2016
2017
2015
2016
2017

Colombia

Egypt

Ghana

Kenya

Nigeria

Peru

South Africa

Tanzania

Tunisia

Socio-economic
impact

Financial Viability

Affordability
assessment

Comparative
assessment

Market
assessment

Risk identification

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓
✓

✓
✓

✓
✓

✓
✓

✓
x

✓
✓

✓
✓

✓
✓

✓
x

✓
✓

✓
✓

✓
✓

✓
x

✓
✓

✓
✓

✓
✓

✓
x

✓
✓

✓
✓

✓
✓

✓
✓

✓
✓

✓
✓

✓
✓

✓
✓

✓
✓

✓
✓

✓
✓

✓
✓

✓
✓

✓
✓

✓
✓

✓
✓

✓
✓

✓
x

✓
✓

✓
✓

✓
✓

✓
✓

✓
✓

✓
✓

✓
✓

✓
✓

✓
✓

✓
✓

✓
✓

✓
x

✓
✓

✓
x

✓
x

✓
x

✓
x

x
x

✓
x

✓

✓

✓

✓

x

x
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Table 7 shows that all countries enforced all the indicators except that Tanzania, Peru,
Ghana, and Columbia did not conduct market assessment. Egypt did not conduct any
affordability assessment. Ghana did not conduct any socio-economic impact (IBRD, 2015).
Tunisia is the only country that did not conduct any assessment for the year 2015. Overall,
there is consistency in the scores of those countries based on the indicators. It was important
to show this consistency because of the lack of available data for all three years for a
considerable number of countries. Furthermore, it shows that PPP governance is considered
by countries in their past practices. The issue is that data was collected extensively before
2017.
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Table 8: Frequency of Binary Variables
Variables
Central Budgetary Authority
Fiscal treatment
PPP prioritization
Economic assessment
Fiscal affordability assessment
Risk identification
Financial viability assessment
Market Sounding analysis
Environment impact assessment
Assessments included in the RFP
Draft PPP contract included in the RFP
Standardized PPP model contracts
Publication of contract
System to manage implementation
System for tracking progress
Monitoring and evaluation system
Foreign companies to repatriate income
Evaluation committee qualifications
Public procurement notice of the PPP issued
Foreign companies participate in PPP bidding
Minimum period/time to submit bid (>=60 days)
Tender documents detail the stages of the process
Clarification questions for procurement notice
Pre-bidding conference
Financial model submitted with proposal
Treatment when only one proposal is received
Negotiations with the selected bidder
Circumstances during the life of the PPP contract regulated
Dispute resolution mechanisms
Lenders step-in right
Ground for termination
Publication of award notice
Standstill period
Modification of the PPP contract regulated
Change in the structure of the private partner

Frequency
Yes No
88
12
37
63
86
14
92
8
85
15
82
18
81
19
49
51
81
19
42
58
77
23
34
66
53
47
86
14
77
23
91
9
98
2
74
26
99
1
97
3
93
7
94
6
95
5
50
50
49
51
61
39
58
42
96
4
99
1
46
54
90
10
91
9
39
61
84
16
67
33

Percent
Yes No
88
12
37
63
86
14
92
8
85
15
82
18
81
19
49
51
81
19
42
58
77
23
34
66
53
47
86
14
77
23
91
9
98
2
74
26
99
1
97
3
93
7
94
6
95
5
50
50
49
51
61
39
58
42
96
4
99
1
46
54
90
10
91
9
39
61
84
16
67
33

Table 8 displays the frequencies of the binary variables. Table 8 showed how many
times countries answered yes and no to each of the practices. The frequencies are important
because they help understand how frequently countries enforce the internationally recognized
PPP practices. For instance, less than 50 countries did not implement seven practices,
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meaning that the frequencies for those seven practices is less than 50. In other words, at least
50 countries have implemented the rest of the practices. 99% of the countries enforced the
dispute resolution mechanisms, meaning that 99 countries out of the 100 answered “yes.” The
implementation of the practice pre-bid conference is split at 50% for those that implemented
it and those that did not.
Exogenous Variable
Country governance is the exogenous variable and is characterized by six indicators
including voice and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory
quality, rule of law, and control of corruption (Kaufmann, et al., 2010; The World Bank,
2019a). The indicators were extracted from the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI)
dataset (The World Bank, 2019a). The WGI project constructs aggregate indicators of six
broad dimensions of governance from 1996 to 2017. The data are gathered from several
survey institutions, think tanks, non-governmental organizations, international organizations,
and private sector firms (The World Bank, 2019a). The aggregate of data from these entities
yielded the scores on the good governance indicators. The estimates of governance
performance for each variable range from approximately (-2.5) equal weak to (2.5) equal
strong. For this dissertation, the data for the year 2017 were used because data for the same
year were used for the endogenous and endogenous mediator variables. The data were used to
examine the impact of governance for various regional and income-based entities. For
example, Pérez-D’Oleo et al. (2015) and Wang, Liu, Xiong, and Song (2019) used the data to
examine the influence of institutional environment on the investment carried out through
PPPs in 80 middle-and-low income countries for the period 1996–2011. The exogenous
variables are described in Table 9.
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Control Variables
Two control variables are used in the study. The first is the gross national income per
capita (GNI) referred to as GNI in the rest of the text. The GNI is used by international
organizations such as the World Bank to classify countries into groups based on the income
level. The GNI is used is used a control variable because the level of development including
the economic and financial conditions of people influence not only the PPP governance but
also the outcome of PPPs. In other words, people in a developed economy are more likely to
ask for accountability than people in a less developed economy. However, there are some
weaknesses associated with the use of the GNI. According to the World Bank, the GNI is
often underestimated in lower-income countries that rely on informal and subsistence
activities. In addition, the GNI does not reflect income inequalities in a country (The World
Bank Group, 2020). This research tests whether the GNI influences the outcome of the PPP
projects. The fact that the GNI is collected and reported in U.S. dollars alongside the PPP
governance scores is another reason why its influence is tested (The World Bank, 2018a).
The second control variable is democracy. Democracy is seen as a system of strong
institutions that guarantees freedom of expression, human rights, and transparency and
fairness. The policies and programs of development are more likely to lead to more efficient
and effective outcomes than in a non-democracy. Das and Kirk (2016) for example found the
lower income countries with market-creating and market-stabilizing institutions had positive
economic growth. That means countries that can improve their democratic governance
including openness, transparency, and deliberative decision-making model will improve
infrastructure investments (Hudon, 2011). Galilea and Medda (2009) linked democratic
accountability to success in PPP projects. The consideration of democratic mechanisms is
seen as necessary to prevent inequitable concentrations of power (Hayllar, 2010). Strong
democratic institutions lead to political stability as all voices are allowed and considered.
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Easterly and Levine (1997) and Easterly et al. (2006) argued that the lack of political stability
due to ethnic divisions and wars had negative impact on development. Thus, it is necessary to
test whether the overall democratic strength in countries affect their PPP outcome.
The data were extracted from Freedom House, which reported on the freedom scores.
Freedom depends on the degree of democratic climate of countries. The democratic climate is
assessed using the political liberties component and the civil rights component. The political
liberties component comprises the electoral process, political pluralism and participation, and
functioning of government (Freedom House, 2017). The civil rights comprise the freedom of
expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, and personal
autonomy and individual rights (Freedom House, 2017). The dissertation uses the aggregate
scores which ranges from 0 to 100.
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Table 9: List of Variable, Measures, and Sources
Group
Mediator

Variable
PPP preparation (Subcategories)
PPP procurement (Subcategories)

Endogenous
variables

Contract management
(Subcategories)
Outcome rating

Measures
Total scores out of 100
Yes=1, No=0
Total scores out of 100
Yes=1, No=0
Total scores out of 100
Yes=1, No=0
“Highly Satisfactory” = 6 to
“Highly unsatisfactory” =1

Bank perf.

Exogenous
Variables

Control Variables

Quality of entry
Quality of supervision
Overall bank perf.
Borr perf. Govt compliance
Implementing agency
Overall Borr. perf
Voice and accountability

Data type
Continuous
Binary
Continuous
Binary
Continuous
Binary
Ordinal

Source
IPPP Report 2018

Countries/Years
Selected countries, 2017

IPPP Report 2018

Selected countries, 2017

IPPP Report 2018
TPPI Report

project scores

Ordinal
Ordinal
Ordinal
Ordinal
Ordinal
Ordinal
Interval

The PPI Report
The PPI Report
The PPI Report
The PPI Report
The PPI Report
The PPI Report
WGI 2018

project scores
project scores
project scores
project scores
project scores
project scores
2017 estimate

Selected countries, 2017

Political stability

-2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong)

Interval

WGI 2018

2017 estimate

Government effectiveness
Regulatory quality

-2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong)
-2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong)

Interval
Interval

WGI 2018
WGI 2018

2017 estimate
2017 estimate

Rule of law

-2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong)

Interval

WGI 2018

2017 estimate

Control of corruption
Gross National Income
Freedom/Democracy

-2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong)
GNI per capital (USD)
0-100

Interval
continuous
continuous

WGI 2018
WGI 2018
Freedom House

2017 estimate
2017 estimate
2017 scores

68

Table 9 presents the groups of mediators, endogenous, exogenous, and control variables. The
mediator, composed of the three categories of PPP governance, is a continuous variable rated
out of 100 for the year 2017. The mediator variable is also composed of 41 subcategories.
Details of those factors are presented in Table 10. The endogenous variable is composed
achieved objectives, the Bank overall performance, and borrower country performance. The
World Bank performance and the borrower country performance have each three subelements. They have ordinal data for the year 2017 rated “Highly Satisfactory” equal 6 to
“Highly unsatisfactory” equal 1. The exogenous variable, country governance, is composed
of six interval data variables rated (-2.5 equal week) to (2.5 equal strong). The data exist for
2017. The control variables include the gross national income (GNI) and the aggregate
democratic scores.
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Table 10: PPP Governance Subcategories
Categories
Preparation
of PPPs (13)

Procurement
of PPPs (18)

Subcategories
Central Budgetary Authority’s approval
Fiscal treatment of PPPs
PPP’s prioritization consistent with public investment prioritization
Economic analysis assessment
Fiscal affordability assessment
Risk identification
Financial viability assessment
PPP vs. Public Procurement comparative assessment
Market Sounding analysis
Environment impact assessment
Assessments included in the RFP
Draft PPP contract included in the RFP
Standardized PPP model contracts
Evaluation committee members’ qualifications
Public procurement notice of the PPP issued
Foreign companies participate in PPP bidding
Minimum period/time to submit bid (>=60 days)
Availability of various procurement procedures
Direct negotiation not discretionary
Tender documents detail the stages of the process
Tender documents specify prequalification criteria
Clarification questions for procurement notice and/or the RFP
Pre-bidding conference
Financial model submitted with proposal
Proposals evaluated in accordance with published evaluation criteria
Treatment when only one proposal is received
Publication of award notice
Notification of the results of the PPP procurement process to all bidders
Negotiations with the selected bidder before contract signing
Standstill period
Publication of contract

Measure
Yes (1) or No (0)

Data Type
Binary

Source, Country, year
IPPP Report 2018
Selected countries, 2017

Yes (1) or No (0)

Binary
IPPP Report 2018
Selected countries, 2017
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Table 10 Continued
Contract
management (10)

System to manage the implementation of the PPP contract
System for tracking progress and completion of construction works
Monitoring and evaluation system
Foreign companies permitted to repatriate income
Change in the structure of the private partner
Modification/renegotiation of the PPP contract regulated
Circumstances that may occur during the life of the PPP contract regulated
Dispute resolution mechanisms
Lenders step-in rights
Grounds for termination of a PPP contract

Yes (1) or No (0)

Binary
IPPP Report 2018
Selected countries, 2017
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Table 10 listed the subcategories for the categories of PPP governance. The dichotomous data
exist for 2017. The data were coded 1 for “yes” answers and 0 for “no” answers. The
subcategories were extracted from the Procuring Infrastructure Public-Private Partnerships
2018 (The World Bank, 2018a).
Data Collection
Sample
The unit of analysis is the country. The population of the study comprises 189
member countries of the World Bank (The World Bank, 2018b). For PPP governance, the
sampling population for which data were collected consisted of 135 countries in the
Procuring Infrastructure Public-Private Partnerships 2018 (The World Bank, 2018a). Not all
135 countries had available or usable data. Countries with significant missing data were
removed from the analysis. The final sample for this study is limited to 100 countries or
observations. Of the 100 countries, 32 are sub-Saharan African, 21 are in Europe and central
Asia, 16 in Latin America and Caribbean, 10 in East Asia and Pacific, 8 in Middle East and
North Africa, 7 in OECD high income countries, and 6 in South Asia. For the exogenous
variable (country governance), data exist from 1996 to 2017 for a total of 214 countries or
authorities. The data were extracted from the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) (The
World Bank, 2019a). The estimates of good governance indicators for the year 2017 were
used because the data on the PPP governance are also available for the year 2017 only. The
PPP governance had data for the years 2015 and 2016 but these data were not used because
they existed for only a few countries. In addition, for the year 2016, not only were the
indicators used different from the indicators for 2015 and 2017 but the process for data
collection was not elaborated. For example, the indicators used in 2015 and 2017 were not
used in 2016, which explained the empty cells in Table 7 where the appraisal scores are
displayed.
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For the exogenous variable, PPP outcome, the collection years go back to the 1960s
on individual projects from various sectors for each country (IEG, 2019). Scores of PPI exist
for countries around the world. Countries have benefited from several PPP transportation
projects from the World Bank since the 1960s. Some countries have benefited from projects
as recently as 2017. The scores of the last project for each country were considered as they
are more likely to represent the country’s current performance on PPP. The dataset contains
the project approval date when the World Bank approved the project and the deactivation
date when the project was completed and formally closed. The countries for which data are
available are listed in Table 11.
The sample of 100 countries is debatable. Scholars have debated and proposed the
sample size that is ideal for the structural equation modeling method. This discussion is
relevant for this study that uses the generalized structural modeling (GSEM). The minimum
sample size that must be used is at least 10 times the number of parameters that can be
estimated in the model (Jayaram, Kannan, and Tan, 2004). Ramirez stated that the traditional
approach is 10 subjects per parameter, not per variable (Chapter 17). Ramirez recommended
a minimum of 100 subjects even if there are only a few parameters. However, if there are far
more than 10 subjects per parameter, this may lead to a statistically significant chi-square
even if the model fits relatively well (Chapter 17). Some suggested the minimum sample size
for structural equation modeling at 150 (Bentler and Chou, 1987). Other put it at 200-500 or
at least 200 (Celik and Yılmaz, 2013). Huber (2014) stated that the rule of thumb is to have
more than 200 observations but added that 100 observations can be adequate. The ratios of
observations to free parameters frequently encountered are 5:1 up to 20:1.
Scholars used different sample sizes in studies where countries were the unit of
analysis. Langbein and Knack (2010) used a sample of 216 countries to validate the indexes
of worldwide governance indicators (WGI) using path, factor, and confirmatory factor
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analyses. Wang, Liu, Xiong, and Song (2019) used a sample of 138 countries to study the
moderating role of governance environment on the relationship between risk allocation and
private investment. Nokelainen showed that smaller numbers of (n=108) randomized were
acceptable. Subsamples of approximately 20% of cases can also be used in structural
equation modeling (SEM). In the study on the the contribution of public libraries to
countries’ economic productivity, Liu (2004) used 61 countries in the path analysis study.
Muchdie (2017) studied economic growth and happiness using a cross-nation path analysis
model. Data on the happiness index were from 156 countries, data on economic growth from
178 countries, and data on human development indexes were from 155 countries. They
solved the problems of missing data by deleting countries with incomplete data. The final
sample on happiness, economic growth, and human development had 124 countries. They
reported the results by grouping the countries into low, medium, and high-income categories.
There were groups of 9, 11, 12, 14, 15, 17, 20, and 41 countries. Diaz (2007) used a sample
of 73 countries to analyze the effect of remittances on economic growth using path analysis.
Kock and Gaskins (2014) used 24 Latin American and 23 sub-Saharan African countries in
their study on the mediating role of voice and accountability in the relationship between
internet diffusion and government corruption in those regions from 2006-2010. They
multiplied the 47 countries by 5 to get a sample size of 235 data points. Thus, the sample of
100 observations can be used in this study. The subsamples are shown in Table 11.
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Table 11: Country Income Classification
Level of
Low-Income
Development Economies
($1,025 or less)
Countries
1. Afghanistan
2. Benin
3. Burkina
Faso
4. Burundi
5. Chad
6. Congo,
Dem. Rep.
7. Eritrea
8. Ethiopia
9. Guinea
10. Haiti
11. Madagascar
12. Malawi
13. Mali
14. Mozambique
15. Niger
16. Rwanda
17. Senegal
18. Sierra Leone
19. Somalia
20. Tanzania
21. Togo
22. Uganda
23. Zimbabwe

Lower-MiddleIncome Economies
($1,026 to $4,035)
1. Armenia
2. Bangladesh
3. Cambodia
4. Cameroon
5. Côte d´Ivoire
6. Djibouti
7. Egypt, Arab
Rep.
8. Ghana
9. Guatemala
10. Honduras
11. India
12. Indonesia
13. Kenya
14. Kosovo
15. Kyrgyz
Republic
16. Lao PDR
17. Moldova
18. Mongolia
19. Morocco
20. Myanmar
21. Nicaragua
22. Nigeria
23. Pakistan
24. Papua New
Guinea
25. Philippines
26. Sri Lanka
27. Sudan
28. Tajikistan
29. Tunisia
30. Ukraine
31. Vietnam
32. Zambia

Upper-Middle-Income
Economies ($4,036 to
$12,475)
1. Albania
2. Algeria
3. Angola
4. Argentina
5. Azerbaijan
6. Bosnia &
Herzegovina
7. Belarus
8. Botswana
9. Brazil
10. Bulgaria
11. China
12. Colombia
13. Costa Rica
14. Dominican
Republic
15. Ecuador
16. Gabon
17. Georgia
18. Iraq
19. Jamaica
20. Jordan
21. Kazakhstan
22. Lebanon
23. Macedonia, FYR
24. Malaysia
25. Mauritius
26. Mexico
27. Montenegro
28. Panama
29. Paraguay
30. Peru
31. Romania
32. Russian Federation
33. Serbia
34. Thailand
35. Turkey

High Income
Economies
(>$12,475)
1. Chile
2. Croatia
3. Estonia
4. Hungary
5. Korea Rep
6. Latvia
7. Lithuania
8. Poland
9. Portugal
10. Slovak
Republic
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Table 11 shows the list of countries based on income level for the year 2017.
Countries are classified into four main groups: low-income economies, lower-middle-income
economies, upper-middle-income economies, and high-income economies. Of the 102
economies, 23 countries are low-income economies; 32 are lower-middle-income economies;
35 are upper-middle income economies; and 10 are high-income economies. The income
level represents the gross national income (GNI) per capita. The lowest GNI in Table 11 is
$570 for Afghanistan. The highest GNI is $27,000 for South Korea. Except South Korea, no
other country has $20,000 GNI. The GNI for the 10 high-income countries in Table 11 is
slightly above the threshold.
Procedures
The dissertation examines multiple relationships between three sets of factors:
Country governance factors, PPP governance factors, and PPP outcome factors. PPP
governance data are gathered from the Procuring Infrastructure Public-Private Partnerships
2018 report, downloaded from the World Bank website (See the World Bank, 2018a). Three
types of data are extracted from the report. First, the data for the main stages of PPP
governance including PPP preparation, PPP procurement, and contract management were
collected. The report rates each of the stages 0 to 100 per country. Second, each of the main
stages has subcategories that are rated in the reports. There is a total of 41 subcategories.
Scores of 1, 0.5, and 0.25 are assigned to each of the subcategories. The system of rating is
too specific, but the details are irrelevant for this study. For example, a subcategory may be
rated 0.5 because a country does not fully enforce the practice or subcategory. Furthermore,
no specific method was used to show how the sub-scores sum up to an aggregate score in the
main stages. Therefore, when collecting the data for the subcategories, any “Yes” answer is
recoded 1 and any “No” answer is recoded 0. Third, the gross national income per capita

76

(GNI) per country is also extracted from the report. The data are reported in thousands of
dollars. The three types of data are copied and pasted in an excel spreadsheet.
PPP outcome data were extracted from the independent evaluators group (IEG). The
excel version of the project performance ratings data was downloaded from the IEG website
(see IEG, 2019a). The IEG World Bank Project Performance Ratings Codebook was also
downloaded and served as a guide for understanding the data (IEG, 2019a). The data were
filtered to isolate transportation projects. For each country, there were several projects that
were executed over several years. The study focused on projects that were more recently
executed for each country. That is because the projects were awarded at different times. Thus,
projects for countries were identified by the closing date of the project, which is usually the
most recent date and year. Once the project for each country was identified, values were
assigned to the Likert scale items. The responses on the performance on each project were
“highly satisfactory, satisfactory, moderately satisfactory, moderately unsatisfactory, and
unsatisfactory, highly unsatisfactory.” Each of the scale items were then assigned the
corresponding value from 6 to 1; 6 being the highest score and 1 being the lowest score.
Countries that did not contain data on transportation projects were excluded.
Country governance data were extracted from the worldwide governance indicators
file. The data were downloaded in excel version from the World Bank data catalog (See the
World Bank, 2019b). The file contained estimates of six good governance indicators for all
countries over several decades. The indicators were rated (-2.50 to 2.5). The 2017 estimates
were reported in the excel spreadsheet along with the PPP governance and PPP outcome data.
Only countries that had PPP governance data, PPP outcome data, and country governance
data were retained.
Two control variables were included in the dataset: The GNI and democracy. The
GNI was reported from the 2018 procuring infrastructure public-private partnerships. The
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democracy score is obtained from the Freedom House, which reported the freedom scores for
countries (Freedom House, 2017). The score is an aggregate of the political liberties scores
and civil liberties scores.
Missing Data
Of 135 countries for which data on PPP governance were collected, 35 countries were
removed from the study because those countries had missing data when matched with the
PPP outcome dataset from which the endogenous variables were drawn. Thus, some countries
that had PPP governance scores had no data on PPP outcome for transportation projects.
When no data existed for those countries, they were noted as “Not rated.” Thus, while
country governance and PPP governance had larger available observations, the number of
observations was reduced to correspond to the number of countries which had available PPP
outcome data. In short, the number of observations was narrowed as a result of matching
across all three types of datasets.
Data Transformation
For the mediator, the study used three main categories which were rated 0 to 100. The
subcategories were dichotomous, with “yes or no” questions. These elements were recorded
in the study as 1 for “yes” and 0 for “no.” For the country governance scores, no changes
were made to the scores which initially ranged from (-2.5) to (+2.5). As for the PPP outcome,
the data were rated from “highly satisfactory” to “highly unsatisfactory” with a maximum of
6 rating in the scale. The data were recoded 6 for “highly satisfactory” and 1 for “highly
unsatisfactory.”
Limitation of Data
There are some limitations to the use of data. For the mediator variable, PPP
governance, data exist for 135 countries collected for the year 2017, which limits the number
of countries that could be used in the study. Furthermore, not all the 135 countries had data
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reported across both the exogenous and endogenous variables. The sample is finally
narrowed down to 100 countries. Thus, the number of observations is relatively low.
However, considering that the total number of countries is 189, and that the data on the
mediator were collected for 135 countries, the sample size of 100 is reasonable.
A second limitation is that the data for the mediator is available for only the year
2017. That is because the data collection for PPP governance started in 2015 with a pilot
study of 10 countries followed by a 2016 assessment on 82 countries (The World Bank,
2018a). The 2017 assessment covered 135 countries. The 2017 assessment of 135 countries
has the largest number of countries ever covered on PPP governance. The newness of the
collection of data on PPP practices explains the limited number of countries covered.
Methods of Analysis
Mediation Analysis
A mediation analysis is an analysis where an exogenous variable affects an
endogenous variable, not directly but rather through an intervening process captured by the
endogenous mediator variable (Iacobucci, 2008). Baron and Kenny (1986), Iacobucci (2008),
and Kenny (2018) argued that four steps or conditions must be met. The researcher must be
able to show that
1. the causal variable is correlated with the outcome
2. the causal variable is correlated with the mediator
3. the mediator affects the outcome variable
4. M (mediator) completely mediates the X-Y relationship.
Acock (2013) argued that contrary to early requirements, recent models of mediation
do not require the existence of correlations. Iacobucci (2008) added that only partial
mediation is reached if only the first three steps are supported. In addition, the effect of the
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exogenous variable (X) directly on the endogenous variable (Y) becomes significantly
smaller in size relative to the effect size in the second equation (Iacobucci, 2008).
According to Kenny (2018), the effects of the mediational model can be estimated
using multiple regressions, ordinary least squares (OLS), logistic regression, multilevel
modeling, and structural equal modeling (Kenny, 2018). Baron and Kenny (1986) and Acock
(2013) suggest estimating three regression equations for testing the mediating role of a
variable. First, one should regress the mediator on the exogenous variable. Second, one
should regress the endogenous variable on the exogenous variable. Third, one should regress
the endogenous variable on both the exogenous variable and on the mediator (Baron and
Kenny, 1986).
Kenny’s (2018) approach is relevant for this dissertation because it shows that one
does not need to necessarily run a single mediation model with SEM. Kenny’s (2018)
approach showed that by running the correct models using the correct variables, one is able to
determine the effect of a mediator. As stated earlier, the variables used in this dissertation are
ordinal, dichotomous, interval, and continuous. The data therefore violate the assumptions of
normality required for structural equation modeling with an endogenous variable, a mediator,
and an exogenous variable. Again, multivariate regression appeared as the correct methods to
test the data. However, when one is faced with the challenge of running a multivariate ordinal
logistic regression, the alternative is to use the generalized version of structural equation
model known as GSEM. GSEM is useful to run sets of equations with variables including any
data type. The study uses a GSEM because the endogenous variable outcome is composed of
ordinal variables. The GSEM method allows the use of ordinal, continuous, categorical and
interval data. Several exogenous variables can be entered simultaneously.
Following Kenny’s (2018) approach, this dissertation explores the mediating role of
PPP governance on the relationship between country governance and PPP outcome using
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regression. The mediation claim is reached by comparing its results with sequential analyses.
It is required to identify the direct relationship between country governance and PPP
outcome. Following Kenny’s approach means that three main models will be run. First, the
influence of country governance on PPP outcome is tested. The main hypothesis is:
H1: Country governance has a positive influence on PPP outcome.
Equation 1: PPP outcome = f ((voice and accountability, political stability,
government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, control of corruption) +
(GNI, democracy)).
Second, the relationship between country governance, and the mediator, PPP
governance is tested. The main hypothesis tested is:
H2: Country governance has a positive influence on PPP governance. The following subhypotheses are tested using the GSEM regression.
H2a) Country governance has a positive influence on PPP governance (main variables)
H2b) Country governance has a positive influence on PPP preparation (subcategories)
H2c) Country governance has a positive influence on PPP procurement (subcategories)
H2d) Country governance has a positive influence on contract management (subcategories)
Equation 2: PPP governance = f ((voice and accountability, political stability and
absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, control
of corruption) + (GNI, democracy)).
Equation 3: PPP governance (PPP preparation, PPP procurement, contract
management) = f ((voice and accountability, political stability and absence of
violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, control of
corruption) + (GNI, democracy)).
Equation 3a: PPP governance (subcategories of PPP preparation) = f ((voice and
accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness,
regulatory quality, rule of law, control of corruption) + (GNI, democracy)).
Equation 3b: PPP governance (subcategories of PPP procurement) = f ((voice and
accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness,
regulatory quality, rule of law, control of corruption) + (GNI, democracy)).
Equation 3c: PPP governance (subcategories of PPP contract management) = f
((voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government
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effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, control of corruption) + (GNI,
democracy)).
Third, the relationship between PPP governance and PPP outcome is tested. The main
hypothesis is:
H3: PPP governance has a positive influence on PPP outcome.
The following sub-hypotheses are tested using the GSEM regression.
H3a: PPP governance has a positive influence on PPP outcome (Main variables)
H3b) PPP preparation has a positive influence on PPP outcome.
H3c) PPP procurement has a positive influence on PPP outcome.
H3d) Contract management has a positive influence on PPP outcome.
The end goal was to evaluate whether PPP governance mediates the relationship
between country governance and PPP outcome. Thus, the role of the mediator PPP
governance on the relationship between country governance and PPP outcome was
determined using the results from the three previous models. The complex models run in
STATA (See Table 12) yielded some results that allow for the analysis of the multiple
relationships between the endogenous, exogenous, and mediator variables. The goal was to
determine the mediating role of PPP governance, hence:
H4: PPP governance mediates the relationship between PPP country governance and PPP
outcome.
To determine the mediating role, it becomes necessary to set the following sub-hypotheses.
H4a: PPP governance mediates the relationship between PPP country governance and PPP
outcome (Main variables).
H4b) PPP preparation mediates the relationship between PPP country governance and PPP
outcome.
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H4c) PPP procurement mediates the relationship between PPP country governance and PPP
outcome.
H4d) Contract management mediates the relationship between PPP country governance and
PPP outcome.
Hypotheses 1, 2 and 3 are examined for each of the income level groups. The fourth
hypothesis is not tested within the income level groups because of limited sample for
examining the mediating role of PPP governance.
Multivariate Regression
The multivariate regression is “a kind of structural model in which each member of a
set of observed endogenous variables is a function of the same set of observed exogenous
variables and a unique random disturbance term” (StataCorp, 2019, p. 653). In a multivariate
regression, the disturbances are correlated. It is important to note that multivariate is
different from multilevel structural equation modeling. In effect, multilevel structural
equation modeling refers to “the simultaneous handling of group-level effects, which can be
nested or crossed” (StataCorp, 2019, p. 313). With the multilevel modeling, the researcher
used subjects are nested in subgroup, and that subgroup itself is nested in a larger group. An
example of a multilevel modeling would be study where the researcher considers students as
subjects nested into classrooms, classrooms nested into schools, and stated nested into states.
Because different measurements including binary and ordinal variables are used, only
the generalized structural equation modeling (GSEM) could be used to test the relationship
between the exogenous, mediator endogenous, and endogenous variables. A total of four
models were tested. The models are displayed in Table 12. With GSEM, the measurements
can be continuous, binary, count, categorical, ordered, fractional, and survival times
(StataCorp, 2019). Generalized linear response variables allow fitting logistic, probit,
Poisson, multinomial logistic, ordered logit, ordered probit, beta, and other models
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(StataCorp, 2019). The multivariate ordinal logit regression was used to test Model 1 and
Model 3 because the endogenous variables (see Table 12) were ordinal. The subcategories of
the mediator variable were binary variables, which called for the use of the Bernoulli (logit)
distribution. Two continuous control variables, including democracy and GNI, were included
in all models to assess whether they affected the endogenous variables (See Table 12).
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Table 12: Models for Testing Hypotheses
Models
Purpose

Model 1
Influence of country governance
on PPP outcomes
H1
- Achieved objectives
- Quality at entry
- Quality of supervision
- Bank overall performance
- Implementing agency
performance
- Government compliance
- Borrowing government
performance

Model 2(a, b, c, d)
Influence of country governance
on PPP governance
H2
- PPP preparation, PPP
procurement, PPP contract
management
- Subcategories of PPP
preparation
- Subcategories of PPP
procurement
- Subcategories of contract
management

Model 3 (a, b, c, d)
Influence of PPP governance
on PPP outcome
H3
- Achieved objectives
- Quality at entry
- Quality of supervision
- Bank overall performance
- Implementing agency performance
- Government compliance
- Borrowing government performance

Model 4 (a, b, c, d)
Mediating role of PPP
governance
H4
- PPP outcome
and PPP governance (see
Model 1, 2, and 3).

Mediating variables
Exogenous variables

NA
- Voice and accountability
- Political stability
- Government effectiveness
- Regulatory quality
- Rule of law
- Control of corruption

NA
- Voice and accountability
- Political stability
- Government effectiveness
- Regulatory quality
- Rule of law
- Control of corruption

NA
- PPP preparation, procurement,
contract management
- Subcategories of PPP preparation
- Subcategories of PPP procurement
- Subcategories of contract
management

PPP governance
- Country governance and
PPP governance (See
Model 1, 2, and 3).

Control variables

-

Score of democracy
- Gross National Income per capita
(GNI)
- Multivariate ordinal logistic
regression (Bernouli, logit)

-

Analysis method

Score of democracy
- Gross National Income per
capita (GNI)
- Multivariate multiple
regression
- Multivariate logistic regression
(logit).
100

Hypotheses
Endogenous variables

Sample size

100

Score of democracy
Gross National Income per
capita (GNI)
Multivariate ordinal logistic
regression (GSEM)

-

100

100

Score of democracy
Gross National Income
per capita (GNI)
Multivariate multiple
regression
Multivariate ordinal
logistic regression (logit).
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Table 12 displayed the models and the corresponding endogenous, exogenous, mediator
variables, and the control variables. Table 12 also showed the methods that are used to
analyze the data. The sample size is also provided.
Data Summary
The exogenous variable, country governance, comprised the observed variables
“voice and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, control of corruption,
rule of law, and regulatory quality”. “PPP governance” comprises the observed variables
“preparation (Prep), procurement (Proc), and contract management (Mgt).” The PPP
governance comprises 34 binary variables. The summary of the 34 binary variables is
provided in Table 14 and have the value 0 and 1. “PPP outcome” comprises the observed
variables “achieved objectives (Obj), quality at entry (QAE), quality of supervision (QOS),
the world bank overall performance (BOP), implementing agency performance (ImpAg),
government compliance (GovPerf), borrowing government overall performance (BorOp”.
The summary of the data is displayed in Table 13.
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Table 13: Data Summary
Variable
Levels
PPP preparation
PPP procurement
PPP contract management
Voice and accountability
Political stability
Government effectiveness
Regulatory quality
Rule of law
Control of corruption
Achieved objectives
Quality at entry
Quality of supervision
Overall Bank performance
Implementing agency
Government performance
Overall borrower performance
Gross national income
Democracy score
Central budgetary authority
Fiscal treatment
PPP prioritization
Economic assessment
Fiscal assessment
Risk identification
Financial viability
Market sounding analysis
Environment assessment
Assessment of the RFP
Draft PPP contracts
Standard PPP models
Evaluation committee
Public procurement notice
Foreign companies’ participation
Minimum period
Tender documents
Clarification question
Prebid conference
Financial model
Treatment of sole proposal
Public of award notice
Standstill period
Negotiation with selected bidder
System for implementation
System for tracking progress
Monitoring and evaluation

Obs
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100

Mean
2.32
47.87
61.06
53.82
-.3485287
-.4235517
-.2712166
-.2151143
-.3552316
-.4275446
3.76
3.63
4
3.8
3.69
3.52
3.59
4964.23
52.32
.88
.37
.86
.92
.85
.82
.81
.49
.81
.42
.77
.34
.74
.99
.97
.93
.94
.95
.5
.49
.61
.91
.39
.58
.86
.77
.91

Std. Dev.
.9415225
21.13433
18.24791
16.51041
.7970292
.8517651
.7486493
.7438809
.6946736
.6723603
1.280152
1.307747
1.206045
1.206045
1.308056
1.344499
1.256056
5047.841
24.91719
.3265986
.4852366
.3487351
.2726599
.3588703
.3861229
.3942772
.5024184
.3942772
.496045
.4229526
.4760952
.440844
.1
.1714466
.2564324
.2386833
.2190429
.5025189
.5024184
.4902071
.2876235
.4902071
.496045
.3487351
.4229526
.2876235

Min
1
8
7
9
-2.165193
-2.780772
-2.055587
-2.195756
-1.689727
-1.544762
1
2
2
2
2
1
1
280
3
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Max
4
92
95
88
1.213141
1.585588
2.205368
2.115007
1.822819
2.133488
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
27600
97
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
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Table 13 Continued
Foreign companies’ income
Change in structure
Modification/ renegotiation
Circumstances regulations
Dispute resolution
Lender’s rights
Ground for termination

100
100
100
100
100
100
100

.98
.67
.84
.96
.99
.46
.9

.1407053
.4725816
.3684529
.1969464
.1
.5009083
.3015113

0
0
0
0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Table 13 shows the number of observations, the mean, the standard deviation, the
minimum and maximum of each observation for each variable. The sample size comprises
100 observations or countries. The mean and the standard deviation of all the variables are
presented for visualization purposes. There are six interval exogenous variables, seven
ordinal endogenous variables, and three continuous mediator variables composed of 34
binary mediator variables. Considering the minimum and maximum for the mediator
variables PPP preparation (Prep), PPP procurement (Proc), and PPP contract management
(Mgt), the values vary greatly. Out of 100 possible points, the smallest value for PPP
preparation is 8 compared to 92. The smallest for PPP procurement is seven compared to 95,
and the smallest for PPP contract management is nine compared to 88 (See Table 13). For the
exogenous variable, the smallest for four of the six interval variables including voice and
accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, and regulatory quality is at least
(-2) and the highest ranges from 1 to 2 (See Table 13). The large differences mean that there
is a large deviation between the observations in the dataset, which may have caused the
kurtosis and skewness in the normality results. In effect, a test of normality was run for
country governance which has interval data and PPP governance which has continuous data.
The results of the skewness and kurtosis test are displayed in Table 14. A non-significant
Prob>chi2 at the 95 % confidence level means that the variable is normally distributed.
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Table 14: Test of Normality Results
Variable
Obs
Voice and
100
accountability
Political stability 100

Pr (Skewness)
0.7223

Pr (Kurtosis)
0.0133

adj chi2(2)
5.96

Prob>chi2
0.0509

0.0824

0.6118

3.37

0.1858

Government
effectiveness
Regulatory
quality
Rule of law
Control of
corruption
PPP preparation

100

0.1062

0.3805

3.47

0.1761

100

0.0970

0.2544

4.17

0.1244

100
100

0.0110
0.0003

0.3107
0.0287

6.91
14.48

0.0317
0.0007

100

0.8917

0.0175

5.49

0.0641

PPP
procurement
PPP contract
management

100

0.0207

0.7814

5.31

0.0703

100

0.2419

0.9495

1.41

0.4953

Looking at the Prob>chi2 at the 95 % confidence level (See D’ Agostino et al., 1990),
Table 15 showed that four variables of country governance including voice and
accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, and regulatory quality are
normally distributed (p>0.05). Rule of law and control of corruption are not normally
distributed. The three variables of PPP governance including PPP preparation, PPP
procurement, and PPP contract management were normally distributed. Normality is required
for the multivariate multiple regression, which is used to test Model 2. Despite the skewness
of rule of law and control of corruption, no transformation was applied to the two variables.
Instead, the robust estimation is used to remedy the violation of normality and ensure that the
results are more accurate.
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Measurement Validity
According to Cronbach and Meehl (1955) and Adcock and Collier (2001),
measurement validity occurs when the operationalization and the scoring of cases adequately
reflect the concept the researcher seeks to measure. It is an examination of the relation among
scores, indicators, and the systematized concept (Adcock and Collier, 2001). One of the types
of validity is content validity or the adequacy of content (Adcock and Collier, 2001), which is
to ensure that the indicator adequately capture the full content of the systematized concept.
On the one hand, the researcher asks whether key elements were omitted from the indicator.
As far as this is concerned, no key element is omitted from this dissertation research. There
were no omissions from the country governance indicators. On the other hand, the researcher
asks whether certain elements are inappropriately included in the indicators. For the PPP
governance, the unsolicited proposals section was omitted because the section is not
considered a stage of the PPP process. For the subcategories, it appears that it would be
inappropriate to include some practices in the models either because they were repetitive, or
they were vague. The interpretation of the results of these variables would not point to clear
concluding points. The evaluation of proposals according to criteria (Propls) was
automatically omitted by STATA and was removed because of collinearity. The availability
of various procedures (AvailProc) is not included because the question is not specific about
the type of procedures. Even if the variable is significant, its relevance to the conclusions
would still be vague. The practice on the specification of prequalification/shortlisting criteria
of the tender documents available to all the bidders was excluded because it was not expected
to be enforced by all countries. The notification of all bidders (Notfictio) is not included
because there was a previous question on the publication of award notice. The direct
negotiation (not discretionary) and the publication of contract (Pblctio) were removed from
the data because they were repetitive. On the PPP preparation subcategories, the comparative
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assessment even though important, was removed because it was less relevant to the PPP
governance. It was unrelated to the rest of the subcategories. This may be related to the fact
that the practice was newly added.
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Table 15: Correlation Matrix for the Exogenous Variables
Continuous and
Interval
variables

Voice and

Political
stability

Government
effectiveness

Regulatory
quality

Voice and
accountability

1.0000

Political
stability
Government
effectiveness

0.5065

1.0000

0.5824

0.6760

1.0000

Regulatory
quality
Rule of law

0.6787

0.6618

0.9197

1.0000

0.6339

0.6949

0.9257

0.9005

Control of
corruption
PPP
preparation
PPP
procurement
PPP
management

0.5715

0.6475

0.8798

0.8445

0.3003

0.1350

0.2594

0.2585

0.4047

0.2269

0.3921

0.3995

0.1703

0.1142

0.1799

0.1838

Rule of Control of
law
corruption

PPP
preparation

PPP
procurement

PPP
management

accountability

1.000
0
0.925
8
0.235
5
0.399
7
0.179
9

1.0000
0.2093

1.0000

0.3728

0.5202

1.0000

0.1914

0.5297

0.4364

1.000
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One of the most important tests of the measurement validity is correlation (Cronbach
and Meehl, 1955). Therefore, a correlation test was run to determine the construct validity of
the six exogenous variable of country governance (See Table 15). To determine the
measurement validity, the convergent validity must be tested first. There is convergent
validity when the scores of the systematized concept produced by the indicators of that same
concept are empirically associated (Adcock and Collier, 2001). In other words, the six
variables that compose country governance including voice and accountability, political
stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption
are included in the correlation test. Stronger associations between those variables constitute
evidence that the six variables are convergent and measure country governance. The results
of the correlation matrix are displayed in Table 15. The relationships between the six
exogenous variables in Table 15 range moderately correlated (r=0.51) to highly correlated
(r=0.92). This means that that there is a good convergent validity and the variables are a good
measure of country governance. The convergent validity for the three variables of PPP
governance was also tested. The results are displayed in Table 15. The relationship ranged
from weakly correlated (r=0.44) to moderately correlated (r=0.53). This means that the
evidence of convergent validity is weak, and the variables do not adequately measure PPP
governance. However, the data summary showed there were larger differences between the
observations. The difference may have contributed to the weak correlation between the
variables.
Furthermore, discriminant validation is used to determine the construct validity.
Discriminant validation is when the indicators of a systematized concept have a weaker
association with the indicators of a second or different systematized concept, thus
discriminating the second group of indicators from the first group (Cronbach and Meehl,
1955; Adcock and Collier, 2001). Weaker associations mean that there is discriminant
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validity between the two concepts. To test for discriminant validity, the correlation between
the six variables of country governance and the three variables of PPP governance were
compared. The results in Table 15 showed that the relationships between the variables are
weak, which confirmed the strength of discriminant validity.
A Spearman's correlation test was run to assess the relationship between the
endogenous variables (PPP outcome variables). There was a strong relationship (from r=0.5
to r=0.8) between the variables, hence the monotonic relationship required for the use of
Spearman's correlation was met. Overall, the results of the measurement validity showed that
the operationalized variables could be used to test the hypotheses set in the study. The
convergent validity was moderately strong. The discriminant validity appeared very strong as
well. The operationalized variables were run using the multivariate regression. The results are
presented and analyzed in Chapter IV.
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CHAPTER IV
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
This “results and analysis” section presents the data description and data summary as
well as the measurement validity of the data. The results of the hypotheses and models are
presented and analyzed in four different steps followed by a summary of the key results. This
was done for the entire sample of 100 countries and for the different income level groups.
Analysis: Country Governance on PPP Outcome
The first step in the mediation analysis process using regression is to test the influence
of the exogenous variables on the endogenous variables. In this step, the study answered the
first research question: Is there any positive relationship between country governance and
PPP outcome? Thus, Model 1 tested the influence of country governance on PPP outcomes.
In other words, Model 1 tested the effect of the six country governance variables on the seven
variables of PPP outcome. The exogenous variables include voice and accountability,
political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of
corruption. The exogenous variables are interval because they are rated from (-2.5) to (2.5).
The endogenous variables include achieved objectives, quality of entry, quality of
supervision, overall Bank performance score, government compliance, implementing agency
performance, and overall borrower performance. Because the endogenous variables are
ordinal, the multivariate ordinal logistic regression (logit) is used to test Model 1. For Model
1, the assumptions of the multivariate ordinal logistic regression include the requirement that
the dependent variable must be ordinal (i.e. Likert scale data) (Statistics Solutions, 2020). In
addition, the assumption that the observations must be independent from one another was met
because the observations were individual countries (Statistics Solutions, 2020). The
assumption that the exogenous variable must have no multicollinearity is also met as the
exogenous variables as shown earlier are not too highly correlated (r=0.5 to r=0.92). Another
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assumption is the use of large sample. The size of the sample was discussed earlier as being
acceptable even though a larger sample would be preferred.
The results of Model 1 are reported in exponentiated coefficients and are displayed in
Table 16. The exponentiated coefﬁcients are interpreted as odds ratios (See StataCorp, 2019).
An exponentiated coefficient or odd ratios (OR) of more than 1 (OR>1) means the outcome is
more likely to occur whereas an odd ratio less than 1 (OR<1) means that the outcome is less
likely to occur. The exogenous variables are interval (data) and the results are analyzed and
interpreted accordingly.
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Table 16: Results of Model 1-Country Governance on PPP Outcome
Country governance

On PPP outcome
Objective

Voice & Accountability
Political stability

Regulatory quality
Government effectiveness

0.3748911*
(0.1627215)
2.460341*
(0.796172)

Quality at
entry

2.912011*
(0.9593568)

Quality of
Bank overall
supervision performance

2.064789*
(0.6535593
)

2.514281*
(0.8041818)

0.1689821*
(3.866768)
5.049964*
(0.1407372)

Rule of Law

Control of corruption
*indicates significant at the 95% confidence level. + indicates robust error significance.

Implementing
agency
0.4310826+
(0.170481)
2.900966*
(0.9555848)

Government
performance

Borrower
overall
performance

2.648148*
(0.8490881)
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The statistical significance was determined using both the default standard errors
estimation and the robust estimation. The standard errors estimation test showed that country
governance factors had a significant effect on the factors of PPP outcome (See Table 16). The
exponentiated coefficients of political stability (OR= 2.46, 95% CI: 1.30-4.64, p=0.005) and
government effectiveness (OR=5.05, 95% CI: 1.12-22.65, p=0.034) had a significant positive
effect on achieved objectives. This means that an increase in the scores for political stability
and regulatory quality increases the probability of highly satisfactory achieved objectives.
Political stability also had a positive effect on quality at entry (OR=2.91, 95% CI: 1.526-5.55,
p=0.001), quality of supervision (OR=2.064, 95% CI: 1.11-3.84, p=0.022), Bank overall
performance (OR=2.51, 95% CI: 1.34-4.70, p=0.004), implementing agency performance
(OR= 2.90, 95% CI: 1.52-5.53, p=0.001), and borrowing country overall performance
(OR=2.64, 95% CI: 1.41-4.96, p=0.002). That means that the increase in the political stability
in a country increases the probability that the scores of most of the PPP outcome factors will
be highly satisfactory for quality at entry, quality of supervision, the Bank overall
performance, and the borrowing country overall performance. Voice and accountability (OR=
0.374, 95% CI: 0.16-0.87, p=0.024) and government effectiveness (OR=0.1689821, 95% CI:
0.03-0.86, p=0.033) had a negative effect on achieved objectives. This means that an increase
in the scores of voice and accountability and government effectiveness decreases the
probability of achieving highly satisfactory results.
With the robust test, the effect of voice and accountability (OR=0.43, 95% CI: 0.190.93, p=0.033) on the implementing agency performance (ImpAg) became significant.
However, its effect was negative, meaning that an increase in the scores of voice and
accountability decreases the probability of increasing the scores of the implementing agency
performance. The control variable, gross national income per capita (GNI) had a weak
positive relationship with quality of supervision, government effectiveness, and borrowing
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country overall performance with an OR= 1.00, 95% CI: 1.00-1.00, p=0.007 for all the
significant effects.
Thus, country governance had a significant effect on PPP outcome via political
stability, regulatory quality, voice and accountability and government effectiveness.
Hypothesis 1 was supported by the variable of political stability via its positive effects on
quality at entry, the quality of supervision, the Bank overall performance, and the borrowing
country overall performance and by regulatory quality via its positive effect on achieved
objectives. In other words, two country governance variables had a positive effect on five
PPP outcome variables, which is a significant result.
In terms of substantive significance, the World Bank and member countries should
focus on improving the political stability and the quality of regulations in the recipient
countries to increase the outcome of PPP projects. Hypothesis 1 was not supported for voice
and accountability and government effectiveness because of the negative direction of the
effects, which is contrary to the expectations. This also means that too much focus on voice
and accountability and government effectiveness may produce the opposite effect.
Another key remark is that political stability had the most recurrent influence on the
outcome of PPP governance from the perspective of both the World Bank and the recipient
countries. Political stability facilitates the effective execution of the tasks that fall under the
Bank’s responsibilities. Furthermore, political stability improves the performance of recipient
countries in PPP projects. Surprisingly, voice and accountability, which refers to freedom of
expression, of association and of the media not only negatively impact the performance of the
implementing agencies in recipient countries but also the objectives of PPP projects. Another
surprising result is the lack of significant impact of control of corruption on the outcome of
PPP. While step 1 consisted of testing the H1, the results will be compared with the results in
step 2 and step 3 presented in later sections.
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Analysis: Country Governance on PPP Governance
Step 2 of the mediation analysis consists in assessing the effect of the exogenous
variable on the endogenous mediator variable. In this step, the study answered the second
research question: Is there any positive relationship between country governance and PPP
governance? Step 2 includes Model 2a, which tested the effect of country governance
variables on the three continuous mediator endogenous variables. The continuous variables
are considered endogenous in Model 2. Therefore, the multivariate multiple regression is
used, and the normality of data is assumed. The Prob>chi2 showed that the three main
endogenous mediator variables PPP preparation, PPP procurement, and PPP contract
management are normally distributed. The Prob>chi2 showed that the six exogenous
variables except the rule of law (RuleL) and control of corruption (Concor) were normally
distributed. The skewness and kurtosis became worse when the two variables were logtransformed. The violation of the normality assumption was in part due to the large
disparities between the scores since some countries scored very high while others scored
extremely low. Nonetheless, the multivariate regression using the initial normality results.
In addition, Model 2b, Model 2c, and Model 2d assess the effect of country
governance on the subcategories of PPP preparation, PPP procurement, and contract
management, respectively. Since all the variables in Model 2b, Model 2bc, and Model 2d are
binary, the multivariate Bernouli (logit) regression is used to test all three models. For Model
2b, Model 2bc, and Model 2d, certain assumptions had to be met. The endogenous variables
in these models are binary (i.e. 1=yes and 0=no). In addition, the assumption that the
observations must be independent from one another was met because the observations were
individual countries. The assumption that the exogenous variable must have no
multicollinearity is also met as the exogenous variables as shown earlier are not too highly
correlated (r=0.5 to r=0.92). Another assumption is the use of large sample. Again, the size of
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the sample was discussed earlier as being acceptable even though a larger sample would be
preferred.
Considering the sample size, GSEM does not allow fitting more than 12 variables at
a time in addition to the two control variables. As a result, the binary subcategory variables
were divided into three groups or models.
Country Governance of PPP Governance: Main Categories.
When the multivariate regression was run for Model 2a, none of the six country
governance variables had a significant effect on the three continuous PPP governance
variables (Model 2a). Only the control variable democracy had a significant effect on PPP
preparation, PPP procurement, and PPP contract management at P<0.05, and negatively
affected all three variables. Therefore, the hypothesis (H2a) that country governance had a
positive influence on the three continuous PPP governance variables was not supported. This
is a surprising finding since countries with good governance are expected to yield better
outcomes. The higher the scores of the PPP preparation, PPP procurement, and contract
management, the better the outcome is expected to be. Their lack of significance or opposite
effects may mean that rating the stages of PPP do not matter. Model 2b, 2c, and 2d were run
to check if country governance had a positive influence on the subcategories of the PPP
governance.
Country Governance on the Subcategories of PPP Preparation
For the Bernoulli logit regression (See Model 2b), government effectiveness (OR=
16.44, 95% CI:0.97-278.76, p=0.052) had a positive significant effect on PPP prioritization,
meaning that for a 1-point increase in the score of government effectiveness, the probability
of ensuring consistency in the PPP prioritization gets higher. Voice and accountability had a
significant effect on risk identification (OR=0.24, 95%CI: 0.056-1.01, p=0.052) and
economic analysis assessment (OR=0.10, 95% CI: 0.01-1.03, p=0.054) and affected the two
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variables negatively (See Table 17). In other words, a 1-point increase in the score of voice
and accountability reduces the likelihood that the score of risk identification and economic
analysis will be enforced. When the score of political stability (OR=0.26, 95% CI: 0.07-0.88,
p=0.031) increases by a 1-point, the likelihood that the PPP prioritization will not be enforced
becomes higher. With the robust test, voice and accountability (OR=0.33, 95% CI: 0.12-0.86,
p=0.024) and political stability (OR=0.50, 95%CI: 0.26-0.95, p=0.036) became statistically
significant, affecting negatively the assessment of RFP and the environmental impact
assessment respectively (See Table 17). In other words, the probability that a 1-point increase
in voice and accountability and political stability will lead to assessment of RFP and the
assessment of environmental impact gets lower respectively. The GNI per capita had a
significant positive effect when the draft PPP contract was included in the RFP. Democracy
had a significant positive on economic analysis, risk identification, and assessment of RFP.
Overall, the hypothesis (H2b) that country governance has a positive influence on the PPP
preparation variables is supported by the relationship between government effectiveness and
the PPP prioritization only.

102

Table 17: Results of Model 2b-Country Governance on PPP Preparation Subcategories
Country
governance

On PPP Preparation (practices)
PPP
Prioritization

Voice and
accountability

Economic
assessment

Risk
identification

Environmental
assessment

0.1022425* 0.2403478*
(0.1209741) (0.1765812)

Political
stability
Regulatory
quality

0.2581404*
(0.1625047)

Government
effectiveness

16.44632*
(23.74917)

Assessment
of the RFP
0.3287448*
(0.1917574)

0.5062112+
(0.1639197)

Rule of law
Control of
corruption
*indicates significant at the 95% confidence level. + indicates robust error significance.

Practically, effective governments are more likely to consider the consistency between
their PPP prioritization and their investment prioritization. However, having one positive
result out of 12 possible variables means weak results for Model 2b. In fact, most of the
significant effects were negative, and therefore produced the opposite direction. For example,
increasing the voice and accountability and political stability and lack of terrorism reduce the
probability that countries will conduct risk identification, economic assessment, environment
impact assessment, assessment of RFP, and ensure PPP prioritization. This calls for a lot of
caution when trying to focus on the good governance factors to enforce the practices of PPP
governance. It was also surprising to note that good governance features such as voice and
accountability, political stability and lack of terrorism, government effectiveness, regulatory
quality, rule of law and control of corruption did not influence the enforcement of PPP
practices. In other words, a country with political stability may not conduct market sounding
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analysis. One explanation is that market sounding analysis is already being done or it is a farfetched demand from the reality of PPPs or the PPP process does not allow the necessary
time for such assessment to take place.
Country Governance on the Subcategories of PPP Procurement
For Model 2c, voice and accountability had a significant positive effect on the
minimum period to submit bid (OR=196.32, 95%CI:2.33-16512.32, p=0.020) and the
issuance of procurement notice (OR=7.69e+13, 95%CI: 9.40e+11-6.30e+15, p=0.000),
meaning that a 1-point increase in the scores of voice and accountability and government
effectiveness increases the probability of respecting the 60-day minimum period to submit
bids. Government effectiveness had a significant positive effect on the minimum period to
submit bid (OR=3892.88, 95%CI:6.09-2485958, p=0.012) and the issuance of procurement
notice (OR=2.32e+42, 95%CI:= 2.11e+39-2.55e+45, P=0.000). This means that countries
increase their score of government effectiveness by 1 point were more likely to meet the 60day minimum period to submit bids. The rule of law (OR=7.95e+16, 95% CI: 4.27e+111.48e+22, p=0.000) became statistically significant and positively affected the issuance of
procurement notice. This means that a 1-point increase in the score of the rule of law reduces
the probability that procurement notice will be issued. In terms of practical significance,
countries that want to meet the minimum period of 60 days and publish the procurement
notice should seek to improve the scores in voice and accountability, government
effectiveness, and rule of law.
On the opposite hand, countries that increase their scores by 1 point in political
stability (OR=0.10, 95%CI: 0.01-0.972, p=0.047) and regulatory quality (OR=0.00, 95%CI:
1.04e-06-0.24, p=0.016) were less likely to meet the 60-day minimum period to submit bids.
In addition, when countries increase their score by 1 point in political stability (OR=6.67e-21,
95% CI: 9.38e-23-4.74e-19, p=0.000) and regulatory quality (OR=1.78e-51, 95% CI: 4.55e-

104

55-6.99e-48, p=0.000), the probability that a procurement notice will not be issued gets
higher (See Table 18). Political stability (OR=0.1322608, 95% CI: 0.02-0.72, p=0.020) also
had a significant negative effect on the publication of award notice, meaning that a 1point
increase in political stability reduces the probability that the award notice will be published.
With the robust estimation, political stability (OR=0.07, 95% CI: 0.00-0.77, p=0.030) and
voice and accountability (OR=0.34, 95% CI: 0.13-0.92, p=0.033) became statistically
significant, meaning that a 1-point increase in the scores of political stability and voice and
accountability is less likely to lead to the elaboration of PPP stages in bid documents and an
effective treatment in the case of the reception of one proposal respectively (See Table 18).

Table 18: Results of Model 2c-Country Governance on PPP Procurement
Country
governance

PPP procurement (Practices)

Public Procurement Minimum
Tender
Treatment/one
Publication of
notice
period
documents
proposal
award notice
+
+
Voice and
7.69e+13
196.3266*
0.3464216
accountability
(1.73e+14)+
(443.955)
(0.1727235)
+
+
Political stability
6.67e-21 (1.45e- 0.1030835* 0.070068
0.1322608*
20)
(0.1180633) (0.0858838)
(0.1148199)
+
Regulatory
1.78e-51 (7.52e- 0.0005098*
quality
51)
(0.0016102)
+
Government
2.32e+42
3892.888*
effectiveness
(8.29e+42)
(12829.41)
Rule of law
7.95e+16+
(4.92e+17)
*indicates significant at the 95% confidence level. + indicates robust error significance.

Practically, focusing on improving the scores of political stability, regulatory quality,
voice and accountability does not necessarily guarantee that the 60-day minimum period to
submit bids will be met, that a procurement notice will be issued, that award notice will be
published, that the elaboration of PPP stages will be included in bid documents and that sole
bids will be effectively treated.
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GNI had a significant positive effect on the 60-day minimum period and the
negotiation with the selected bidders and a significant negative effect on the publication of
award notice. Democracy had a significant positive effect on the detailing of the PPP stages
in bid documents and foreign companies’ participation and a significant negative effect on
the publication of the procurement notice.
Country Governance on the Subcategories of PPP Contract Management
No significant results were found when Model 2d was tested using the standard error
default in STATA. However, when the robust error test was applied, political stability
(OR=10.32, 95% CI: 2.87-37.10, p=0.000) and rule of law (OR=531.06, 95% CI: 14.2619772.88, p=0.001) became significant, positively affecting permission of foreign companies
to repatriate income whereas voice and accountability (OR=0.33, 95% CI: 0.132-0.84,
p=0.020) and control of corruption (OR=0.00, 95% CI: 2.68e-07- 0.93, p=0.48) became
significant but negatively affecting permission of foreign companies to repatriate income
(See Table 19). Put otherwise, an increase in the score of political stability and rule of law
means that foreign companies will be permitted to repatriate income whereas an increase in
the score of voice and accountability and control of corruption means that they will not.
Voice and accountability (OR=3.58e+13, 4.37e+11 -2.93e+15,p=0.000), government
effectiveness (OR= 2.08e+41, 95% CI: 1.89e+38-2.28e+44, p=0.000), and rule of law
(2.69e+16, 95% CI: 1.44e+11-5.01e+21, p=0.000) became statistically significant and
affected the dispute resolution mechanisms positively whereas political stability (OR=2.22e20, 95% CI: 3.12e-22-1.58e-18,p=0.000) and regulatory quality (OR= 3.15e-50, 95%
CI:8.05e-54-1.24e-46), p=0.000) negatively affected the dispute resolution mechanisms. This
means that an increase in the score of voice and accountability, government effectiveness,
and rule of law increase the performance on the dispute resolution mechanisms whereas such
performance is reduced when there is an increase in the score of political stability and
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regulatory quality. Regulatory quality (OR=0.05, 95% CI: 0.00-0.92, p=0.044) became
significant and negatively affecting monitoring and evaluation, meaning that an increase in
the score of regulatory quality reduces the performance on monitoring and evaluation. GNI
per capita had a significant positive effect on ground for termination of a PPP contract and on
change in the structure of the private partner (See Table 19). Democracy had a significant
positive effect on monitoring and evaluation, and modification. Democracy and the GNI per
capita became significant, affecting circumstances that may occur and dispute resolution
mechanisms when the robust estimation was used.

Table 19: Results of Model 2d-Country Governance on PPP Contract Management
Country governance

Voice and
accountability

PPP contract management (Practices)
Monitoring Foreign companies’ income
&evaluation
0.3347652+ (0.1580238)
10.32645+ (6.738766)

Political stability
Regulatory quality

0.0520081+
(0.0762758)

0.58e+13+ (8.04e+13)
2.22e-20+(4.82e-20)
3.15e-50+(1.33e-49)
2.08e+41+ (7.42e+41)

Government
effectiveness
Rule of law

Dispute resolution

531.0617+ (980.0946)

2.69e+16+ (1.67e+17)

Control of corruption
0.0005009+ (0.0019248)
+
indicates robust error significance.

In short, the hypothesis (H2d) that country governance had a positive influence on
contract management subcategories was supported by the variables including political
stability, rule of law, voice and accountability, and government effectiveness due to their
positive effects on the permission of foreign companies to repatriate income and the dispute
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resolution mechanisms. Practically, countries that are eager to guarantee permission to
foreign companies to repatriate income and improve the dispute resolution mechanisms
should focus on improving their score on political stability, rule of law, voice and
accountability, and government effectiveness. Caution should be exercised when using voice
and accountability and control of corruption to guarantee the permission to foreign companies
to repatriate income and political stability. There needs to be caution when regulatory quality
is used to increase the dispute resolution mechanisms.
Analysis: PPP Governance on PPP Outcome
The third step in the mediation analysis is to assess the influence of the PPP
governance on PPP outcome. In this step, the study answered the third research question: Is
there any positive relationship between PPP governance and PPP outcome? This step
includes Model 3a, which tested the effect of PPP governance on the seven variables of PPP
outcomes. In Model 3a, PPP governance is the exogenous variable and PPP outcome is the
endogenous variable. PPP governance comprises two types of variables: the continuous
variables composed of PPP preparation, PPP procurement, and contract management; and the
binary variables composed of 34 binary variables. Thus, Model 3a is tested using the
multivariate ordinal logistic regression.
First, the effect of the three continuous variables on PPP outcome is tested (Model 3a)
using the multivariate ordinal logistic regression. For Model 1, the assumptions of the
multivariate ordinal logistic regression include the requirement that the dependent variable
must be ordinal (i.e. Likert scale data). In addition, the assumption that the observations must
be independent from one another was met because the observations were individual
countries. The assumption that the exogenous variable must have no multicollinearity is also
met as the exogenous variables (i.e. the three main variables) as shown earlier are not too
highly correlated (r=0.4 to r=0.5). Another assumption is the use of large sample. The size of

108

the sample was discussed earlier as being acceptable even though a larger sample would be
preferred.
Second, the effect of the binary variables is tested. For the binary variables, three
different models (Model 3b, Model 3c, and Model 3d) are tested. For Model 3b, Model 3c,
and Model 3d, the assumptions of the multivariate ordinal logistic regression include the
requirement that the dependent variable must be ordinal (i.e. Likert scale data). In addition,
the assumption that the observations must be independent from one another was met because
the observations were individual countries. The exogenous variable are the binary variables
(i.e. 1=yes and 0=no). The size of the sample was discussed earlier as being acceptable even
though a larger sample would be preferred. Considering the sample size, GSEM does not
allow fitting more than 12 variables at a time in addition to the two control variables.
Therefore, the binary subcategory variables have been divided into three groups. The first
group constitutes the subcategories of the PPP preparation (Model 3b). The second group
(Model 3c) constitutes the subcategories of the PPP procurement. The third group (Model 3d)
constitutes the subcategories of the PPP contract management. The test of each model is
further explained in the rest of the section. As in step 1 and step 2, the statistical significance
in step 3 is determined using both the standard errors estimation and the robust estimation.
The exponentiated results are reported in Table 20.
Stages of PPP Governance on PPP Outcome
With the standard errors estimation for the continuous variables (Model 3a), only
procurement management (OR=0.97, 95% CI: 0.94-0.99, p=0.030) had a negative effect on
quality at entry (See Table 19). Considering that an odd ratio of 1 is considered a neutral
effect, the odd ratio of (0.97) means that the negative effect is negligible and translated to no
effect. In other words, an increase in the scores of contract management does not influence
the scores of the quality at entry. Thus, the hypothesis (H3a) that the three continuous of PPP
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governance have a positive influence on PPP outcome is not supported. The results are
surprising since countries that enforce the internationally recognized practices of the PPP
governance should logically be able to improve their outcomes. GNI had a significant effect
on achieved objectives, quality of supervision, Bank overall performance, government
effectiveness, and borrowing country overall performance with an OR=1, significant at
p<0.030).

Table 20: Results of Model 3a-Stages of PPP Governance on PPP Outcome
PPP
governance

PPP outcome
Achieved Quality at
objectives entry

PPP
Preparation

Quality of
Supervision

Overall
Bank
performance

Implementing
agency

Government
performance

0.9700303*
(0.0135735)

PPP
Procurement
PPP
management
*indicates significant at the 95% confidence level.

Subcategories of PPP Preparation on PPP Outcome
The standard errors estimation of the binary variables showed some statistical
significance on the PPP outcome variables (See Table 21). The standardization of PPP model
contracts or the development of transaction documents had a significant positive effect on
achieved objectives (OR= 2.37, 95% CI: 1.02-5.52, p=0.044), quality at entry (OR=3.78,
95% CI: 1.56-9.18, p=0.003), and Bank overall performance (OR=2.64, 95% CI: 1.10-6.34,
p=0.029). This means that countries that standardized their PPP model contracts are more
likely to increase the probability of satisfactory results on achieved objectives, quality at
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entry, and Bank overall performance than those that do not. Countries that also assess their
requests for proposals are more likely to increase the probability of satisfactory results on
quality of supervision than those that do not. The robust estimation increased the list of
expected results. For instance, the effect of fiscal affordability assessment (OR=3.43, 95%
CI: 1.01-11.61, p=0.048) on achieved objectives became significant and was positive,
meaning that country that carry on fiscal assessment are more likely to reach satisfactory
achieved objectives. In addition, when countries conduct environment impact assessment
(OR=2.26, 95%CI: 0.99-5.13, p=0.051), the probability of satisfactory score on government
performance increases more than when they do not. These significant results point to the
expected direction. Therefore, Hypothesis 3a (H3b) is supported by the variables including
standardization of PPP model contracts, assessment of request for proposals, fiscal
affordability assessment, and environmental impact assessment via their significant positive
effect on achieved objectives, quality at entry, Bank overall performance, quality of
supervision and government performance. This means that countries that are eager to yield
satisfactory outcomes on their PPP projects should focus on those variables.
A few significant results point to the opposite direction. For example, countries that
conduct risk identification are less likely to increase the probability of satisfactory results on
quality at entry (OR=0.21, 95%CI: 0.05-0.78, p= 0.020), quality of supervision (OR=0.22,
95% CI: 0.05-0.87, p=0.032), and government performance (OR=0.20, 95% CI: 0.06-0.71,
p=0.013) (See Table 21). Countries are less likely to increase their satisfaction level in Bank
performance (OR=0.30, 0.09-0.99, p=0.050) and implementing agency performance (OR=
0.28, 95% CI: 0.08-0.98, p=0.048) when they focus on ensuring consistency between PPP
prioritization and public investment prioritization than when they do not. In other words, risk
identification, and prioritization of PPP do not support H3b because their effects are negative.
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Table 21: Results of Model 3b-Subcategories of PPP Preparation on PPP Outcome
PPP governance

PPP outcome
Achieved
objectives

Standard PPP model
Fiscal assessment
Risk identification
Assessment of the RFPs
PPP Prioritization

Quality at
entry

2.37538*
3.787213*
(1.022431) (1.712424)
3.429006+
(2.133992)
0.211594*
(0.1417968)

Quality of
Supervision

Overall Bank
performance

Implementing
agency

2.645445*
(1.181227)

0.2202167*
(0.154984)
2.611134*
(1.261898)

Government
performance
0.2069761*
(0.131044)

0.2798681*
(0.1857631)

0.2999283*
(0.1839219)

Financial viability
Environmental
assessment
*indicates significant at the 95% confidence level. + indicates robust error significance.

0.2871034*
(0.1808651)
0.4842549+
0.2251893
2.260709+
(0.9466573)

Overall
Borrower
performance
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Overall, the hypothesis (H3b) that the subcategories of PPP preparation have an
influence on PPP outcome was supported. When countries enforce the internationally
recognized practices, they are more likely to improve their performance in PPP projects both
in terms of achieved objectives and improved effectiveness in the Bank’s and the recipient
countries’ actions. While the standardization of PPP model contracts, the assessment of the
request for proposals, the fiscal assessment, and the environment impact assessment
contribute to the greater performance, it is surprising that risk identification had the opposite
effect on PPP outcome. The risk identification is one of the practices that are recommended
to be done before any partnership projects are implemented. It was surprising to note that the
enforcement of practices such as the approval of the central budgetary authority, fiscal
treatment of PPPs, financial viability assessment, and market sounding analysis did not have
any influence on the outcome of PPPs.
Subcategories of PPP Procurement on PPP Outcome
The hypothesis (H3c) that the subcategories of PPP procurement had a positive
influence on PPP outcome was supported. The results also showed that countries which bid
documents detail the stages of the process (OR= 7.23, 95% CI: 0.98-53.00, p=0.052), those
that provide clarification questions for procurement notice (OR=16.89, 95% CI:1.28
221.32, p=0.031), and those that allow negotiations with the selected bidder before contract
signing (OR=2.89, 95% CI:1.11-7.52, p=0.029) are more likely to reach better satisfaction in
the objectives that they seek to achieve than those that do not. The overall performance of the
borrowing countries are more likely to improve for countries with detailed bid documents
(OR=11.20, 95% CI: 1.32-94.74, p=0.027) and those that provide clarifications (OR=18.50,
95% CI: 0.98-349.16, p=0.052) (See Table 22). The performance of the implementing agency
is more likely to improve for countries with detailed bid documents of the PPP process
(OR=38.051, 95% CI: 1.72-838.96, p=0.021) (See Table 22). The robust test showed that
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when foreign companies can participate in PPP bidding (OR=10.57, 95% CI: 2.15-51.89,
p=0.004), the probability of satisfactory scores of Bank overall performance increases more
than when they cannot.
Again, Hypothesis 3c (H3c) is supported by the variables detailed bid documents,
clarification of questions, negotiation before signature, permission for foreign companies in
the bidding process via their positive effects on achieved objectives, borrowing country
overall performance, Bank overall performance, and performance of the implementing
agency. The results of the subcategories of the procurement are very important. In terms of
practical significance, it means that countries interested in achieving their objectives and
increasing their performance must ensure that they have bid documents that provide details
on the PPP stages. They must be forthcoming in providing clarifications and information
necessary to the procurement process, conducting negotiations with the selected bidders
before signing the contract, and allowing foreign companies to participate in the bidding
process.
Some significant results in Model 3c were negative and did not support H3c. The
results showed that countries that hold pre-bid conference were less likely to improve their
scores on achieved objectives (OR=0.39, 95% CI: 0.15-0.99, p=0.048) and quality of
supervision (OR= 0.32, 0.13-0.83, p=0.019) than those that do not. The publication of award
notice had a negative effect on Bank overall performance (OR=0.21, 95% CI: 0.04-1.02,
p=0.053) and the performance of the implementing agency (OR=0.10, 95% CI: 0.01-0.67,
p=017). This means that countries that publish the award notice are less likely to improve the
implementing agency performance than those that do not. The publication of award notice
(OR= 0.10, 95% CI: 0.01- 1.01, p=0.052) also became significant but negatively affecting the
quality of supervision, meaning that countries that consider the publication of award notice
are less likely to increase the probability of satisfactory results on the quality of supervision.
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Countries with qualified evaluation committee members (OR=0.32, 95% CI: 0.11-0.90,
p=0.031) are less likely to improve their Bank overall performance scores than those without.
Countries that issue public procurement notice of the PPP (OR=0.00, 0.00- 0.33, p=0.017) are
less likely to improve their scores on achieved objectives than those that do not. The same
was true for the effect of the issuance of the public procurement notice of the PPP (OR= 0.00,
95% CI: 0.00-0.12, p=0.001) on the performance of the implementing agency and the
performance of the borrowing country overall performance, meaning that countries that issue
notice of PPP are less likely to improve the performance of their implementing agency and
the borrowing country overall performance than those that do not.
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Table 22: Results of Model 3c-Subcategories of PPP Procurement on PPP Outcome
PPP governance

PPP outcome
Achieved
objectives

Public
procurement
notice
Tender
documents
Clarification
questions
Prebid conference
Negotiations

Quality at
entry

Quality of
supervision

Overall Bank
performance

Implementing
agency

0.0024251*
(0.0061087)

0.0055913+
(0.0088911)

7.231478*
(7.349343)
16.89311*
(22.17455)
0.3937169*
(0.1859948)
2.894988*
(1.410644)

38.05095*
(60.0525)
0.3287352+
(0.1503359)

Foreign
10.5742+
companies’
(8.582288)
income
Publication of
0.2004972+
0.2142171*
award notice
(0.1628486)
(0.1706307)
Evaluation
0.320085*
committee
(0.1688632)
*indicates significant at the 95% confidence level. + indicates robust error significance.

0.1061264+
(0.1223252)

Government
Performance

Overall
borrower
Performance
0.018771+
(0.0250372)
11.20348*
(12.2037)
18.50418*
(27.7336)
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In other words, focusing on pre-bid conference, the publication of award notice, the
evaluation of committee members’ qualifications, and issuance of procurement notice of PPP
as a strategy for improving the outcomes of PPP projects produces the opposite effect. The
fact that those practices have the opposite effect is surprising. The pre-bid conference is
praised as an opportunity to share important information of the projects with potential
bidders. The publication of award notice, the evaluation of committee members’
qualifications, and the issuance of procurement notice of PPP are designed to ensure
transparency and fairness in the procurement process. When there is transparency, better
outcome is expected as the contract is awarded to the best bidder chosen through a
transparent process by a competent committee. The GNI per capita had a significant positive
effect on quality of supervision.
Subcategories of PPP Contract Management on PPP Outcome
The hypothesis (H3d) that the subcategories of the PPP contract management had a
positive influence on PPP outcome was supported by the variables including lender’s step-in
rights, dispute resolution mechanisms, and permission to foreign companies to repatriate
income due to their positive effect on quality of supervision, implementing agency
performance, government performance, and quality at entry. For instance, countries that
consider lender’s step-in rights were more likely to improve the level of satisfaction on the
quality of supervision (OR=2.98, 95% CI: 1.19-7.42, p=0.019), implementing agency
performance (OR=2.59, 95% CI: 1.05-6.36, p=0.038) and government performance
(OR=2.48, 95% CI: 0.99-6.20, p=0.052 (See Table 23) than those that do not. Countries with
dispute resolution mechanisms (OR=9.39, 95% CI: 1.50-58.41, p=0.016) become more likely
to perform better in quality at entry than those without. When foreign companies are
permitted to repatriate income (OR=3.56, 95% CI: 1.08-11.71, p=0.036), the probability of
satisfactory on government performance increases more than when they are not.
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Some significant results for H3d did not point to the expected direction. For instance,
the system to manage implementation (OR=0.14, 95% CI: 0.03-0.62, p=0.010) had a
significant effect on government performance, meaning that countries that had a system to
manage implementation are less likely to increase the probability of satisfactory government
performance than those that did not. The control variable GNI had a very minimal positive
effect on quality of supervision, Bank overall performance, government performance, and
borrower overall performance whereas democracy had a negative effect on achieved
objectives and government effectiveness.
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Table 23: Results of Model 3d-Subcategories of PPP Contract Management on PPP Outcome
PPP contract
management

PPP outcome
Achieved
objectives

Dispute
resolution
Lender’s rights

Quality at
entry
9.391285+
(8.757745)

Quality of
supervision

Overall Bank
performance

2.985361*
(1.388358)

System

Foreign
companies’
income
*indicates significant at the 95% confidence level. + indicates robust error significance.

Implementing
agency

Government
performance

2.592274*
(1.188992)

2.481761*
(1.159887)
0.1429818*
(0.108141)
3.566231+
(2.164699)

Overall borrower
performance
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Overall, the practices at the contract management stage contribute to better outcomes
in PPP projects. In terms of substantive significance, countries that give the right to lenders to
intervene in project management when necessary, those that have mechanisms in place to
settle disputes, and those that allow foreign companies to repatriate income from their work
have a positive influence on the actions of both the World Bank performance and the
performance of recipient countries’ government and of their implementing agency. A
surprising finding is the fact that countries that had a system in place to manage the
implementation of the PPP contract negatively impacted the performance of their
governments. It was surprising that practices such as tracking the progress and completion of
construction works and monitoring and evaluation did not have any influence on the outcome
of PPP projects.
Summary of Results
Table 24 summarized the results of the hypotheses that were supported and those
that were not. The hypothesis (Hypothesis 1) that country governance had a positive
influence on PPP outcome was supported considering the statistical significance of country
governance variables on PPP outcome variables. Four of the six country governance factors
including political stability, regulatory quality, voice and accountability, and government
effectiveness had significant effects on the variables of PPP outcome including achieved
objectives, quality at entry, quality of supervision, Bank overall performance, and borrower
country overall performance. Of the six country governance variables, political stability is
by far the most recurring influential variables because of its positive effect on six of the
seven PPP outcome variables. Apart from political stability, only regulatory quality had a
positive effect on achieved objectives.
The hypothesis (Hypothesis 2a) that country governance had a positive influence on
PPP governance was rejected for the main variables and supported for the subcategories.
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The main hypothesis that country governance had a positive influence on the three
continuous variables was not supported (see Table 24). None of the six country governance
variables had a significant effect on the three main PPP governance variables.
Second, the hypotheses that country governance had a significant effect on PPP
governance via the subcategories were supported. The hypothesis (Hypothesis 2b) that
country governance had a significant effect on the subcategories of PPP preparation was
supported. Government effectiveness had a positive effect on PPP prioritization. Voice and
accountability did not support Hypothesis 3a because of its negative effect on economic
assessment and risk identification. The hypothesis (Hypothesis 2c) that the subcategories of
PPP procurement had a positive effect on PPP outcome was supported. Government
effectiveness and voice and accountability had a positive effect on the 60-day minimum
period to submit bids and the issuance of procurement notice whereas political stability and
regulatory quality had a negative effect on the same variables. The rule of law had a
positive effect the issuance of procurement notice.
The hypothesis (Hypothesis 2d) that the subcategories of PPP contract management
had a positive effect on PPP outcome was supported. Political stability and rule of law had
a positive effect on the permission of foreign companies to repatriate income whereas voice
and accountability and control of corruption had a negative effect on the permission of
foreign companies to repatriate income. Voice and accountability, government
effectiveness, and rule of law had a positive effect on the dispute resolution mechanisms
whereas political stability and regulatory quality had a negative effect on the same variable.
The hypothesis (Hypothesis 3a) that PPP governance had a positive influence on
PPP outcome was rejected for the main variables and supported for the subcategories. First,
the main hypothesis that the three main PPP governance variables had a positive influence
on PPP outcome was not supported (see Table 24). Only the contract management had a
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negative effect on quality at entry. The hypotheses that the subcategories of PPP
governance had a positive influence on PPP outcome were supported. The hypothesis
(Hypothesis 3b) that the subcategories of PPP preparation had a positive influence on PPP
outcome was supported. The standardization of PPP model contracts had a positive effect
on achieved objectives, quality at entry, and Bank overall performance. Fiscal affordability
assessment had a positive effect on achieved objectives. Environment impact assessment
had a positive effect on government performance.
The hypothesis (Hypothesis 3c) that the subcategories of PPP procurement had a
positive influence on PPP outcome was supported. Bid documents with details of the stages
of the process, the clarification of questions, the issuance of procurement notice, negotiation
with the selected bidder before contract signing had a positive effect on achieved objectives.
Bid documents with details of the stages of the process and clarifications of questions had a
positive effect on borrowing country overall performance. Bid documents with details of the
stages of the process had a positive effect on the implementing agency performance. The
permission of foreign companies to participate in bidding had a positive effect on Bank
overall performance.
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Table 24: Supported Hypotheses for Models 1, 2, & 3
Hypotheses
H1: Country governance has a positive
influence on PPP outcome.
H2: Country governance has a positive
influence on PPP governance
• H2a Country governance has a positive
influence on PPP governance (main
variables)
• H2b) Country governance has a positive
influence on PPP preparation
• H2c) Country governance has a positive
influence on PPP procurement
• H2d) Country governance has a positive
influence on contract management
H3: PPP governance has a positive influence
on PPP outcome.
H3a: PPP governance has a positive influence
on PPP outcome (3 main variables)
• H3b) PPP preparation has a positive
influence on PPP outcome.
• H3c) PPP procurement has a positive
influence on PPP outcome.
• H3d) Contract management has a positive
influence on PPP outcome.

Results
Supported

Comments
There were both positive and
negative statistical significance

Not
supported
Supported
Supported
Supported

Not
supported
Supported
Supported
Supported

There were both positive and
negative statistical significance
There were both positive and
negative statistical significance
There were both positive and
negative statistical significance

The lone statistical significance
was negative.
There were both positive and
negative statistical significance
There were both positive and
negative statistical significance
There were both positive and
negative statistical significance

The hypothesis (Hypothesis 3d) that the subcategories of PPP contract management
had a positive influence on PPP outcome was supported. Lender’s step-in rights had a
positive effect on quality of supervision, implementing agency performance, government
performance. Dispute resolution mechanisms had a positive effect on quality at entry. The
permission for foreign companies to repatriate income had a positive effect on government
performance. The system to manage implementation had a significant effect on government
performance.
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Analysis: The Mediating Role of PPP Governance
Iacobucci (2008) argued that in mediation analysis, the effect of the exogenous
variable (X) directly on the endogenous variable (Y) becomes significantly smaller in size
relative to the effect size of the mediator on the endogenous variable. Put otherwise, the odd
ratio of country governance on PPP outcome will be significantly smaller than the odd ratio
of PPP governance on PPP outcome. Table 25 displayed the odd ratio of both models.
It is time to examine whether the PPP governance mediates the relationship between country
governance and PPP outcome. Each of the seven outcome variables is examined.
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Table 25: Summary of Mediation Results
Variables

On PPP outcome

Country governance

Achieved
objectives
0.3748911
2.460341
0.1689821
5.049964

Voice and accountability
Political stability
Regulatory quality
Government effectiveness
PPP management
PPP Prioritization
Fiscal assessment
Risk identification
Financial viability
Environmental assessment
Assessment of the RFP
Standard PPP model
Evaluation committee
Public procurement notice
Foreign companies’ participation
Tender documents
Clarification questions
Prebid
Publication of award notice
Negotiation
System of implementation
Foreign companies’ income
Dispute resolution
Lender’s rights

Quality at
entry

Quality of
supervision

Overall Bank
performance

2.912011

2.064789

2.514281

Implementin
g agency
0.4310826+
2.900966

0.2999283

0.2871034

Government
performance

Overall borrower
performance

2.648148

2.648148

0.9700303
3.429006+
0.211594

0.2202167

0.2069761
0.4842549+
2.260709+

2.611134
2.37538

3.787213

2.645445
0.320085

0.0024251

0.0055913+

0.018771+

38.05095

11.20348
18.50418

10.5742+
7.231478
16.89311
0.3937169

0.3287352
0.2004972+

0.2142171

0.1061264

2.894988
0.1429818
3.566231+
9.391285 +
2.985361
+

*indicates significant at the 95% confidence level. indicates robust error significance.

2.592274

2.481761
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Looking at the odd ratios of country governance variables on achieved objectives on
Table 25, the highest is 5.05. Any PPP governance variable with an odd ratio higher than 5.05
will be considered a mediator. It appears that the odd ratios of bid documents of the PPP
stages which is 7.23 and for clarifications of questions which is 16.9 are higher than 5.05.
Therefore, bid documents of the PPP stages and clarifications of questions mediate the
relationship between voice and accountability, political stability, regulatory quality,
government effectiveness and achieved objectives. A more detail examination showed that
negotiation with selected bidders with an odd ratio of 2.89 and fiscal analysis assessment
with an odd ratio of 3.43 mediate the relationship between voice and accountability, political
stability, regulatory quality, and achieved objectives.
For the odd ratios of country governance variables on quality at entry, the highest is
2.91. Any PPP governance variable with an odd ratio higher than 2.91 will be considered a
mediator. Standardized PPP model contracts with an odd ratio of 2.37 and dispute resolution
mechanisms with an odd ratio of 9.39 are higher than 2.91. Therefore, standardized PPP
model contracts and dispute resolution mechanisms mediate the relationship between political
stability and quality at entry. For the odd ratios of country governance variables on quality of
supervision, the highest is 2.06. Any PPP governance variable with an odd ratio higher than
2.06 will be considered a mediator. The assessment of RFP with an odd ration of 2.61 and
lender step-in rights with an odd ratio of 2.98 mediate the relationship between political
stability and quality of supervision. For the odd ratios of country governance variables on
Bank overall performance, the highest is 2.51. Any PPP governance variable with an odd
ratio higher than 2.51 will be considered a mediator. It appears that the odd ratios of
standardized PPP model contracts with an odd ratio of 2.64 and foreign company permission
with an odd ratio of 10.572 are higher than 2.51. Therefore, standardized PPP model
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contracts and foreign company permission mediate the relationship between political stability
and Bank performance.
As far as the odd ratios of country governance variables on the implementing agency
are concerned, the highest is 2.90 whereas the odd ratios of bid documents detailing the PPP
stages are 38.05. Therefore, bid documents detailing the PPP stages mediate the relationship
between political stability and implementing agency. The highest odd ratios of country
governance variables on government performance are 2.65. Any PPP governance variable
with an odd ratio higher than 2.65 will be considered a mediator. It appears that the odd ratios
of foreign company income repatriation with an odd ratio of 3.56 is higher than 2.65.
Therefore, foreign company income repatriation mediates the relationship between political
stability and government performance. Looking at the odd ratios of country governance
variables on borrower overall performance, the highest is 2.65. Any PPP governance variable
with an odd ratio higher than 2.65 will be considered a mediator. The odd ratios of bid
documents detailing the PPP stages with an odd ratio of 11.20 and clarification questions
with an odd ratio of 18.50 are higher than 2.65. Therefore, bid documents detailing the PPP
stages and clarification questions mediate the relationship between political stability and the
borrower overall performance.
The analysis showed that PPP governance factors mediate the relationship between
country governance factors and PPP outcome factors. Each of the seven outcome variables
one way or the other has been mediated by a PPP governance variable.
Analysis: Results by Income Level
The hypotheses used to analyze the research questions on the relationships between
country governance, PPP governance, and PPP outcome are used for the income level
analysis. In other words, the same hypotheses, H1, H2 (a, b, c, d), H3 (a, b, c, d) are tested for
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each income level group. H4 could not be run for the income level analysis because of
limited sub-samples.
Model 1, Model 2 (a, b, c, d), and Model 3 (a, b, c, d) were run to assess the multiple
influences between country governance, PPP governance, and PPP governance by including
all the 100 countries in the same sample. The dissertation is also interested in those
relationships within specific income levels. More specific models were run to understand the
influence of country governance on PPP outcome by income level. Five models are used to
test five different levels of income.
The first model (Model I) included the low income countries with a sample of 23
countries. It was shown earlier that the assumptions of the endogenous variables were met.
There has been no change in the endogenous variables. However, the normality test showed
that four variables of country governance including government effectiveness, regulatory
quality, rule of law, and control of corruption were not normally distributed. However, the
distribution for government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of
corruption were not severe. Therefore, no transformation of the data occurred. The main
variables of PPP governance including PPP preparation, PPP procurement, and PPP contract
management were all normally distributed (p>0.05). A correlation test of the exogenous
variable (country governance) showed that there was no multicollinearity (r=0.45 to r=0.95).
For the main PPP governance variables, the relationship was weak to moderate. This was
explained by the fact that the sample size is small.
The second included the lower-middle income countries with a sample of 32 countries
(Model II). The normality test showed that five of the six variables of country governance
including voice and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory
quality, rule of law, were normally distributed. Only the distribution for control of corruption
was not normally distributed. No transformation of the variable occurred because the non-
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distribution was not severe (P=0.038). The two main variables of PPP governance including
PPP preparation and PPP contract management were normally distributed (p>0.05). The PPP
contract management variable was slightly non-normal (p=0.04). A correlation test of the
exogenous variable (country governance) showed that the relationships were strong except
the relationships between political stability; and government effectiveness; and rule of law;
and control of corruption were moderate. Only the relationship between voice and
accountability and political stability was weak (p=0.25). In addition, there was no
multicollinearity. For the main PPP governance variables, the relationship was moderate to
strong, which is acceptable for running the multivariate regression.
The third constituted the upper-middle income level with a sample of 35 countries. It
was shown earlier that the assumptions of the endogenous variables were met. There has been
no change in the endogenous variables. The normality test showed that five of the six
variables of country governance including voice and accountability, government
effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption were normally
distributed. Only the distribution for political stability was slightly not normally distributed
(p=0.045). No transformation of the variable occurred because the non-distribution was not
severe. The three main variables of PPP governance were normally distributed (p>0.05). A
correlation test of the exogenous variable (country governance) showed that the relationships
were moderate to strong. In addition, there was no multicollinearity. For the main PPP
governance variables, the relationships were strong.
The fourth group included all the levels excluding high income countries with a
sample of 90 countries. It was shown earlier that the assumptions of the endogenous variables
were met. There has been no change in the endogenous variables. However, the normality
test showed that four variables of country governance including government effectiveness,
regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption were not normally distributed.
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Therefore, no transformation of the data occurred because the data was used in previous
models. The purpose of income level analysis is to compare the results by income level.
Therefore, transforming the data would be detrimental to the spirit of the analysis. The main
variables of PPP governance including PPP preparation and PPP contract management were
normally distributed (p>0.05) except the PPP procurement variable which was slightly nonnormal (p=0.044). A correlation test of the exogenous variable (country governance) showed
that there was no multicollinearity (r=0.43 to r=0.90) and the variables were moderately and
strongly correlated. For the main PPP governance variables, the relationships were moderate
to strong.
The fifth group concerned a sample of 32 Sub-Saharan African countries. Again, it
the assumptions of the endogenous variables were met. However, the normality test showed
that four variables of country governance including government effectiveness, regulatory
quality, rule of law, and control of corruption were not normally distributed. As in the
previous income level, no transformation of the data occurred because the data was used in
previous models. Again, the purpose of income level analysis is to compare the results by
income level. Therefore, transforming the data would be detrimental to the spirit of the
analysis. All the main variables of PPP governance were normally distributed (p>0.05). A
correlation test of the exogenous variable (country governance) showed that there was no
multicollinearity (r=0.43 to r=0.90) and the variables were strongly correlated. For the main
PPP governance variables, the relationships were moderately correlated.
Four models including Model I, Model II, Model III, and Model IV were run to test
hypothesis I (H I), hypothesis II (H 2), hypothesis III (H III), and hypothesis IV (H IV) (See
Table 26 for models and hypotheses). The models and hypotheses were tested for each of the
five income levels. The hypotheses were the same as in Model 1, Model 2, and Model 3
except that the binary variables were not tested. The binary variables were not tested because
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the samples at each level became too small for the large number of binary variables. It was
also impossible to run the data in STATA and obtain results, hence the decision to remove
the binary variables.
The exogenous variables and the endogenous variables for Model I, Model II, and
Model III in Table 26 remained the same as in Model 1, Model 2, and Model 3. The change
occurred with the endogenous mediator variable as the binary variables were left out. Thus,
for the mediator endogenous variable, only the three continuous endogenous mediator
variables were used. There was no change in the two control variables which included
democracy and GNI. Model I and Model III were tested using the multivariate ordinal
logistic regression (GSEM). Model II was tested using the multivariate multiple regression.
Model IV summarized the results of the three other models to deduct the mediating role of
PPP governance.
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Table 26: Models for Testing Hypotheses by Income Level
Purpose

Hypotheses
Endogenous
variables

Model I
Influence of country governance
on PPP outcomes

Model II
Influence of country governance
on PPP governance

Model III
Influence of PPP governance
on PPP outcome

Model IV
Mediating role of PPP governance

HI
-

H II
- PPP preparation
- PPP procurement
- PPP contract management

H III
- Achieved objectives
- Quality at entry
- Quality of supervision
- Bank overall performance
- Implementing agency
performance
- Government compliance
- Borrowing government
performance
- NA
- PPP preparation
- PPP procurement
- PPP contract management
- Subcategories of PPP
preparation

H IV

-

-

Mediating variables
Exogenous variables

Control variables

-

Achieved objectives
Quality at entry
Quality of supervision
Bank overall performance
Implementing agency
performance
Government compliance
Borrowing government
performance
- NA
Voice and accountability
Political stability
Government effectiveness
Regulatory quality
Rule of law
Control of corruption
Score of democracy
Gross National Income per
capita (GNI)
Multivariate ordinal logistic
regression (GSEM)

Analysis method

-

Sample size

23, 32, 32, 35,90

-

- NA
Voice and accountability
Political stability
Government effectiveness
Regulatory quality
Rule of law
Control of corruption
Score of democracy
Gross National Income per
capita (GNI)
Multivariate multiple
regression

23, 32, 32, 35,90

-

Score of democracy
Gross National Income per
capita (GNI)
Multivariate ordinal logistic
regression (logit)

23, 32, 32, 35,90

-

-

PPP outcome and PPP governance
(see Model I, II, and III)

- PPP governance
Country governance and PPP
governance (see Model I, II, and
III).

Score of democracy
Gross National Income per capita
(GNI)
- Multivariate multiple regression
- Multivariate ordinal logistic
regression (logit)
23, 32, 32, 35,90
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Low Income Countries
The hypothesis (H I) that country governance had a positive influence on PPP
outcome was tested for the sample of 23 low income countries. Political stability had a
significant positive effect on the performance of the implementing agency (OR: 14.87, 95%
CI: 1.05-209.03, p=0.045). This means for a 1-point increase in the score of political stability
of low income countries, the probability of higher satisfaction in the performance of
implementing agencies gets higher. Regulatory quality had a significant negative effect on
the quality of supervision (OR: 0.00, 95% CI: 0.00-1.05, p= 0.052), meaning for an increase
in the score of regulatory quality of low income countries, there is a lower probability that
there are higher satisfactory results. The GNI per capita (OR: 0.03, 95% CI: 1.00-1.01) had a
significant but a neutral effect on government performance. Thus, the hypothesis that country
governance had a positive influence on PPP outcome for low income countries is supported
by political stability via its effect on the implementing agency performance. Practically, for
low-income countries, political stability contributes to better performance of recipient
countries, especially the performance of the implementing agencies. The regulatory quality
had a negative influence on the quality of supervision.
For the influence of country governance on PPP governance (H II), only government
effectiveness was significant with a negative effect on contract management (OR= -27.91,
95%CI: -56.19- 0.36, p=0.053). This shows that a 1-point increase in the government
effectiveness score lowers the score of contract management by 56.2%, controlling for the
effect of all other variables. Thus, the hypothesis (H II) that country governance had a
positive influence on PPP outcome for low income countries was not supported. Practically,
focusing on government effectiveness will more likely lower the scores of PPP contract
management.
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As far as the influence of the PPP governance on PPP outcome (H III) was concerned,
PPP preparation had a significant positive effect on the borrowing country overall
performance (OR=1.108684, 95%CI: 1.00-1.22, p=0.046), meaning that an increase in the
score of PPP preparation leads to higher probability of satisfactory performance of the
borrower country. PPP contract management had a significant effect on achieved objectives
(OR= 0.89, 95%CI: 0.79-0.98, p=0.030), quality at entry (OR= 0.9099126, 95%CI: 0.830.99, p=0.043), Bank overall performance (OR= 0.89, 95%CI: 0.81-0.989, p=0.028),
government performance (OR=0.87, 95%CI: 0.78-0.96, p=0.011), and the borrowing country
overall performance (OR= 0.83, 95%CI: 0.72-0.95, p=0.009). In other words, for a 1-point
increase in the scores of contract management, the probability of satisfactory results gets
lower for all these variables. However, it is important to note that these variables are not too
far from being positive. If positive, these variables would have shown that contract
management was important for achieving greater PPP outcomes. PPP procurement had a
significant effect on Bank overall performance (OR= 0.9290738, 95%CI: 0.86-0.99, p=0.040)
and the implementing agency performance (OR= 0.92, 95%CI: 0.86- 0.99, p=0.048). Thus,
an increase in the score of PPP procurement reduces the probability that the implementing
agency performance will be more satisfactory. However, the reduction of such probability is
very small at about 8%.
Thus, the hypothesis (H III) that PPP governance had a positive influence on PPP
outcome was supported by PPP preparation via its effect on the borrowing country overall
performance. The effects of PPP procurement and contract management do not support H III.
However, their odd ratios are closer to 1. Practically, when low income countries increase
their PPP preparation scores, they are more likely to perform better. While PPP procurement
and contract management failed to be positively significant, in practice, they are very close to
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having a positive influence on PPP outcome. In other words, they should not be discarded as
being irrelevant for satisfactory outcomes.
Lower-Middle Income Countries
The influence of country governance on PPP outcome for the 32 lower-middle income
countries was also tested, but there were no significant results. Only the control variable GNI
1.00, 95% CI: 1.000-1.002, p=0.014) had a significant effect on the quality at entry.
Therefore, the hypothesis (H I) that country governance had a positive influence on PPP
outcome for lower-middle income countries was not supported.
The test of the influence of country governance on PPP governance (H II) showed that
government effectiveness had a significant positive effect on PPP preparation (OR=39.61,
95%CI: -1.44-80.66, p=0.058). This means that a 1-point increase in the score of government
effectiveness leads to an increase in the score of PPP preparation by 39.61%, controlling for
the effect of all other variables. Control of corruption (OR= 35.14, 95%CI : 5.84-64.43,
p=0.021) for the first time had a significant positive effect on PPP preparation. This means
lower-middle income countries that increase their score in the control of corruption, the score
of PPP preparation increases by 35.14%, controlling for the effect of all other variables. The
effect of political stability (OR= -12.88, 95%CI: [-22.74667) - (-3.021258), p=0.013] on PPP
procurement was significant and negative; which means that a 1-point increase in the score of
political stability leads to 12.88% reduction in the score of PPP procurement, controlling for
the effect of all other variables. Thus, the hypothesis (H II) that country governance had a
positive influence on PPP governance for lower-income countries was supported by
government effectiveness and control of corruption via their effects on PPP preparation. In
terms of substantive significance, this means that when lower-income countries improve their
score in government effectiveness and control of corruption, the scores of PPP preparation
also increase; hence they should focus on those two variables.
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The test of the influence of PPP governance on PPP outcome (H III) for lower-middle
income countries showed that only PPP preparation had a significant negative impact on
quality at entry (OR=0.94, 95%CI: .89-0.99, p=0.049). The probability of higher satisfactory
results for quality at entry gets lower as the score of PPP preparation increases by 1 point.
This means that the hypothesis (H III) that PPP governance had a positive influence on PPP
outcome for lower-middle income countries was not supported.
Upper-Middle Income Countries
The influence of country governance on PPP outcome for upper-middle income
countries was tested. Political stability had a significant positive effect on achieved objectives
(OR: 25.3251, 95% CI: 4.64-138.08, p=0.000), quality of supervision (OR: 6.94, 95% CI:
1.78-27.04, p=0.005), Bank overall performance (OR: 15.92, 95% CI: 3.21-78.98, p=0.001),
performance of the implementing agency (OR: 5.51, 95% CI: 1.46-20.71, p= 0.012),
government performance (OR: 4.65, 95% CI: 1.23-17.58, p=0.023), quality at entry (OR:
20.74, 95% CI: 3.50-122.79, p=0.001), and the borrower government overall performance
(OR: 7.98, 95% CI: 2.00-31.78, p=0.003). This means that for a 1-point increase in the score
of political stability, the outcome for each of achieved objectives, the quality of supervision,
the Bank overall performance, the performance of the implementing agency, and quality at
entry is more likely to be satisfactory. It was also found that for the upper-middle income
countries, a 1-point increase in the score of regulatory quality is more likely to lead to more
satisfactory achieved objectives (OR: 658.15, 95% CI: 16.12-26871.1, p=0.001),
performance of the implementing agency (OR18.29, 95% CI: 1.12-296.66, p=0.041),
government performance (OR: 44.17, 95% CI: 2.08-936.30, p=0.015), and the overall
performance of the borrowing country (OR: 16.99, 95% CI: 0.96-298.96, p=0.053). Control
of corruption (OR: 20.60, 95% CI: 1.10-384.94, p=0.043) had a significant positive effect on
achieved objectives. This means that for a 1-point increase in the score of control of
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corruption, the probability of better satisfactory achieved objectives gets higher. Voice and
accountability (OR: 5.857865, 95% CI: 1.11-30.84, p=0.037) had a significant positive effect
on the Bank overall performance.
Overall, the hypothesis (H I) that country governance had a positive influence on PPP
outcome for upper-middle income countries was supported by political stability, control of
corruption, and regulatory quality via their strong and extensive significant effect on the
variables of PPP outcome. The practical significance is that upper-middle income countries
should focus on improving political stability, control of corruption, and regulatory quality.
Some significant effects were negative. Government effectiveness (OR: 0.01, 95% CI:
0.00-0.36, p=0.010) and rule of law (OR: 0.00, 95% CI: 2.90e-06- 0.13, p=0.007) had a
significant negative effect on achieved objectives. In other words, the probability of better
achieved objectives gets lower for a 1-point increase in the score of government effectiveness
and rule of law. As the score in the rule of law increases by 1 point, the probability of
satisfactory results for the quality at entry (OR: 0.0067783, 95% CI: 0.00-1.02, p=0.051),
Bank overall performance (OR: 0.00, 95% CI: 0.00-0.61, p=0.031), performance of the
implementing agency ( OR: 0.00, 95% CI: 0.00-0.24, p=0.012), government performance
(OR: 0.01, 95% CI: 0.00-0.82, p=0.039) and the borrowing government overall performance
(OR: 0.00, 95% CI: 0.00- 0.29, p=0.014) gets lower. The control variable, democracy (OR:
0.92, 95% CI: 0.86-0.97, p=0.008) had a significant effect on the government performance.
Thus, government effectiveness and rule of law did not support hypothesis I (H I). Uppermiddle income countries should exercise caution in their approach to government
effectiveness and rule of law.
When the test was run for the effect of country governance on PPP governance
(Hypothesis II), it is found that upper-middle income countries which increase their score of
regulatory quality (OR=29.0716, 95%CI: -0.69-58.83, p=0.055) by 1 point also increase their
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score of PPP preparation by about 29.07%. When they increase their score in the rule of law
(OR=-57.28, 95%CI: (-104.12)- (-10.43), p=0.018) by 1 point, their score in PPP preparation
is significantly reduced by 57.28%, controlling for the effect of all other variables. Thus, the
hypothesis (H II) that country governance had a positive influence on PPP outcome was
supported by regulatory quality via its effect on PPP preparation.
The test of the influence of PPP governance on PPP outcome (Hypothesis III) for
upper-middle income countries showed that PPP procurement (OR=1.06, 95%CI: 1.00-1.12,
p=0.040) had a significant positive effect on achieved objectives. This means that the
increase in the probability of higher satisfactory outcomes from the increase in the score of
PPP procurement is only 6%. Upper-middle income countries that increase their PPP
procurement (OR: 1.08, 95%CI: 1.01-1.14, p=0.013) score by 1-point are expected to
increase the probability of greater performance of the implementing agency by only 7%.
When those countries increase their contract management (OR= 0.92, 95%CI: 0.86-0.99,
p=0.03 score by 1-point, they are expected to have lower performance of their implementing
agencies. Overall, the hypothesis (H III) that PPP governance had a positive influence on PPP
outcome for upper-middle income countries was supported by PPP procurement via its
effects on achieved objectives and implementing agency performance. This means that in
practice, upper-middle income countries with high scores in PPP procurement achieved
greater PPP outcomes.
Low, Lower-Middle and Upper-Middle Income Countries
For the influence of country governance on PPP outcome (H I), political stability had
a significant positive effect on achieved objectives (OR=2.69, 95% CI: 1.40-5.15, p=0.003),
quality at entry (OR=3.49, 95% CI: 1.76-6.90, p=0.000), quality of supervision (OR=2.19,
95% CI: 1.16-4.13, p=0.015), Bank overall performance (OR =2.96, 95% CI: 1.54-5.68,
p=0.001), the performance of the implementing agency (OR=2.90, 95% CI: 1.50-5.59,
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p=0.001), and the overall performance of the borrowing country (OR: OR=3.01, 95% CI:
1.56-5.78, p=0.001). This means that for all these variables, an increase by 1 point in the
score of political stability leads to higher satisfactory scores. When the score in the voice and
accountability (OR: 0.37, 95% CI: 0.14-0.98, p=0.046) increases by 1 point, the probability
of higher satisfactory outcomes gets lower. Overall, the hypothesis (H I) that country
governance had a positive influence on PPP outcome is supported by political stability via its
effects on quality at entry, quality of supervision, Bank overall performance, implementing
agency performance, and borrowing country overall performance. In other words, political
stability is important for greater performance in PPP projects.
No significant effect was found when the test of the influence of country governance
on PPP governance was run. This means that hypothesis II that country governance had a
positive influence on PPP governance was not supported.
For the influence of PPP governance on PPP outcome, it was found that the contract
management (OR= 0.96, 95%CI: 0.93-0.99, p=0.023) had a significant negative effect on
achieved objectives. The probability of greater satisfactory outcomes is lowered only by 4%
for any 1-point increase in the score of PPP contract management. This means that hypothesis
III was not supported.
Sub-Saharan African Countries
The hypothesis (H I) that country governance had a positive influence on PPP
outcome for Sub-Saharan African countries was supported. In effect, political stability had a
significant positive effect on the Bank overall performance (OR=3.34, 95% CI: 0.99-11.25,
p=0.051), borrowing country overall performance (OR: 8.74, 95% CI: 1.71-44.64, p=0.009),
and the performance of the implementing agency (Robust) (OR: 3.27, 95% CI: 1.06-10.02,
p= 0.038]. This means there is a higher probability of an increase in the scores of the Bank
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overall performance, borrowing country overall performance, and the performance of the
implementing agency for a 1-point increase in the score of political stability.
The test of the influence of country governance on PPP governance for Sub-Saharan
African countries showed that when these countries increase their score in voice and
accountability (OR= 10.85629, 95%CI: 2.79-18.91, p=0.010), their score in PPP procurement
increases by almost 11%. When their score in political stability increases by 1 point, their
score in PPP procurement [OR=-9.76, 95%CI: (-17.38) – (-2.14), p=0.014] lowers by almost
10%. The hypothesis (H III) that country governance had a positive influence on PPP
governance for Sub-Saharan African countries was supported by voice and accountability via
its effect on PPP procurement. For sub-Saharan African countries, no significance was found
for the test of the influence of PPP governance on PPP outcome. In other words, hypothesis
III was not supported.
In short, the analysis provided the significant results on the relationships between
country governance and PPP outcome, country governance and PPP governance, and PPP
governance and PPP outcome as well as the mediating role of PPP governance in the
relationship between country governance and PPP outcome. The analysis focused on the
results for the sample of 100 countries and then broke down the countries by income level.
The analysis of the results by income level were explained earlier. The significant results are
discussed in Chapter V.
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CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The purpose of this study was to examine the relationships between country governance, PPP
governance, and PPP outcome and determine whether PPP governance mediated the relationship
between country governance and PPP outcome. To that regard, five research questions were
posed and answered through the analysis of the results. This section discusses and concludes on
the important findings.
Concluding Points: Country Governance and PPP outcome
To the first question on whether there was a relationship between country governance on PPP
outcome, the study found that the hypothesis that country governance had a positive influence on
PPP outcome was supported. The significant (positive and negative) results appear on Figure 6.
The study found that countries that had political stability and were free of terrorism and ethnic
divisions achieved the objectives of their PPP projects. Political stability was defined as the
likelihood that the government will be destabilized by unconstitutional or politically motivated
violence and terrorism (Kaufmann et al., 2010; WGI, 2018). Where there are political stability
and no terrorism or ethnic division, the recipient countries are more likely to improve the
performance of the implementing agencies as well as the overall performance of the recipient
country in the PPP projects. Under the same circumstances, the World Bank performs better with
regards to quality at entry, which entails identifying, facilitating the preparation of, and
appraising the operation. The World Bank also performs more effectively with regards to its
proactive supervisory role and addressing threats. Under politically stable conditions, the Bank
claims higher overall performance. These findings are supported by scholars who found that the
lack of political stability (Chou et al., 2012) or political instability (Eberhard and Gratwick,
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2013), internal conflict (Lee et al., 2018), and political uncertainty (Osei-Kyei and Chan, 2017)
had a negative effect on PPP investments. From a broader perspective, scholars also found that
ethnic fragmentation (Karnane and Quinn, 2019), ethnic divisions and tensions (Houdhary and
Reksulak, 2019), the lack of social cohesion (Easterly and Levine, 1997), and opportunistic
politics (Easterly, Ritzen, and Woolcock, 2006) led to the degradation of the economic fabric of
countries. When decisions on PPPs are made under these conditions, the impact is more likely to
be negative on the performance of both the recipient countries and the World Bank.
The study also found that the quality of regulations had a positive influence on the
objectives of PPPs. The quality of regulations is defined as the ability of the government to
formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector
development (Kaufmann et al., 2010; WGI 2018). Previous findings showed that PPP investment
in infrastructure was highly sensitive to the quality of regulations (Moszoro et al., 2014; Moszoro
et al., 2015) and that regulatory quality had a positive impact in attracting private investors
(Pérez-D’Oleo et al., 2015; Baker, 2016) and the private bidders and the market competitiveness
of the ports (Panayides et al., 2015). Wang et al. (2019) showed that regulatory quality in
developing countries reduced the negative relationship between risk allocation and private
investment. Even though these findings showed a positive direction of expected relationships,
they differ from the finding in this research because this study went further to show that the
specific impact of regulatory quality is on the objectives of PPPs.
The surprising finding is the negative influence of voice and accountability on the
performance of the implementing agency of recipient countries. “Voice and accountability” was
defined as the participation of a country’s citizens in selecting their government as well as
freedom of expression, freedom of association, and free media (Kaufmann et al., 2010, WGI,
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2018). Pérez-D’Oleo et al. (2015) and Wang et al. (2019) found that countries that focused on
voice and accountability could attract more investments and reduce risk. Their finding was not
supported in this study. On the contrary, the study showed that greater accountability could have
a negative influence on the performance of the implementing agencies. The reasons may be that
accountability is sometimes a political process and the political influence on PPPs may be based
on political interests that manipulate the decisions of the agencies.

Figure 6: Significant Results: Country Governance on PPP Outcome
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In Figure 6, the solid lines show the positive findings whereas the dotted lines show the negative
findings. Figure 6 shows that for the influence of country governance on PPP outcome, seven
relationships were positive whereas three relationships were negative. The relationships were
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discussed earlier. Rule of law, control of corruption, and government performance have no lines
because there were no significant results from or to those variables.
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Concluding Points: Country Governance and PPP Governance
To the second research question whether there was any relationship between country
governance and PPP governance, the study found no support for the hypothesis when a global
score is assigned at the stage level of PPPs; that is, rating each of the preparation,
procurement, and management out of 100. The lack of support may be related to the fact the
details or the practices at each level are more important than the scores at the stage level. In
effect, the study found support for the hypothesis that country governance had a positive
influence on the practices of PPP preparation. The significant (positive and negative) results
appear on Figure 7. The study found that government effectiveness had a strong positive
influence on the prioritization of PPP. Government effectiveness was defined as the quality of
public services or civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures,
the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s
commitment to policies (Kaufmann et al, 2010). This finding is relevant in that an effective
government is more likely to prioritize the PPPs to make them consistent with the investment
priorities. Previous findings showed that higher government effectiveness in developing
countries (Lee et al., 2018), bureaucratic efficiency and independence (Sabry, 2015; and
Bota-Avram, 2014), and government positive attitude towards private sector investments
(Osei-Kyei and Chan, 2017) led to higher level of investments.
The study found that voice and accountability and political stability had a negative
effect on the assessment of the RFPs and the environmental impact assessment, respectively.
Perhaps the assessment of the RFPs and the environment impact are more effectively
conducted when there is no political or media involvement in the decision making. In effect,
in some countries, there are independent specialized units and agencies that are responsible
for conducting such assessments. Political stability had a negative effect on PPP
prioritization. That may mean that countries that are politically stable and safe have no
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urgency in seeking consistency between prioritization of PPPs and the investments priorities
as such measures may already exist.
To the hypothesis that country governance had a positive influence on the practices of
PPP procurement, the study found support. The study found that countries with greater
freedom of expression and accountability are more likely to meet the 60-day minimum period
to bidders to submit bids. This finding is meaningful since media may report on the delays in
the contracts while bidders usually have the right to appeal. This makes the procurement
authorities more likely to act diligently. Countries with greater government effectiveness tend
to meet the minimum period of submission and tend to publish the public procurement notice
of the PPPs. Countries that respect and enforce the rule of law tend to issue the public
procurement notice as well. No previous studies have focused on the specific practices of
PPP procurement. Therefore, it is impossible to discuss these results in light of the extant
literature. Furthermore, the purpose of the study was to investigate these new practices.
Unlike accountability and government effectiveness, countries with greater political
stability and regulatory quality tend to neither meet the 60-day minimum period to submit nor
publish the public procurement notice. Countries with greater political stability and voice and
accountability fail to provide details of the PPP stages in bid documents and effectively treat
sole proposals. Those with greater political stability tend to not publish the award notice.
To the question on whether country governance had a positive influence on the
practices of PPP contract management, the study found support. Political stability and rule of
law had a positive influence on the permission of foreign companies to repatriate income
whereas voice and accountability and control of corruption had the opposite influence.
Previous studies supported that countries with greater political stability (Osei-Kyei and
Chan., 2017; Chou et al., 2012) and the rule of law (Moszoro et al., 2014; Lee et al., 2018)
attract investors and more investments. The finding is logical as the rule of law provides
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some guarantee that government will act with justice, fairness, honesty, and openness for the
benefit of all citizens (Salevao, 2005). However, it is also understandable that greater voice
and accountability and control of corruption do not work in favor of foreign companies when
they repatriate income. In fact, media reporting on the benefits made from projects may
discredit the reputation of foreign companies and tag them as greedy. As for corruption, it has
been often cited as the reason for capital flight from poor countries to developed countries.
An effective control of corruption may therefore limit foreign companies’ capacity to
repatriate income, especially through illegal means. Foreign companies often see such control
as exaggerated and arbitrary. Another important finding is that countries with greater voice
and accountability, government effectiveness, and rule of law tend to have the best dispute
resolution mechanisms whereas those with greater political stability and regulatory quality
tend to have the opposite influence. Solutions are easily found where people are accountable
and express their positions freely; when the government has effective means in place; and
when the rule of law is enforced. On the other hand, political stability and the regulatory
quality may obstruct the process of dispute resolution because of cumbersome strict
regulations. It was found that regulatory quality had a negative influence on monitoring and
evaluation, which may again be explained by the fact that cumbersome regulations limit the
possibilities of further evaluation of projects. The regulations themselves may not be welldesigned and fit. The results discussed earlier are presented in Figure 7.
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Figure 7: Significant Results: Country Governance on PPP Governance
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Figure 7 is a summary of the positive and negative results for the influence of country
governance on PPP governance. The solid lines show the positive findings whereas the dotted
lines represent the negative findings. Figure 7 shows that for the influence of country
governance on PPP governance, nine relationships were positive whereas 18 relationships
were negative.
Concluding Points: PPP Governance and PPP Outcome
To the third research question that PPP governance had a positive influence on PPP
outcome, the study found no support for the hypothesis when a global score is assigned at the
stage level of PPP; that is, rating each of the preparation, procurement, and management out
of 100. This means that it may not be reasonable to rate PPP at the stage level. Again, the
lack of support may be related to the fact that the details or the practices at each level are
more important than the scores at the stage level. Thus, the study found support for the
hypothesis that the practices of PPP preparation had a positive influence on PPP outcome.
The significant (positive and negative) results appear on Figure 8. The study found that
countries with standardized PPP model contracts had higher satisfaction in terms of achieved
objectives, quality at entry, and Bank overall performance. This confirms previous findings
that standardized contract models are important for orientation to better and more efficient
agreements (Kotze et al., 1999; The World Bank, 2018a). In particular, standardized models
are important for achieving the objectives and for the World Bank to assume its roles of
assisting in the preparation and supervision. It was found that fiscal affordability assessment
contributes to greater achieved objectives, which was confirmed by the World Bank (2018a).
When countries assess their requests for proposals, the World Bank is more likely to provide
quality supervision; and when countries conduct environment impact assessment, they are
more likely to increase their performance in terms of compliance. The surprising finding is
that risk identification negatively influences the Bank’s assistance as well as the recipient
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country government performance. Difficulties and complexities related to risk identification
may slow down the progress of the World Bank and recipient countries. Perhaps seeking
consistency between PPP prioritization and public investment prioritization becomes a
burden for the Bank and the implementing agencies in recipient countries.
The study found support for the hypothesis that the practices of PPP procurement had
a positive influence on PPP outcome. Countries that had bid documents detailing the stages
of the process, provided clarification questions, and allowed negotiations with the selected
bidder before signing the contract had higher satisfactory achievement of objectives. This
finding is supported by past studies which found that direct negotiation, presence of details of
the procurement stages, prequalification criteria, and openness to clarification questions on
RFPs were necessary for a successful PPP project (El-Sawalhi and Mansour, 2014; Liu et al.,
2015). Countries with details of the procurement stages and openness to clarifications
improved their overall performance in projects (El-Sawalhi and Mansour, 2014; Liu et al.,
2015). Countries with details of the procurement stages could increase the performance of
their implementing agencies. The World Bank could expect to increase its overall
performance when foreign companies are allowed to participate in the bidding for PPP
contracts.
On the other hand, countries that hold a pre-bid conference could neither achieve their
objectives nor improve the quality of supervision. The publication of award notice did not
facilitate the supervisory role of the Bank either. These findings contradicted the previous
literature that pre-bid conference and the publication of award notice were key to PPP success
(El-Sawalhi and Mansour, 2014; Liu et al., 2015). It was not also clear why the publication of
award notice would have a negative impact on the Bank overall performance as well as on the
performance of the implementing agency. The qualifications of evaluation committee
members reduced the Bank overall performance while issuing the public procurement notice
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of the PPP led to less satisfactory achieved objectives, lower performance of the
implementing agency, and of the borrowing country. This finding is contradictory to past
studies that found qualifications of evaluation committee members to be a desired practice
(Soomro and Zhang, 2015).
The study found support for the hypothesis that the practices of contract management
had a positive influence on PPP outcome. In effect, countries that guarantee the rights of
lenders to intervene in the process, the dispute resolution mechanisms, and the permission for
foreign companies to repatriate income had extensive influence on the performance of the
Bank in terms of quality at entry and quality of supervision and on the recipient country in
terms of the implementing agency performance and government compliance. This influence
is understandable in that the World Bank needs those guarantees to prepare and sustain
partnerships. One surprising finding is the negative influence on government performance
when there is a system in place to manage the implementation of PPP projects. This negative
influence may occur when the system is too strict or not related to the recipient country’s
conditions or the recipient countries is unprepared to work effectively from the system
established to manage the projects. The results discussed earlier are summarized in Figure 8.
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Figure 8: Significant Results: PPP Governance on PPP Outcome
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Figure 8 is a summary of the positive and negative results for the influence of PPP
governance on PPP outcome. The solid lines show the positive findings whereas the dotted
lines represent the negative findings. Figure 8 show that for the influence of PPP governance
on PPP governance, 12 relationships were positive whereas 18 relationships were negative.
Concluding Points: The Mediating Role of PPP Governance
To the question whether PPP governance mediated the relationship between country
governance and PPP outcome, the study found that the hypothesis was supported. The
findings are new as no previous studies examined the mediating role of PPP governance. The
significant results appear on Figure 9. The study found that countries with the bid documents
that describe the PPP stages and are open to clarifications of questions mediated the
relationship between each of the variables voice and accountability, political stability,
regulatory quality, government effectiveness and the PPP outcome variable, achieved
objectives. In other words, the influence of voice and accountability, political stability,
regulatory quality, and government effectiveness on achieved objectives is indirect through
having the bid documents. This also mean that countries with greater voice and
accountability, political stability, regulatory quality, government effectiveness may still need
to have bid documents if they want to achieve their objectives. It is understandable that the
bid documents are important since they describe the stages of the PPP process for potential
bidders. The presence of bid documents detailing the PPP stages was also found to mediate
the relationship between political stability and the implementing agency performance. In fact,
the bid documents are an important for the implementing agencies that need guidance and
important details to do their work. The documents lay out the expectations and the
requirements for the bidders. The study also found that the relationship between political
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stability and the borrower overall performance is mediated by the bid documents detailing the
PPP stages and openness to clarifications of questions.
Also important is the finding that negotiation with selected bidders and the fiscal analysis
assessment mediate the relationship between voice and accountability, political stability,
regulatory quality, and achieved objectives. To achieve their objectives, countries will not
only need to have greater voice and accountability, political stability, and regulatory quality,
but more importantly ensure that they negotiate with the selected bidders on important terms
as well as conduct fiscal assessment with regards to the term of the contracts. Standardized
PPP model contracts and the dispute resolution mechanisms mediate the relationship between
political stability and quality at entry. For the World Bank to perform well in quality at entry,
countries will not only need greater political stability, but also ensure that they have
standardized PPP model contracts and dispute resolution mechanisms in place and enforce
them. While greater political stability may lead to high performance in quality at entry, the
performance is higher when standardized PPP model contracts and dispute resolution
mechanisms are enforced. Standardized PPP model contracts and foreign company
participation in the bidding process mediate the relationship between political stability and
Bank performance. When countries take measures to allow the participation of foreign
companies in the PPP bidding process, this increases the overall performance of the Bank.
The foreign company income repatriation mediates the relationship between political stability
and government performance. This means that recipient countries in addition to political
stability need to allow foreign companies to repatriate income generated from their operations
in the recipient countries.
The study also found that the inclusion of assessments in the RFPs and bid documents
and lender step-in rights mediate the relationship between political stability and quality of
supervision. In addition to a stable political situation, there is greater performance in the
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supervisory role when countries include their different assessments in the RFPs and allow the
lenders to intervene in the process when necessary. That is because the documents provide
important information to lenders, which more likely leads to effective decision-making.
Allowing the lenders to intervene may also reduce the risks and threats as lenders contribute
technical and financial assistance.
Overall, the study found that three practices of the PPP preparation are mediators of the
relationships between some variables of country governance and some PPP outcome
variables. The practices are the inclusion of assessments in the RFPs, the fiscal analysis
assessment, and the standardized PPP model contracts. For PPP procurement, the study found
that four practices including bid documents detailing the PPP stages, openness to
clarifications of questions, foreign companies’ participation in PPP bidding, and negotiations
with the selected bidder were mediators of the relationships between country governance and
PPP outcome. Three practices of the PPP contract management including the lender step-in
rights, the foreign company income repatriation, and the dispute resolution mechanisms were
mediators of the relationships between country governance and PPP outcome. The significant
mediation relationships are summarized on Figure 9. Rule of law and control of corruption
have no lines because there were no significant results.
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Figure 9: Significant Mediation Relationships
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Mediation of the relationship between the country governance indicators in blue and chieved objectives via the indicators
negotiations with the selected bidder fiscal affordability assessment, bid documents detailing the stages of the PPP process, and
clarification questions for procurement notice.
Mediation of the relationship between political stability and quality of supervision via the indicators assessments included in the
RFP and lender’s step-in rights.
Mediation of the relationship between political stability and quality at entry via the indicators standardized PPP models and dispute
resolution mechanisms.
Mediation of the relationship between political stability and overall bank performance via the indicators standardized PPP models
and foreign company permission.
Mediation of the relationship between political stability and implementing agency performance via tender documents detailing the
stages of the PPP process.
Mediation of the relationship between political stability and overall borrower performance via bid documents detailing the stages
of the PPP process, and clarification questions for procurement notice.
Mediation of the relationship between government effectiveness and government performance via foreign companies’ permission
to repatriate income.
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To conclude, the answers to the five research questions led to a new framework for
examining the relationships between good governance, PPP governance, and PPP outcome.
The framework is shown on Figure 10. The arrows represent the individual relationships
between the three concepts. The top longer arrow represents the finding that there is a
relationship between good governance and PPP outcome. The short, left arrow represents the
finding that there is a relationship between good governance and PPP governance. The short,
right arrow represents the finding that there is a relationship between PPP governance and
PPP outcome. The bottom arrow represents the finding that PPP governance mediates the
relationship between good governance and PPP outcome.
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Figure 10: Framework for Understanding Public-Private Partnerships
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Concluding Points: Income Level Discussion
Low Income Countries
Low income countries are countries which gross national income per capita is $1,025
or less. To the hypothesis whether country governance had a positive influence on PPP
outcome for low income countries, the study found that the hypothesis was supported. When
these countries enjoy greater political stability, their implementing agencies are more likely
to yield satisfactory performance. This finding is supported by Eberhard and Gratwick (2013)
and Lee et al (2018) who found that political uncertainty and internal conflicts in developing
countries had a negative impact while Chou et al. (2012) and Osei-Kyei and Chan (2017)
found that political stability and the lack of terrorism had a positive impact on PPP outcome.
Today, political stability and lack of terrorism are the major determinants of PPP success.
The World Bank and its donors or investors believe that technical and financial assistance
will be useful only to those countries that can control distracting social, political, and
economic conditions. However, this approach may need deeper examination, and if
necessary, some individual country level analysis. In other words, investing strategically may
help these countries overcome their challenges whereas not investing could mean that these
countries can keep sinking deeper into chaos. Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff (2011) for
example argued that pre-existing institutional and governance shortcomings in developing
countries impaired the ability of the partnership to produce desired outcomes. The study
found that the regulatory quality did not lead to any satisfactory supervision of the World
Bank for low-income country partnerships. In fact, when the quality of the regulations is
enhanced, little supervision from the World Bank may be needed or the supervision level is
reduced.
The practices of PPP governance were not tested because of the small sample size.
For the influence of country governance on PPP governance, the study found that greater
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government effectiveness reduced the performance in contract management. This is contrary
to past studies that found that good bureaucratic efficiency and independence increased PPP
performance (Sabry, 2015; Bota-Avram, 2014).
As far as the influence of the PPP governance on PPP outcome is concerned, the study
found that countries with effective PPP preparation yielded an overall satisfactory
performance. This is understandable as these countries are more likely to avoid risks and
threats at later stages of the process because the preparation stage of PPPs includes risk,
fiscal, economic, financial, environmental, and market assessments (Siemonsma et al., 2012;
El-Sawalhi and Mansour, 2014; Jacob et al., 2014; Kashi, 2015; Soomro and Zhang, 2015;
Opawole and Jagboro, 2017; The World Bank, 2018a; Lee et al, 2018; Osei-Kyei and Chan,
2019). On the other hand, greater PPP contract management had a negative influence on
achieved objectives, quality at entry, Bank overall performance, government performance,
and the borrowing country overall performance. This means that assigning a global score to
the contract management did not provide any useful information on how to improve the
outcome of PPP projects including the objectives as well as the Bank’s and the recipient
countries’ performance. However, the influence was close to being positive. Perhaps a closer
examination of the composition of the rating will lead to a positive influence; thus,
insinuating that more details on contract management rating would improve the PPP outcome
for low income countries. Examining the effects of the practices of PPP contract management
would have provided more detailed information. However, the practices were not tested
because of the small sample size. The study made similar remarks for the influence of the
PPP procurement on the Bank overall performance and the implementing agency
performance.
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Lower-Middle Income Countries
Lower-middle income countries are countries which gross national income per capita
ranges from $1,026 to $4,035. To the hypothesis that country governance had a positive
influence on PPP outcome for the lower-middle income countries, the study found no
significant results. This finding is contrary to past studies which found that good governance
led to better PPP outcomes.
To the hypothesis that country governance had a positive influence on PPP
governance for lower-middle income countries, the study found that government
effectiveness and control of corruption had a large positive influence on PPP preparation. If
the governments of these countries are effective in their policies and their control of
corruption, especially those towards PPPs, the preparation stage is more likely to be
significantly improved. Government effectiveness may improve the preparation of PPPs as
the government will have taken steps and measures for improving the preparation of PPPs.
The same is true for control of corruption as this means that the government will have taken
some measures to reduce or discourage corruption in PPPs. The study found that political
stability had a negative influence on PPP procurement. The procurement stage is more
concerned with transparency and fairness in the process. The requirement for transparency
and fairness are dealt within the agencies and PPP units. Therefore, the decisions may have
less to do with whether a country is politically stable. In other words, seeking political
stability is a far-fetched condition that may compromise the pursuit of transparency and
fairness.
To the hypothesis that PPP governance had a positive influence on PPP outcome for
lower-middle income countries, the study found that PPP preparation had negative influence
on quality at entry. Countries that are already equipped to prepare their PPPs may not need
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further assistance from the Bank. In other words, additional and overlapped requirements
would produce the opposite effect.
Upper-Middle Income Countries
Upper-middle income countries are countries which gross national income per capita
ranges from $4,036 to $12,475. This level includes Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina,
Azerbaijan, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Belarus, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, China, Colombia,
Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Gabon, Georgia, Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan,
Kazakhstan, Lebanon, Macedonia, FYR Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, Montenegro, Panama,
Paraguay, Peru, Romania, Russian Federation, Serbia, Thailand, and Turkey (see Table 11).
To the hypothesis that country governance had a positive influence on PPP outcome
for upper-middle income countries, the study found that greater political stability was largely
indicative of the outcome of PPPs. The study found that countries with greater political
stability had a positive influence on all seven PPP outcome variables including achieved
objectives, quality of supervision, Bank overall performance, performance of the
implementing agency, government performance, quality at entry, and the borrower
government overall performance. Chou et al. (2012) had found that political stability was
important for attracting the private partners for infrastructure projects. Their findings fell
short of discussing outcomes as is done in this study. The study also found that the regulatory
quality had an extensive positive influence on achieved objectives, performance of the
implementing agency, government performance, and the overall performance of the
borrowing country. This finding stood out because it shows that upper-middle income level
countries that have effective regulations not only achieve their objectives, but also improve
the performance of their agencies. Sabry (2015) argued that regulatory quality was indicative
of good performance. This study similarly found that control of corruption had a significant
positive influence on achieved objectives, which means that the ability to control corruption
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leads to more satisfactory results in terms of objectives (Galilea and Medda, 2009). Asongu
(2013) argued that countries engaged in the fight against corruption through institutional
reforms had positive results.
Finally, the study found that voice and accountability had a significant positive
influence on the Bank overall performance. This means that freedom of expression is more
likely to provide useful information to the World Bank in its decision-making, and thus
improving its performance. The study found that for upper-middle income countries,
government effectiveness and rule of law reduced the likelihood of achieving the objectives.
In effect, if those countries per their level of development already have strong institutions and
measures with regards to their policies, seeking to reform those institutions may create
confusion for the agencies, and therefore create the opposite effect. The study found that the
rule of law had a negative influence on the performance both of the recipient countries and
the Bank performance especially with regards to the quality at entry, Bank overall
performance, performance of the implementing agency, government performance and the
borrowing government overall performance. Upper-middle income countries already have
strong legal systems. Seeking to reform these systems may create some overlap and
confusion for implementing agencies. Therefore, the recipient countries and the World Bank
need to carefully examine the intuitional conditions of upper-middle countries when
recommending or requiring certain conditions to be met. In short, the finding implies that
upper-middle countries already operate under acceptable conditions in the decision-making
process.
To the hypothesis that country governance had a positive influence on PPP
governance, the study found that for upper-middle income countries, regulatory quality had a
positive influence on PPP preparation by about 29.07%. That may be because the regulations
provide some guidelines for risk identification, economic assessment, and environmental
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impact assessment; and the government enforces those guidelines. Unlike regulatory quality,
higher scores in the rule of law reduce the score in PPP preparation.
To the hypothesis that PPP governance had a positive influence on PPP outcome for
upper-middle income countries, the study found that PPP procurement had a positive
influence on achieved objectives. Fairness, transparency, and competition in the PPP process
increase the likelihood of satisfactory results as the bidder emerged from the process and is
awarded the contract. The study also found that upper-middle income countries were more
likely to increase their implementing agency performance when there were fairness,
transparency, and competition. However, when those countries increase their contract
management, they could not expect any change in the performance of their implementing
agencies.
Low, Lower-Middle, and Upper-Middle Income Countries
The study then combined the three previous levels and left out the high income
countries. To the hypothesis that country governance will have a positive influence on PPP
outcome for all levels except high level income countries, the study found that political
stability had a positive influence on achieved objectives, quality at entry, quality of
supervision, Bank overall performance, the performance of the implementing agency, and the
overall performance of the borrowing country. This finding was also supported for lowermiddle income countries and upper-middle income countries when they were analyzed
individually. The negative influence of voice and accountability on achieved objectives is
also confirmed for the three levels of income combined. The study found no significant
results that country governance will have a positive influence on PPP governance. To the
hypothesis that PPP governance will have positive influence on PPP outcome, it found that
contract management had a significant negative influence on achieved objectives. In short,
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the combination of the three levels does not provide detailed findings of the relationships
between country governance, PPP governance, and PPP outcomes.
Sub-Saharan African Countries
The study particularly examined a total of 32 sub-Saharan African countries and
found that the hypothesis that country governance had a positive influence on PPP outcome
for Sub-Saharan African countries was supported. Ensuring political stability was important
for Sub-Saharan African countries to improve their overall and implementing agency
performance as well as the Bank overall performance. “Voice and accountability” was also
important for them to increase their global scores in PPP procurement. Seeking greater
political stability for improving PPP procurement was more likely to produce the opposite
effect. The hypothesis that PPP governance had a positive influence on PPP outcome yielded
no results.
Beyond the Study: Implications for Coronavirus 2019-Covid-19
With the Covid-19 increasingly affecting the economies of countries, PPPs are
experiencing delays in construction schedules and funding sources and disruptions of the
operations of PPPs underway. The transportation PPPs are struggling to generate revenues
(Baxter, 2020). As a result, the World Bank held sessions with governments to discuss
solutions to distressed PPPs by emphasizing attention to best practices, good governance,
transparency, and fiscal sustainability (Fakhoury, 2020). Countries needs to enhance their
performance in the best practices of PPPs as well as in the good governance factors discussed
in this study. In these unprecedented times, some practices of PPP governance such as
negotiations and lender step-in rights will have to be used to cope with the financial losses
resulting from the Covid-19. As Fakhoury (2020) explained, the World Bank is aware of the
disruptions created by the pandemic and is playing its role of financial advice, technical
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assistance, and expertise. Koala (2020) suggested that governments and the private partners
engage in public-private stewardship to tackle the consequences of Covid-19.
The Covid-19 has also forced many employees to work from home. In other words,
telecommuting though existing before the covid-19 now appears as the most copying strategy
to the Covid-19. As such, it casts doubt on the future of physical transportation infrastructure
facilities for connecting work and home. If the health of people continues to be threatened by
the pandemic which is contracted by human contact, more industries and individuals will find
it more beneficial and reliable to adopt telecommuting for the tasks that employees could
perform from home. In countries with high internet speed, telecommuting can be the best
alternative, especially in the short term. However, in developing countries where the formal
economic market is smaller than the informal market, and where most industries and
individuals could not access high speed internet, telecommuting may not be an effective
solution. Those countries will face the dual task of concomitantly developing their
transportation infrastructure and promoting access to high speed internet connection.
Recommendations
Political stability and the lack of terrorism and ethnic divisions appeared as the indicator
that is the most conducive to better performance both when countries are considered globally
and when they are considered by income level or geographically. Unstable political
conditions with frequent attacks and arbitrary use of power on operations disturbed the fair,
just, and transparent process as well as the implementation of the projects. Political instability
leads to unexpected changes of courses of actions, personnel, contractors as well as poor and
negligent execution of projects.
The internationally recognized practices must be considered by the World Bank and
recipient countries in two perspectives. First, they must be considered by how they are
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influenced by good governance indicators, and second by how they influence PPP outcomes.
The practices should not be prescribed and isolated. The study recommends studying their
relationship with good governance and PPP outcome in order to establish some coherence in
the good governance-PPP governance-and PPP outcome chain. By doing so, recipient
countries and the World Bank establish well-known and reliable paths towards effectiveness
and efficiency in PPP projects. This study has explored, identified, and established those
paths.
The World Bank and recipient countries should understand that practices such as bid
documents detailing the PPP stages and openness to clarification of questions mediate the
relationship between voice and accountability and achieved objectives; between political
stability and achieved objectives; between regulatory quality and achieved objectives; and
between government effectiveness and achieved objectives. Bid documents detailing the PPP
stages and openness to clarification of questions mediate the relationship between political
stability and the borrower overall performance. The negotiation with selected bidders and the
fiscal analysis assessment mediate the relationship between voice and accountability and
achieved objectives; between political stability and achieved objectives; and between
regulatory quality and achieved objectives. The permission of foreign company to repatriate
income mediates the relationship between political stability and government performance.
The standardized PPP model contracts and the dispute resolution mechanisms mediate the
relationship between political stability and quality at entry. The standardized PPP model
contracts and foreign company participation in the bidding process mediate the relationship
between political stability and Bank performance. The inclusion of assessments in the RFPs,
bid documents detailing the PPP stages, and lender step-in rights mediate the relationship
between political stability and quality of supervision.
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On the influence of good governance on the practices of PPP process, some practices
need special consideration. Government effectiveness will increase the likelihood of practices
such as the consistency between the PPP’s prioritization and public investment prioritization,
the 60-day minimum period to submit bids, the publication of the public procurement notice
of the PPPs, and the dispute resolution mechanisms. The rule of law will increase the
likelihood that the publication of the public procurement notice will occur and that the
dispute resolution mechanisms are enforced. Greater voice and accountability will increase
the likelihood that the dispute resolution mechanisms are in place whereas the opposite is true
for the assessment of the RFPs. Countries with greater political stability and rule of law
enforce practices such as the permission of foreign companies to repatriate income whereas
the opposite is true with voice and accountability and control of corruption. Political stability
reduced the likelihood that there will be consistency between the PPP’s prioritization and
public investment prioritization, the dispute resolution mechanisms, and the publication of
award notice. Countries with greater political stability do not meet the 60-day minimum
period to submit bids, do not publish the public procurement notice, and do not conduct the
environmental impact assessment. Countries with greater regulatory quality do not enforce
the dispute resolution mechanisms and do not complete monitoring and evaluation.
Some consideration is also needed on the influence of PPP practices on PPP outcome.
The standardized PPP model contracts, fiscal affordability assessment, bid documents
detailing the stages of the process, clarification of questions, negotiations with the selected
bidder before contract signing increase the likelihood of achieving the objectives whereas
holding pre-bid conference and the publication of the public procurement notice of the PPP
do not. The standardized PPP model contracts, consistency between PPP prioritization and
public investment prioritization, participation of foreign companies in bidding increase the
Bank overall performance whereas the publication of award notice and the qualifications of
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evaluation committee members do not. The standardized PPP model contracts increase
quality at entry whereas risk identification reduces it. Consistency between PPP
prioritization, public investment prioritization, bid documents detailing the procurement
stages, and openness to clarifications increase the likelihood of greater performance of the
implementing agencies whereas the publication of the public procurement notice of the PPPs
and of the award notice reduce its likelihood. Bid documents detailing the procurement stages
and openness to clarifications increase the overall performance of recipient countries. The
environment impact assessment increases the government performance whereas risk
identification and the public procurement notice of the PPP do not. Assessment of the request
for proposals increases the quality supervision whereas holding a pre-bid conference and the
publication of award notice do not.
The study shows that using a global score at the stage level of PPPs is not indicative
of the practices needed by countries to improve their performance. The World Bank and
member countries must focus on the internationally recognized practices to make
recommendations to recipient countries. The study also shows that depending on the income
level (lower, lower-middle, upper-middle, and high), the governance conditions are different
and so should the solutions proposed to improve their performance in PPPs be. Not all
solutions are relevant for improving the performance at all the income levels. Not all good
governance indicators contribute to better PPP outcomes for all countries.
In terms of the influence of good governance on PPP outcomes, the study makes specific
recommendations based on income level. For example, maintaining political stability is
important for low income, upper-middle income, and sub-Saharan African groups whereas no
significant results could be found for the lower-middle income group. For upper-middle
income countries, regulatory quality, control of corruption, and voice and accountability are
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important indicators of satisfactory outcome whereas government effectiveness and rule of
law lead to negative results.
Contribution
To Practice
The study presented important information that is relevant to the community of
practitioners especially for the World Bank, its donors, and the recipient countries and their
implementing agencies. The study explored four important relationships based on the major
concepts of good governance, PPP governance and PPP outcomes and discussed the results.
First, the influence of country governance on PPP outcome was explored. The results showed
that focusing on good governance indicators such as political stability could contribute to
higher satisfactory performance.
Second, the influence of country governance on PPP governance was explored to
understand whether countries with good governance scores could improve their preparation,
procurement, and management score. The study found that when scores are assigned at the
stage level of the PPP process, no results could be useful. On the other hand, countries with
good governance scores could improve their internationally recognized practices or the
practices of the preparation, procurement, and management stages.
Third, the influence of PPP governance on PPP governance was explored to understand
whether countries with high scores in the main stages and the recognized practices could
improve their PPP outcomes. Assigning scores to the main stages is not useful to countries to
understand areas that need improvement. On the other hand, the internationally recognized
practices influence the outcome of PPP projects.
Fourth, the study established that the internationally recognized practices for PPPs not
only had an influence on PPP outcome, but also mediated the relationship between good
governance indicators and PPP outcome indicators. The mediation means that instead of
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countries focusing on good governance indicators alone to improve their performance, they
could as well do so by improving the practices of the PPP process. In other words, it is less
likely that countries will achieve their PPP objectives if they do not enforce these
internationally recognized practices.
Good governance was traditionally studied to understand its impact on the
macroeconomic development and government programs and policies. There was less focus
on the influence of good governance on arrangements such as PPPs. When good governance
was studied in relation to PPPs, it consisted of examining the influence of good governance
on the level of investments and attracting investors. This study conducted a deeper
examination as it studied the relationship with the outcomes of PPP projects. The World
Bank and the recipient countries must understand that the factors that attract investments may
be different than those that improve outcomes. Furthermore, the focus on income level
showed that the improvements needed by countries to improve their capacity and outcome
depend on conditions that are specific to their income level.
To Theory
First, the study contributes to theory as it suggested the mediation role between good
governance and PPP outcome. According to Ekundayo (2017), good governance mirrors an
efficient public service, an independent judicial system and legal framework to enforce
contracts, and responsible use of public funds. An implication of the need of good
governance theory is that whenever good governance exists in a country, satisfactory results
are expected. This study argued that PPP contracts led to better outcomes because established
standards are enforced, which maximize the results of PPP projects. The influence of good
governance on PPP outcome was too farfetched as the important role of internationally
recognized practices had been omitted.
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Second, the study contributes to theory because it fills the gap and corrects the
mischaracterization of outcomes. Most studies examined the relationship between good
governance and the level of investment or the attraction of investments and insinuated in their
conclusions that the level of investment is an outcome. This study argued that the level of
investment in PPPs could not be considered an outcome resulting from good governance. It is
the performance of the recipient governments and their implementing agencies and the World
Bank with regards to the PPP process that is more indicative of outcomes.
Third, good governance had not been studied in relation to the internationally
recognized practices. Previous studies did not examine the influence of good governance on
the practices of PPPs. In other words, the idea that political stability, accountability, rule of
law, etc. could lead to the enforcement or non-enforcement of those practices was not
explored. This study focused extensively on the practices and the significant results were
presented and discussed earlier.
Fourth, the study conceived the internationally recognized practices under the concept
of PPP governance; referring to how those practices are enforced and whether they are
enforced by countries. In other words, the term “PPP governance” could barely be found in
the literature. The successful enforcement of these practices entails governing units and
committees in place. The governance starts from the preparation to the implementation and
concerned monitoring of progress, changes, integration, and closing of PPP contracts.
Limitations
The sample of100 countries used constitute a smaller sample compared to number of
parameters generated during the analyses. The small size of the sample made it impossible to
enter all variables at once. That is why the practices of the three stages were run separately.
When the analyses were run by income level, the subcategories which had from 10 to 12
variables could not be analyzed. Therefore, even though the study was able to examine the
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subcategories for 100 countries, it could not do the same when they were broken down into
smaller sample from 23 to 35 countries. Another limitation is that for the PPP outcome data,
certain projects for certain countries were not updated. Updated projects would allow not
only the use of current scores but also the use of scores over time. The same issue was
noticed with the internationally recognized practices because data are available for only 135
countries in 2017. The previous years 2015 and 2016 were limited to ten countries and 82
countries respectively, which would further limit the sample of the study if they were to be
considered in the analysis. Despite the limitations, the study remains strong for exploring
multiple and new relationships.
Generalizability
The study used a sample of 100 countries out of possible 200 or more countries or
entities. The sample is a mix of low, middle, and high income countries. That sample is
representative of the population of countries. The measurement validity including convergent
validity and discriminant validity as well as content validity of the exogenous, endogenous,
and control variables were discussed earlier in the dissertation. The measurement validity
showed that there was validity and reliability in the data, hence the argument that external
validity to a greater extent is achieved. However, it could not be stated that countries are
equally represented in terms of their influence on the overall results, hence this study could
not defend the achievement of internal validity. To account for that issue, the study
approached countries based on their income level characterized by the size of the national
gross income per capita, which more likely led to strong internal validity except that the use
of the GNI to classify the country remained debatable. In the income-based analysis, the
results of one level could not be generalized to another.
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Future Studies and Publication
This study explores the multiple possible relationships between good governance, PPP
governance, and PPP outcome. These relationships can be more deeply examined in future
studies. The availability of updated data will make those studies relevant for understanding
the factors that influence the outcomes of PPP projects. The role of PPP governance for
achieving such outcomes should be particularly researched. The findings in this study can
serve as a basis for conducting specific studies based on regions or groups of countries as all
regions and countries are not covered in this study for lack of data. They can also pick and
study the internationally recognized practices by focusing on one or on all three PPP stages.
The main concern in previous studies was the problematic definition of PPP outcome. As
scholars conduct more studies, they need to be specific about whether it is PPP output or
outcome that is being studied. Finally, scholars should aim at fitting the framework provided
with new findings either based on income, geographical, or other considerations.
Future studies can also use the conceptual framework examine PPPs at the miso/
micro level of governments. Local governments also enter PPP contracts for the construction
of infrastructure. For these governments, good governance and good practices are necessary.
Therefore, the framework can be applied to the PPP projects at the local level. The studies at
the local level may be focus on transportation PPPs as well as PPPs in departments where
contracts are frequently used such as the Department of Defense.
The next step is to publish the results of this research in peer-review journals and
eventually put together a book. The results of this research will be presented at conferences
and practitioners’ forums. The hope is that this research will open the door to grant
opportunities for further research for the World Bank and its stakeholders. Furthermore, the
skills developed throughout this process can contribute to the World Bank through
consulting. Considering a career in the general field of public administration and policy,
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pursuing the study of PPPs in relation to good governance and good practices is of special
interest.
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